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 Clark County School District No. 161
Supreme Court Case No. 46354-2018 
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Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, 
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Berrett, Ronald Ryan 
CASE ASSIGNMENT 
CV-2017-328 
Jefferson County District Court 
06/28/2017 
Pickett, Bruce L. 
PARTY INFORMATION 
Clark County School District No. 161 
EVENTS & ORDERS OF THE C0l!RT 
Complaint Filed (Judicial Officer: Stephens, Alan C. ) 
Complaint Filed 
New Case Filed Other Claims (Judicial Officer: Stephens, Alan C. ) 
New Case Filed - Other Claims 
Attorney Retained (Judicial Officer: Stephens, Alan C.) 
Plaintiff: Berrett, Ronald Attorney Retained Jacob S Wessel 
Notice of Appearance (Judicial Officer: Stephens, Alan C. ) 
Notice Of Appearance 
Attorney Retained (Judicial Officer: Stephens, Alan C. ) 
Plaintiff: Berrett, Lanie Attorney Retained Jacob S Wessel 
Notice of Appearance (Judicial Officer: Stephens, Alan C.) 
Notice Of Appearance 
ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Stephens, Alan C. ) 
Case 
Status: 08/02/2018 Closed 
Lead Attorneys 
Wessel, Jacob Scott 
Retained 
208-522-1230(W) 
Wessel, Jacob Scott 
Retained 
208-522- l 230(W) 




Filing: AA- All initial civil case filings in District Court of any type not listed in categories E, 
F and H(l) Paid by: Wessel, Jacob S (attorney for Berrett, Ronald Ryan) Receipt number: 




















JEFFERSON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-2017-328 
0002362 Dated: 5/10/2017 Amount: $221.00 (Check) For: Berrett, Ronald Ryan (plaintiff) 
Summons Issued (Judicial Officer: Stephens, Alan C.) 
Summons Issued 
Affidavit of Service (Judicial Officer: Stephens, Alan C. ) 
Affidavit of Service-D. Lantis served 
Notice (Judicial Officer: Stephens, Alan C.) 
Notice of Non Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Diqualify 
Motion (Judicial Officer: Stephens, Alan C.) 
Motion for Disqualification 
Affidavit (Judicial Officer: Stephens, Alan C.) 
Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion for Disqualificaiton 
Attorney Retained (Judicial Officer: Stephens, Alan C.) 
Defendant: Clark County School District No. 161 Attorney Retained Blake G. Hall 
Notice of Appearance (Judicial Officer: Stephens, Alan C.) 
Notice Of Appearance 
ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Stephens, Alan C. ) 
Filing: I 1 - Initial Appearance by persons other than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: Hall, 
Blake G. (attorney for Clark County School District No. 161) Receipt number: 0002937 
Dated: 6/12/2017 Amount: $136.00 (Check) For: Clark County School District No. 161 
( defendant) 
ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Stephens, Alan C. ) 
Order of Disqualification 
Order (Judicial Officer: Stephens, Alan C.) 
Order of Assignment 
Change Assigned Judge (Judicial Officer: Moeller, Gregory) 
Change Assigned Judge 
Notice (Judicial Officer: Moeller, Gregory) 
Plaintiff's Notice of Intent to Take Default 
Motion (Judicial Officer: Moeller, Gregory ) 
Motion for Disqualification 
ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Moeller, Gregory) 
Defendant's Answer to Complaint 
ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Moeller, Gregory) 
Order of Disqualification 
Order (Judicial Officer: Moeller, Gregory) 
Order of Assignment 
Change Assigned Judge (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.) 
Change Assigned Judge 
Hearing Scheduled (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.) 
Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference 07/12/2017 02:00 PM) 
ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. ) 
Notice Of Hearing- Status Conference 


















JEFFERSON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-2017-328 
Hearing Scheduled (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. ) 
Hearing Scheduled (Motions 08/09/2017 02:00 PM) Motion for partial summary judgment 
Motion (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. ) 
Motion for Change of Venue 
ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. ) 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Change of Venue 
Affidavit (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. ) 
Affidavit of Blake G. Hall in Support of Motion for Change of Venue 
Minute Entry (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. ) 
Minute Entry 
Hearing type: Status Conference 
Hearing date: 7112/2017 
Time: 2:33 pm 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: Kylee Wetherell 
Tape Number: 
Hearing Held (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.) 
Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled on 07/12/2017 02:00 PM: Hearing Held 
Status Conference (2:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.) 
Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled on 07/12/2017 02:00 PM· Hearing Held 
Motion (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.) 
Motion for Change of Venue 
ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. ) 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Change of Venue 
Affidavit (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. ) 
Affidavit of Blake G Hall in support of Motion for Change of Venue 
Hearing Scheduled (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. ) 
Hearing Scheduled (Motions 08/09/2017 02:00 PM) Motion for change of Venue 
Hearing Vacated (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.) 
Hearing result for Motions scheduled on 08/09/2017 02:00 PM: Hearing Vacated Motion for 
change of Venue 
Hearing Vacated (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.) 
Hearing result for Motions scheduled on 08/09/2017 02:00 PM: Hearing Vacated Motion for 
partial summary judgment 
Hearing Scheduled (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.) 
Hearing Scheduled (Motions 09/29/2017 01:30 PM) Motion for Summary Judgment 
ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. ) 
Notice Of Hearing- Motion for Summary Judgment 
Hearing Scheduled (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. ) 
Hearing Scheduled (Pre-Trial Conference 01/29/2018 01:30 PM) 
Hearing Scheduled (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.) 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 02/26/2018 09:00 AM) 




















JEFFERSON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-2017-328 
CANCELED Motion Hearing (2:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.) 
Vacated 
Motion for partial summary judgment Hearing result for Motions scheduled on 08/09/2017 
02:00 PM· Hearing Vacated 
CANCELED Motion Hearing (2:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.) 
Vacated 
Motion for change of Venue Hearing result for Motions scheduled on 08/09/2017 02:00 PM: 
Hearing Vacated 
Notice of Hearing (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.) 
Defendant's Notice of Hearing 
Motion (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. ) 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. ) 
Defendant's memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
Affidavit (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.) 
Affidavit of Blake G. Hall 
Affidavit (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. ) 
Affidavit of David Kress 
Affidavit (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. ) 
Affidavit of Erin Haight-Mortensen 
Affidavit (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.) 
Affidavit of Gayle Woods 
Notice of Hearing (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.) 
Plaintiff's Notice of Hearing 
Motion (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.) 
Plaintiff's Motion/or Partial Summary Judgment 
Affidavit (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.) 
Affidavit of Ronald Ryan Berrett in Support of Motion/or Partial Summary Judgment 
ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. ) 
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion/or Partial Summary Judgment Striking 
Defendant's Fourteenth Affirmative Defense (Rules 12(j) and 56) 
Affidavit (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. ) 
Affidavit of Jacob S. Wessel in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. ) 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
Affidavit (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. ) 
Affidavit in Support of Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion/or Partial Summary 
Judgment 
ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. ) 
Plaintiff's Response to: Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
Affidavit (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.) 
Affidavit of Jacob S. Wessel in Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
Hearing Vacated (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.) 















JEFFERSON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-2017-328 
Hearing result for Motions scheduled on 09/29/2017 01:30 PM: Hearing Vacated Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
Hearing Scheduled (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. ) 
Hearing Scheduled (Motions 10/06/2017 09:00 AM) Motions for Summary Judgment 
ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. ) 
Notice Of Hearing - Motions for Summary Judgment 
Reply (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. ) 
Plaintiff's Reply to Defendant's Response to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
Reply (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.) 
Reply in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
CANCELED Motion Hearing (I :30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.) 
Vacated 
Motion for Summary Judgment Hearing result for Motions scheduled on 09/29/2017 01:30 
PM: Hearing Vacated 
Minute Entry (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.) 
Minute Entry 
Hearing type: Motions 
Hearing date: 10/6/2017 
Time: 8:56 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: Kylee Wetherell 
Tape Number: 
Jacob S. Wessell 
Blake G. Hall 
Mary Fox 
Hearing Held (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. ) 
Hearing result for Motions scheduled on 10/06/2017 09:00 AM: Hearing Held Motions for 
Summary Judgment 
Motion Hearing (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.) 
Motions for Summary Judgment Hearing result for Motions scheduled on 10/06/2017 09:00 
AM· Hearing Held 
Order (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. ) 
Opinion and Order on Parties Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment 
Judgment (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.) 
Judgment of Dismissal 
Status Changed (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. ) 
Case Status changed: Closed pending clerk action 
Civil Disposition Entered (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. ) 
Civil Disposition Entered entered for: Clark County School District No. 161, Defendant; 
Berrett, Lanie, Plaintiff; Berrett, Ronald Ryan, Plaintiff. Filing date: 11/22/2017 
Dismissed With Prejudice 
Party (Berrett, Ronald Ryan) 
Party (Berrett, Lanie) 
Party (Clark County School District No. 161) 
Hearing Scheduled (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.) 
Hearing Scheduled (Motions 01/12/2018 10:00AM) Motion to Reconsider 

















JEFFERSON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-2017-328 
ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. ) 
Response Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider 
Affidavit (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.) 
Affidavit of Blake G Hall 
Miscellaneous (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.) 
Plaintiff's Reply RE:Motion to Reconsider 
Minute Entry (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.) 
Minute Entry 
Hearing type: Motions 
Hearingdate: 1/12/2018 
Time: 10:00am 
Courtroom: Large Courtroom #3 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: Denise Criddle 
Tape Number: 
Party: Clark County School District No. 161, Attorney: Blake Hall 
Party: Lanie Berrett, Attorney: Jacob Wessel 
Party: Ronald Berrett, Attorney: Jacob Wessel 
Minute Entry (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.) 
Minute Entry RE: Motion to Reconsider 
Hearing Held (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.) 
Hearing result/or Motions scheduled on 01/12/201810:00 AM: Hearing Held Motion to 
Reconsider 
Motion Hearing (10:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.) 
Motion to Reconsider Hearing result for Motions scheduled on OJ /1212018 I 0:00 AM: 
Hearing Held 
Hearing Vacated (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. ) 
Hearing result/or Pre-Trial Conference scheduled on 01/29/2018 01:30 PM: Hearing 
Vacated 
Hearing Vacated (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.) 
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 02/26/2018 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 
CANCELED Pre-trial Conference (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.) 
Vacated 
Hearing result/or Pre-Trial Conference scheduled on 01/29/2018 01:30 PM: Hearing 
Vacated 
ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.) 
Memorandum Decision on Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider 
Jury Trial (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.) 
02/27/2018-03/02/2018 
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 02/26/2018 09:00 AM· Hearing Vacated 
Motion (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.) 
Motion for Summary Judgment RE: Federal Claims 
ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. ) 
Memorandum in Support of Motion/or Summary Judgment RE: Federal Claims 
Affidavit (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. ) 
Affidavit of Blake G Hall in Support of Motion/or Summary Judgment RE: Federal Claims 
Hearing Scheduled (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. ) 
















JEFFERSON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-2017-328 
Hearing Scheduled (Motions 05103/2018 01: 30 PM) Motion for Summary Judgment 
Notice of Hearing (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.) 
Notice of Hearing: 05/03/2018@01:30 PM 
ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.) 
Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's 2nd Motion for Summary Judgment 
Affidavit (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.) 
Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition to Defendant's 2nd Motion/or Summary Judgment 
Reply to Memorandum (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. ) 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion/or Summary Judgment RE: Federal Claims 
Minute Entry (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. ) 
Minute Entry 
Hearing type: Motions 
Hearing date: 5/312018 
Time: 10:48 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: Denise Criddle 
Tape Number: 
Party: Clark County School District No. 161, Attorney: Blake Hall 
Party: Lanie Berrett, Attorney: Jacob Wessel 
Party: Ronald Berrett, Attorney: Jacob Wessel 
Hearing Held (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. ) 
Hearing result/or Motions scheduled on 05/03/2018 01:30 PM: Hearing Held Motion/or 
Summary Judgment 
Motion Hearing (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.) 
Motion for Summary Judgment Hearing result for Motions scheduled on 05/03/2018 01: 30 
PM: Hearing Held 
ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. ) 
Memorandum Decision on Defendant's Motion/or Summary Judgment 
Motion (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. ) 
Motion/or Reconsideration RE: Attorney Fees 
ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. ) 
Memorandum in Support of Motion/or Reconsideration RE: Attorney Fees 
Hearing Scheduled (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.) 
Hearing Scheduled (Motions 08/01/2018 02:00 PM) 
Notice of Hearing (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.) 
Notice of Hearing: 08/01/2018@ 02:00 PM 
Miscellaneous (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.) 
Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion to Reconsider 
Reply (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. ) 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion/or Reconsideration RE: Attorney Fees 
Minute Entry (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. ) 
Minute Entry 
Hearing type: Motions 
Hearing date: 8/1/2018 
Time: 1:46pm 
Courtroom: Large Courtroom #3 














JEFFERSON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-2017-328 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: Denise Criddle 
Tape Number: 
Party: Clark County School District No. 161, Attorney: Blake Hall 
Party: Lanie Berrett, Attorney: Jacob Wessel 
Party: Ronald Berrett, Attorney: Jacob Wessel 
Hearing Held (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. ) 
Hearing result/or Motions scheduled on 08/01/2018 02:00 PM: Hearing Held Motion/or 
Reconsideration Re: Attorney Fees 
Motion Hearing (2:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.) 
Motion/or Reconsideration Re: Attorney Fees Hearing result/or Motions scheduled on 
08/01/2018 02:00 PM· Hearing Held 
Order (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. ) 
Order on Defendant's Motion to Reconsider 
Judgment (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.) 
Final Judgment 
Status Changed (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.) 
Case Status changed: Closed 
Notice (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. ) 
Notice of Appeal 
ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. ) 
Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Supreme Court Paid by: Wessel, Jacob S 
( attorney for Berrett, Lanie) Receipt number: 0004520 Dated: 9/ 1212018 Amount: $129. 00 
(Check) For: Berrett, Lanie (plaintiff) and Berrett, Ronald Ryan (plaintiff) 
ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. ) 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The Clerk, Per Page 
Paid by: Jacob Wessel Receipt number: 0004536 Dated: 9/12/2018 Amount: $100.00 (Check) 
Miscellaneous (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.) 
Clerk's Certificate of Appeal 
• Miscellaneous (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.) 
Clerk's Resord and Reporter's Transcript Due Dates Set 
• Reporter's Notice ofTranscript(s) Lodged 
• Transcript Filed 
FINANCIAL INFORMATION 
Defendant Clark County School District No. 16 l 
Total Charges 
Total Payments and Credits 
Balance Due as of 11/2/2018 
Plaintiff Berrett, Lanie 
Total Charges 
Total Payments and Credits 
Balance Due as of 11/2/2018 
Plaintiff Berrett, Ronald Ryan 
Total Charges 
Total Payments and Credits 
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Jacob S. Wessel, ISB 7529 
THOMSEN HOLMAN WHEILER, PLLC 
2635 Channing Way 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Telephone (208) 522-1230 
Fax (208) 522-1277 
wessel@thwlaw.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH ruDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
RONALD RYAN BERRETT AND LANIE ) 
BERRETT, husband and wife, ) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
v. 










COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR 
JURY TRIAL 
Fee Category: A 
Fee: $221.00 
COME NOW plaintiffs Ronald Ryan Berrett and Lanie Berrett, and for cause of action 
against defendant, allege as follows: 
INTRODUCTION 
1. This matter was origirutlly filed in tbe United States District Court for 
tbe District ofldabo in Case 4: 12-cv-00626-EJL-CWD Berrett v. Clark County School District No. 
161 asserting claims under federal law and claims under state law, over which tbat court had 
jurisdiction based upon tbat court's supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 USC § 1367. 
2. On September 30, 2014, tbe United States District Court for tbe District of Idaho 
granted summary judgment to Defendant Clark County School District No. 161 on all claims. 
1 - COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
3. Plaintiffs appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals; the Ninth 
Circuit reversed and remanded as to Plaintiffs' state law claims, but upheld the granting of summary 
judgment as to Plaintiffs' federal claims. A courtesy copy of this decision is attached hereto as 
Exhibit A. 
4. On April 18, 2017, in its Memorandum Decision and Order of Dismissal, the United 
States District Court declined federal jurisdiction and dismissed plaintiffs' federal complaint without 
prejudice pursuant to 28 USC § 1367 ( c) for filing in state court. A courtesy copy of this decision 
is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
5. Plaintiffs timely bring this Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial pursuant to 28 USC 
§ 1367 (d); Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), the period of limitations is tolled for a period of thirty 
(30) days after the federal claims are dismissed in order to provide adequate time to refile in state 
court. 
6. Plaintiffs are residents and citizens of the State of Idaho and are residents of the 
County of Jefferson. 
7. Defendant Clark County School District # 161 is a school district operating in the 
State ofldaho, County of Clark. 
8. Venue is proper in Jefferson County, State of Idaho pursuant to Idaho Code§ 6-
2105(3) and the District Court properly has jurisdiction as the amount in controversy is in excess of 
$10,000.00. 
ALLEGATIONS 
9. Plaintiffs' allegations are contained in the federal Complaint and Demand for Jury 
2 - COMPLAJNT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
/\ 
Trial attached hereto as Exhibit C, and incorporated as if fully set forth herein. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs request this Court: 
1. To assume jurisdiction over each of the causes set forth herein. 
2. To declare Clark's conduct as alleged herein to be in violation of the relevant statutes 
and public policy. 
3. For plaintiffs' lost wages, benefits, and remuneration from the date of termination 
until reinstatement in amounts to be proven at trial; 
4. For reinstatement with full fringe benefits and seniority rights, but if reinstatement 
is not an option as an equitable remedy in lieu of reinstatement, plaintiffs are entitled 
to an award of lost wages, benefits, and remuneration in amounts to be proven at 
trial; 
5. For assessment of a civil fine; 
6. For pre-judgment interest at the highest applicable rate on all amounts found due and 
owing; 
7. For an award of plaintiffs' attorney fees, expert witness fees, and court costs incurred 
in bringing this action; and 
8. For such other and further relief as the court deems just and equitable. 
3 - COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
DATED May 4, 2017. 
TIIOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By: ~ 1 5~  
acob S. Wessel, Esq. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Plaintiff hereby demands trial by jury. 
DATED May 4, 2017. 
TIIOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By: ~ 5., ~ 
Jacob S. Wessel, Esq. 
4 - COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
NOT FOR PUBLICATION 
UNITEDSTATESCOURTOFAPPEALS 
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 






MOLLY C. DWYEB, CLERK 
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 4: 12-cv-00626-EJL-CWD 
v. 
MEMORANDUM* 
CLARK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT 
NO. 161, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Idaho 
Edward J. Lodge, District Judge, Presiding 
Argued and Submitted March 9, 2017 
Seattle, Washington 
Before: GRABER, IKUTA, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges. 
Plaintiffs Ronald Ryan and Lanie Berrett appeal the district court's order 
granting summary judgment in favor of defendant Clark County School District 
(Clark County). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
• This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. 
EXHIBIT 
I A 
The district court erred in granting Clark County's motion for f!nmmary 
judgment on Mr. Berrett's claim for retaliatory discharge under the Idaho 
Protection of Public Employees Act (Idaho Whistleblower Act). Mr. Berrett 
established a prim.a facie case of retaliatory conduct by presenting evidence that: 
he engaged in protected activity by reporting "a violation or suspected violation of 
a law," Idaho Code§ 6-2104(1)(a); he suffered an "adverse action" when he was 
terminated, id. § 6-2103(1); and the "close relation in time" between them, among 
other factors, suggests he may have been fired for reporting the propane issue. 
Curlee v. Kootenai Cty. Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391,397 (2008). This is 
sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact to survive summary judgment 
Id. at 396 (holding that the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework does 
not apply to claims under the Idaho Whistleblower Act at the summary judgment 
stage). 
The district court correctly held that Ms. Berrett did not engage in any 
protected activity and therefore cannot bring a claim under the Idaho 
Whistleblower Act However, the court failed to address Ms. Berrett's common 
law claim for termination in violation of public policy-that is, firing her in 
retaliation for her husband's statutorily protected whistleblower activity--and 
should consider on remand whether this claim also survives summary judgment. 
2 
The district court did not err in granting Clark County's motion for summary 
judgment on the Berretts' claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990 (ADA), because the Berretts failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as 
to whether they were terminated ''because of [Mr. Berrett's] disability." Allen v. 
Pacific Bell, 348 F.3d 1113, 1114 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). The Berretts also 
argue that they were terminated for Mr. Berrett's reasonable accommodation 
requests but failed to produce evidence supporting this theory. 
Nor did the district court err in granting Clark County's motion for 
immmary judgment on the Berretts' claims under the Fair Housing Act. Clark 
County provided evidence that the Berretts were evicted because they were no 
longer employees, and the Berretts do not offer any direct or circumstantial 
evidence that they were evicted because of Mr. Berrett's disability. Nor is there a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Clark County raised the Berretts' rent 
or altered the Berretts' payment policy because of Mr. Berrett's disability. 
Although Clark County asserted that it changed the Berretts' payment policy to 
avoid raising Mr. Berrett's income to the point where he would lose his disability 
benefits, such economic considerations do not constitute discrimination based on 
disability. 
3 
Finally, the district court did not err by declining to rule on evidentiary 
objections that were not ''material to its ruling." Norse v. City of Santa Cruz, 629 
F.3d 966,973 (9th Cir. 2010) (en bane). 
The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal. 
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED. 
4 
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Case 4:12-cv-006~ ,-EJL-CWD Document 50 Filed 04, _ ..,/17 Page 1 of 5 
UNITED STAIBS DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO 
RONALD RY AN BERRETT and 
LANIE BERRETT, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
CLARK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT 
NO: 161, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 4:12-CV-0626-EJL 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Currently pending before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Court to Decline 
Jurisdiction. (Dkt. 46). The parties have filed their responsive briefing and the matter is 
now ripe for the Court's consideration. 
Having fully reviewed the record, the Court finds that the facts and legal arguments 
are adequately presented in the briefs and record. Accordingly, in the interest of avoiding 
further delay, and because the Court conclusively fmds that the decisional process would 
not be significantly aided by oral argument, the Motions shall be decided on the record 
before this Court without oral argument. 
BACKGROUND 
On September 30, 2014, this Court issued a decision dismissing all of Plaintiffs' 
claims. (Dkt. 38.) These included claims brought under the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a), ("ADA"); the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(f), 3613; 
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and Idaho law, including termination in violation of public policy, specifically the Idaho 
Whistleblower Act, I.e. §§ 6-2101-2109. (Dkt. 1.) Plaintiffs alleged that the employment 
practices described in the Complaint occurred in Clark County, Idaho. (Id., 'If 6). 
Plaintiffs appealed the Court's decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. (Dkt. 
41.) On March 17, 2017, the Ninth Circuit issued a decision affirming in part and reversing 
in part the Court's decision. (Dkt. 45.) The Ninth Circuit affmned the Court's decision 
dismissing the federal claims, reversed the Court's decision dismissing the state law claims, 
and remanded the case back to the Court for further proceedings. 
Three days after the case was remanded, Defendant moved to effectively dismiss 
the remaining state law claims. (Dkt. 46.) Defendant argues that the Court should decline 
jurisdiction over the state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1367(c). 
DISCUSSION 
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. The Plaintiffs' Complaint initially 
raised claims based on federal laws over which the Court has original jurisdiction. See 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 ("The district court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising 
under the constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.") The Complaint also raised 
state law claims over which the Court exercised supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1367(a) ("[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the 
district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related 
to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case 
or controversy under Article ill of the United states constitution.") 
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In its original decision dismissing Plaintiffs' state law claims, the Court opted to 
exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims after dismissing the federal 
law claims. (Dkt 38.) However, at this point and after the Ninth Circuit's decision, all of 
Plaintiffs' federal claims have been dismissed and the Court is left to decide whether to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' only remaining claim: wrongful 
discharge in violation of the Idaho Whistleblower Act. 
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1367(c)(3), the Court has discretion to decide whether to 
decline, or exercise, supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. "To 
decline jurisdiction under §1367(c)(3), the district court must first identify the dismissal 
that triggers the exercise of discretion and then explain how declining jurisdiction serves 
the objectives of economy, convenience and fairness to the parties, and comity." Trustees 
of Constr. Indus. & Laborers Health & Welfare Trust v. Desert Valley Landscape & 
Maintenance, Inc., 333 F.3d 923,925 (9th Cir. 2003). 
In this case, after the appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the Court is left to decide the state 
claim exclusively. Thus, the Ninth Circuit remand essentially triggered the Court to 
conduct a 28 U.S.C. §1367(c)(3) analysis to determine whether it should exercise 
jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' state claims exclusively for the purpose of trial. 
The Court finds that the interests of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity 
weigh heavily in favor of dismis.~ing the case without prejudice in order that the case may 
be tried in the Idaho state courts. First and foremost, the state courts are in the best position 
to determine claims, such as those remaining here, that hinge on state policy considerations. 
Second, the state courts are likely in a better position to have this case set for trial before 
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this Court can set the case for trial. Third, nearly two and a half years have passed since 
the Court issued a decision dismissing Plaintiffs' claims. Thus, the parties and the Court 
will have to reacquaint themselves with the facts of this case and prepare for trial essentially 
anew whether this case is tried in state or federal court. 
Plaintiffs raise three basic arguments in favor of the Court retaining jurisdiction over 
these state law claims. First, Plaintiffs are concerned about further delays, especially in 
light of the fact the harm alleged in the complaint occurred almost five years ago. (Dkt. 47, 
p. 3.) Plaintiffs argue that, because of the timing of vacating the jury trial, they are ready 
to try the case as soon as schedules allow and believe they will be able to go to trial sooner 
if the Court retains jurisdiction over the state law claims. Id., p. 4. Second, Plaintiffs argue 
that this Court has already considered Plaintiff state claims and is, therefore familiar with 
them. Id., p. 4. Third, Plaintiffs argue that there are expenses associated with starting over 
in state court, including the costs of filing fees as well as the costs necessary to prepare 
pretrial filings under state law. Id. 
Toe Court has considered Plaintiffs' concerns but is, nevertheless, convinced that 
the state court is in a better position to try these claims for the reasons outlined above. 
Moreover, while the Court is mindful of the Plaintiffs' expressed cost concerns, the 
Defendant expressed a countervailing argument that costs will be reduced if the case is 
tried in Clark County, where the alleged conduct occurred and witnesses are located. Thus, 
the economic factors, on balance, like the convenience and fairness factors, do not sway 
the Court in favor of exercising its jurisdiction over the remaioioe state court claims. 
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ORDER 
In light of the foregoing, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Court 
to Decline Jurisdiction. (Dkt. 46.) Plaintiffs' state law claims are dismissed without 
prejudice. 
~-war .. Lodg .. ·· . . . UmteaSta~ 
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Fax (208) 522-1277 
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs Ronald Ryan and Lanie Berrett 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO 
RONALD RY AN BERRETT and LANIE 






CLARK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT ) 





COMPLAINT AND DEMAND 
FOR JURY TRIAL 
Plaintiffs Ronald Ryan and Lanie Berrett, for cause of action against Clark County School 
District No. 161 (hereinafter "Clark"), state and allege as follows: 
NATURE OF THE ACTION 
1. This is a claim under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 to correct 
unlawful employment practices on the basis of disability and/or age, to vindicate plaintiff's rights 
and the rights of other qualified people with disabilities to fair treatment and equal opportunity, and 
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to make plaintiffs whole. Plaintiff Ronald R. Berrett is a qualified individual with a physical 
impairment, which substantially limits him in one or more major life activities. Clark discriminated 
against Plaintiffs Ronald R. Berrett and Lanie Berrett in the terms and conditions of their 
employment by firing them for Mr. Berrett's disability. 
2. Plaintiffs also allege an action under and Titles I and Vil (Fair Housing Act) of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1968 and 1991 and the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 because Clark 
evicted them from their home following the termination. 
3. Plaintiffs also allege an action under Idaho Code § 6-2101, et seq. and Idaho 
common law because Clark terminated them both for reporting a violation of law to Clark. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
4. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this complaint pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1331. This actionisauthorizedandinstitutedpursuantto Section 107(a)oftheAmericans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990 as amended ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a),pursuantto Section 102 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 198l(a), and pursuant to Title Vil of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1968 as amended in 1988 also known as the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(f), 3613. 
5. The court has jurisdiction over plaintiffs' state law claims set forth in this complaint 
pursuant to its supplemental jurisdiction to hear related state law claims under 28 U .S.C. § 1367( a). 
Both the federal and state law claims alleged herein arose from a common nucleus of operative fact, 
the state action is so related to the federal claim that they form part of the same case or controversy, 
and the actions would ordinarily be expected to be tried in one judicial proceeding. 
6. The employment practices alleged herein were committed in the District of Idaho, 
County of Clark. 
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PARTIES 
7. Plaintiffs are residents and citizens of the State ofldaho and at all times relevant 
hereto were residents of the County of Clark. 
8. Defendant Clark County School District # 161 (hereinafter "Clark") is a school 
district operating in the State ofldaho, County of Clark. 
9 Clark employs and has employedduringtherelevantperiods more than 15 employees 
and was engaged in an industry affecting commerce. At all material times, Clark was and is an 
employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1211 l(S)(A). 
10. Plaintiff Ronald R. Berrett is a qualified individual with a disability for purposes of 
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), in that be has a physical impairment which substantially affects one or more 
major life activities, including, but not limited to, his ability to walk and to use his hands. 
11. Clark leased a dwelling in Clark County, Idaho to Plaintiffs and then evicted 
them for the disability; thus Plaintiffs are aggrieved persons within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 
3613. 
12. Clark regarded and treated plaintiffRonald R. Berrett as a person with an impairment 
that substantially limited one or more major life activities. Plaintiff's ability to perform the essential 
functions of his position with Clark was limited as a result of the attitude of Clark toward his 
impairments. 
13. Despite his disability, at all relevant times plaintiff was able to work and qualified 
for the positions he held with Clark. He was experienced in maintenance work, and with or without 
reasonable accommodation was fully able to perform the essential functions of the positions he held 
with Clark. 
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14. PlaintiffLanieBerrettwasemployedbyClark,agovernmentagency,asalunchroom 
supervisor until Clark terminated her employment on June 30, 2012. 
PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS 
15. Plaintiff Ronald R. Berrett has filed charges of unlawful employment practices with 
the Idaho Human Rights Commission, and with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
("EEOC") raising the issues complained of herein. 
16. Plaintiff received a Notice of Right to Sue from the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission ("EEOC'') authorizing him to commence a civil action. Plaintiff has filed this 
complaint within 90 days from the date he received his notice authorizing him to bring actions. 
CLAIMS OF RELIEF 
(DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION) 
(fITLE I OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT) 
17. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 16 as if 
fully set forth herein. 
18. Plaintiff Ronald Ryan Berrett began working for Clark in July of 2010 and was 
employed by Clark part time as the maintenance supervisor, working in Dubois, Clark County Idaho 
until he was terminated in violation of the ADA on June 30, 2012. 
19. At the time of his hiring, Clark was aware that Plaintiff Ronald Ryan Berrett was 
disabled, thus Clark promised that his duties would include calling contractors and light duties, but 
not strenuous physical duties; Clark promised to accommodate his disability by hiring someone to 
help with the physical duties. 
20. Despite the request by Plaintiff Ronald Ryan Berrett for an accommodation, 
Clark failed to accommodate Plaintiff's disability. 
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21. PlaintifIRonaldRyanBerrettwasqualifiedforhispositionasmaintenancesupervisor 
and was able to perform the essential functions of such positions. 
22. Plaintiff Ronald Ryan Berrett was at all times relevant hereto and is a disabled 
individual within the meaning of the Americans in that he has a disability that affects one or more 
major life activities including, but not limited to his ability to walk and to use his hands and do other 
manual labor. 
23. Plaintiff Lanie Berrett worked for Clark full time as a lunchroom Supervisor 
in Dubois, Clark County Idaho until she was terminated in violation of the ADA on June 30, 2012. 
24. Dated June 27, 2012, Clark's Superintendent at the time, Dave Kerns, sent both 
Plaintiffs Lanie Berrett and Ronald Ryan Berrett letters terminating their employment effective June 
30, 2012. 
25. The reasons Clark stated in the termination letters for the terminations are 
pretext. The true reason and a motivating factor that both Plaintiffs were terminated was because 
of Plaintiff Ronald Ryan Berrett's disability and Clark's unwillingness to accommodate his 
disability. 
26. Clark engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination against plaintiffs on the 
basis of disability in the terms and conditions of plaintiffs' employment and in their termination. 
27. As a result of Clark's intentional acts alleged herein, plaintiffs suffered severe 
emotional distress, mental pain and anguish, embarrassment, loss of dignity and self-esteem, 
humiliation, loss of enjoyment of life, and eviction from their home resulting in damages in such 
amount as may be available under applicable law. 
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28. Clark's acts were done intentionally with an improper, abusive, discriminatory 
motive, and with reckless indifference to plaintiffs' federally protected rights. Such conduct should 
not be tolerated by this society, and punitive damages in the amount of$300,000.00,or as otherwise 
fixed by a jury and available under applicable law, should be awarded to punish Clark and deter such 
conduct in the future. 
29. Plaintiff is entitled to attorney fees, expert witness fees, and costs incurred herein, 
pursuant to one or more of the following: 42 U.S.C. § 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 12205,IdahoCode § 12-
120, and any other applicable federal and/or state statute. 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(HOUSING DISCRIMINATION) 
(TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1968) 
30. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 29 as if 
fully set forth herein. 
31. When Clark terminated Plaintiffs for Plaintiff Ronald Ryan Berrett's disability, 
Plaintiffs were living in housing owned by Clark. 
32. In the termination letters dated June 27, 2012, Clark's superintendent at the 
time, Dave Kerns, also informed Plaintiffs that since they were using District Housing, that they 
must vacate that dwelling by Monday, July 9'", 2012. 
33. Clark evicted Plaintiffs from their home because of Plaintiff Ronald Ryan Berrett's 
disability, making their dwelling unavailable to them on the basis of Mr. Berrett's disability in 
violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f). 
34. Plaintiffs are entitled to all remedies available under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 
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§ 3613. 
35. Plaintiffs are entitled to actual damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c) in an 
amount fixed by a jury. 
36. Clark's acts were done intentionally with an improper, abusive, discriminatory 
motive, and with reckless indifference to plaintiff's federally protected rights. Such conduct should 
not be tolerated by this society, and punitive damages in an amount fixed by a jury and available 
under applicable law, should be awarded to punish Clark and deter such conduct in the future. 
37. Plaintiff's are entitled to an award of costs and attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3613(c). 
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(RETALIATION/WHISTLE-BLOWER) 
(IDAHO CODE§ 6-2101 et seq.) 
38. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 37 as if 
fully set forth herein. 
39. ThisisaclaimunderldahoCode, Title6Chapter21,protectionofPublicEmployees 
(hereinafter "Whistle-blower Act''). 
40. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to its supplemental jurisdiction to hear related 
state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). 
41. Clark is subject to the Whistle-blower Act and meets the definition of an 
employer under the Act pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-2103(4). 
42. Plaintiffs are within the protected class of the Whistle-blower Act because they were 
employees of an Idaho government entity. 
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43. In Janwuy, 2012, as mamtenance supervisor, Plaintiff Ronald Ryan Berrett began 
receiving calls about the strong odor of propane emanating from a propane tank located in an old 
gymnasium owned by Clark. 
44. Plaintiffhad Mike Holden at Sermon Service and Electric come to check on the tank. 
45. Mr.Holden determined that the since July 1, 2011, thetankhadnotbeen safe or legal 
and was not up to the code of the State of Idaho; Mr. Holden gave the Clark a quote to fix the 
problem. 
46. Plaintiff Ronald Ryan Berrett reported the problem and showed the quote to then 
Superintendent Dave Kerns. 
47. Mr. Kerns told Mr. Berrett to keep quiet about the problem because of the cost 
48. Mr. Berrett responded that he could not keep quiet because the situation was unsafe 
and was affected the school children. 
49. Mr. Berrett then reported the problem and gave the quote to the Chairman of the 
District's Board of Trustees, Erin Mortensen; he also wrote a letter to the Board entitled ''Propane 
Issue and Best Way to Remedy Situation." 
50. Nothing was done, and in April, 2012 Mr. Kern wanted to continue to use the 
gymnasium and the propane tank, but Mr. Berrett advised him against it because of the safety risk. 
51. The disagreement between Mr. Kerns and Mr. Berrett regarding the safety of the 
propane tank and the need to fix it continued with no results until May, 2012 when the Board 
terminated Mr. Kerns' employment as superintendent. 
52. Mr. Kerns terminated both Plaintiff Ronald Ryan Berrett and his wife PlaintiffLanie 
Berrett before his termination was effective. 
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53. On June 30, 2012, Clark terminated Plaintiffs' employment The reason which 
Clark gave for plaintiffs' termination was a pretext The true reason and a motivating reason for 
plaintiffs' terminations was thatPlaintiffRonaldRyanBerrettcommunicated to the District, in good 
faith, a violation of a law, rule or regulation which had been adopted under the law of the state of 
Idaho. 
54. Plaintiffs' terminations from employment were a violation of the Whistle-blower 
Act, entitling plaintiff to all remedies under the Act, Idaho Code§ 6-2106. 
55. Plaintiffs' terminations from employment were also a common law action that is 
contrary to the public policy of the State of Idaho. 
56. Plaintiffs are entitled to lost wages, benefits, and remuneration from the date of 
termination until reinstatement in amounts to be proven at trial. 
57. Plaintiffs are entitled to reinstatement with full fringe benefits and seniority rights, 
but if reinstatement is not an option as an equitable remedy in lieu of reinstatement, plaintiffs are 
entitled to an award of lost wages, benefits, and remuneration in amounts to be proven at trial. 
action. 
58. Clark should be assessed a civil fine pursuant to Idaho Code§ 6-2106(6). 
59. Plaintiffs are entitled to prejudgment interest on all amounts found due and owing. 
60. Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs incurred in bringing this 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs request this Court: 
1. To assume jurisdiction over each of the causes set forth herein. 
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2. To declare Clark's conduct as alleged herein to be in violation of the relevant statutes 
and public policy. 
COUNT I (DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION) 
3. For back pay and benefits from the date of termination to date of trial, in an amount 
to be proven at trial; 
4. For front pay and benefits from date of trial in an amount to be proven at trial as an 
equitable remedy in lieu of reinstatement; 
5. For a permanent injunction enjoining Clark, its owners, officers, management 
personnel, employees and all persons in active concert or participation with Clark 
from engaging in any employment practice which discriminates on the basis of 
disability; 
6. For general damages for plaintiffs' emotional distress in an amount to be proven at 
trial; 
7. For punitive damages in an amount to be proven at trial; 
8. For pre-judgment interest at the highest applicable rate upon all amounts found due 
and owing; 
9. For plaintiffs' attorney fees, expert witness fees and court costs incurred in bringing 
this action; and 
I 0. For such other and further relief as the court deems just and equitable. 
COUNT II (FAIR HOUSING ACT) 
11. For Plaintiffs' actual damages in an amount to be proven at trial; 
12. For an award of punitive damages in an amount to be proven at trial; 
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13. For pre-judgment interest at the highest applicable rate on all amounts found due and 
owing; 
14. For plaintiffs' attorney fees, expert witness fees and court costs incurred in bringing 
this action; and 
15. For such other and further relief as the court deems just and equitable. 
COUNT ill (WIDSTLE BLOWER/RETAIJATION) 
16. For plaintiffs' lost wages, benefits, and remuneration from the date of termination 
until reinstatement in amounts to be proven at trial; 
17. For reinstatement with full fringe benefits and seniority rights, but if reinstatement 
is not an option as an equitable remedy in lieu of reinstatement, plaintiffs are entitled 
to an award of lost wages, benefits, and remuneration in amounts to be proven at 
trial; 
18. For assessment of a civil fine; 
19. For pre-judgment interest at the highest applicable rate on all amounts found due and 
owing; 
20. For plaintiffs' attorney fees and court costs incurred in bringing this action; and 
21. For such other and further relief as the court deems just and equitable. 
DATED December 20, 2012. 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By: /s/ 
Jacob S. Wessel, Esq. 
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DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Plaintiff hereby demands trial by jury. 
DATED December 20, 2012. 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By: /s/ 
Jacob S. Wessel, Esq. 
J:\data\JSW\9500\001 Complaint 
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HALL ANGELL & ASSOCIATES, LLP 
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Telephone (208) 522-3003 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
RONALD RY AN BERRETT and LANIE 
BERRETT, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
CLARK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT 
NO. 161, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-17-328 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
COMES NOW Defendant, Clark County School District No. 161, and by and through 
counsel of record, Hall Angell & Associates, LLP, submits the following as an Answer to 
Plaintiffs' Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, dated May 4, 2017, (hereinafter "Complaint"). 
In answering this Complaint, Defendant expressly reserves, in addition to the defenses set 
forth below, all defenses provided for or authorized by Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12 
and all other defenses provided by law. Moreover, Defendant states that its investigation of this 
matter is continuing and as such, certain averments, statements and defenses may change in the 
future in light of additional or newly discovered information. 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - I 
herein. 
ANSWER 
Defendant denies any and all allegations in Plaintiffs' Complaint not expressly admitted 
INTRODUCTION 
I. With regard to paragraph 1, Defendant admits the same. 
2. With regard to paragraph 2, Defendant admits the same. 
3. With regard to paragraph 3, Defendant admits the same. 
4. With regard to paragraph 4, Defendant admits the same. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
5. With regard to paragraph 5, Defendant admits the same. 
6. With regard to paragraph 6, Defendant is without sufficient information to either 
admit or deny the allegations ofthis paragraph, and therefore, denies the same. 
7. With regard to paragraph 7, Defendant admits the same. 
8. With regard to paragraph 8, Defendant is without sufficient information to either 
admit or deny the allegations of this paragraph, and therefore, denies the same. 
ALLEGATIONS 
9. With regard to paragraph 9, Defendant admits that Plaintiffs' allegations are 
contained in their federal Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, but Defendant 
denies Plaintiffs' allegations and further states as follows: 
a. Plaintiffs' first claim for relief contained in their federal Complaint and 
Demand for Jury Trial, ,r,[ 17-29, due to alleged disability discrimination 
was dismissed in federal court, case no. 4:12-cv-00626-EJL and is not a 
claim in this present action. 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 2 
b. Plaintiffs' second claim for relief contained in their federal Complaint and 
Demand for Jury Trial, ,nr 30-37, due to alleged housing discrimination was 
dismissed in federal court, case no. 4:12-cv-00626-EJL and is not a claim in 
this present action. 
c. Plaintiffs' third claim for relief contained in their federal Complaint and 
Demand for Jury Trial, fl 38----60, due to alleged violation ofldaho's 
Whistleblower Act is Plaintiffs' only claim in this present action. 
d. Defendant responds to the allegations contained in Plaintiffs' federal 
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, which are applicable to this present 
action, as set forth in its Answer to Complaint, filed January 30, 2013 in 
federal court, case no. 4:12-cv-00626-EJL, attached hereto as Exhibit A, 
and incorporated as if fully set forth herein. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
1. Plaintiffs' Complaint, and each and every allegation contained therein, fails to state 
a claim against Defendant upon which relief can be granted. 
2. Plaintiffs have failed to comply with requirements of the Idaho Tort Claims Act. 
3. Defendant is entitled to immunity as set forth in the Idaho Tort Claims Act. 
4. Plaintiffs are barred from maintaining this action against Defendant under the 
doctrine of absolute immunity or qualified immunity. 
5. All relevant decisions regarding or affecting Plaintiffs made by Defendant were 
based on legitimate business reasons. 
6. Plaintiffs have failed to exhaust administrative remedies with regard to some or all 
of the claims asserted for which exhaustion is required under applicable law. 
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7. Plaintiffs' damages, if any, are solely attributable to the conduct of Plaintiffs and/or 
were proximately caused in whole or in part by unforeseeable, independent, intervening, 
and/or superseding events and by the unforeseeable, acts and/or omissions of persons or 
entities other than Defendant. 
8. Plaintiffs' claims are precluded by the doctrines of Waiver, Estoppel and/or 
Laches. 
9. Plaintiffs' claims are precluded by the applicable Statutes of Limitation. 
10. Plaintiffs have failed to mitigate damages, if any. 
11. The acts or omissions of Plaintiffs and/or others constitute comparative negligence 
which, pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-801 et seq, or other applicable laws, bars or reduces 
Plaintiffs' recovery, if any, against Defendant. 
12. The actions of Defendant were at all times carried out in good faith. Defendant 
had objectively reasonable belief that all conduct was lawful at all times stated in 
Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
13. Equitable remedies are not appropriate. 
14. Defendant has not engaged in any conduct that would violate or be contrary to 
public policy. 
15. Defendant alleges Plaintiffs did not engage in any activity protected by the Idaho 
Whistleblower Act. 
16. Plaintiffs' Complaint and the averments contained therein fail sufficiently to allege 
the times and places at which certain material events described in the complaint allegedly 
occurred, and such claims therefore are barred and/or subject to dismissal pursuant to Rule 
9 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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17. Plaintiffs' damages, if any, are limited to the extent provided for by Idaho Code§§ 
6-1603, 6-1604 and 6-1606, and/or applicable Idaho law. 
18. The foregoing defenses are applicable, where appropriate, to any and all of 
Plaintiffs' claims for relief. In asserting these defenses, Defendant does not admit the 
burden of proving the allegations or denials contained in the defenses, but, to the contrary, 
assert that by reasons of the denials and/or by reason of relevant statutory and judicial 
authority, the burden of proving the facts relevant to many of the defenses and/or the 
burden of proving the inverse to the allegations contained in many of the defenses is upon 
the Plaintiffs. Defendant does not admit, in asserting any defense, any responsibility or 
liability, but, to the contrary, specifically den any and all allegations of responsibility and 
liability in Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
19. Defendant may have additional defenses to Plaintiffs' Complaint, but cannot at this 
time, state with specificity those defenses. Accordingly, Defendant reserves the right to 
supplement this Answer and add additional defenses as discovery in the case progresses. 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
Defendant has been required to retain counsel to defend this action, and is entitled to 
recover reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in the defense of this action from Plaintiff, 
pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 6-918A, 12-117, 12-120, 12-121, Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure and all other applicable laws allowing for the recovery of costs or attorney fees in this 
action. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays for judgment as follows: 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 5 
I. That Plaintiffs' Complaint be dismissed with prejudice, with Plaintiffs taking 
nothing thereunder; 
2. Defendant be awarded costs and attorney fees necessarily incurred in defending 
this action; 
3. For such other relief as the Court may deem just and proper. 
Dated this __Lk___ day of June, 2017. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following 
this_&_ day of June, 2017, by the method indicated below: 
Jacob S. Wessel 
THOMSEN HOLMAN WHEILER, PLLC 
2635 Channing Way 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Fax:522-1277 
email: wessel@thwlaw.com 
[,X ] Mailing 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[Xl Fax 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 6 
BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ. 
SAM L. ANGELL, ESQ. 
NATHAN R. STARNES, ESQ. 
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, P.A. 
490 Memorial Drive 
P. 0. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630 
Telephone (208) 522-3001 
Fax (208) 523-7254 




Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO 
RONALD RYAN BERRETT and LANIE 
BERRETT, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
CLARK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT 
NO. 161, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 4:12-cv-00626-EJL 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT 
By and through counsel of record, Defendant submits the following as an Answer to 
Plaintiff's Complaint, filed December 21, 2012, (hereinafter "Complaint"). 
In answering this Complaint, Defendant expressly reserves, in addition to the defenses set 
forth below, all defenses provided for or authorized by Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 and all other defenses 
provided by law. Moreover, Defendant states that its investigation of this matter is continuing 
and as such, certain averments, statements and defenses may change in the future in light of 




Defendant denies any and all allegations in Plaintiffs Complaint not expressly admitted 
NATURE OF THE ACTION 
I. With regard to paragraph I, Defendant denies the same. 
2. With regard to paragraph 2, Defendant denies the same. 
3. With regard to paragraph 3, Defendant denies the same. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
4. With regard to paragraph 4, Defendant denies the same. 
5. With regard to paragraph 5, Defendant denies the same. 
6. With regard to paragraph 6, Defendant admits the same. 
PARTIES 
7. With regard to paragraph 7, Defendant is without sufficient information to either 
admit or deny the allegations of this paragraph, and therefore, denies the same. 
8. With regard to paragraph 8, Defendant admits the same. 
9. With regard to paragraph 9, Defendant admits that it employs more than 15 
employees, but denies the remainder ofthis paragraph. 
I 0. With regard to paragraph I 0, Defendant denies the same. 
11. With regard to paragraph 11, Defendant admits that it leased a dwelling in Clark 
County to Plaintiffs, but denies the remainder of this paragraph. 
12. With regard to paragraph 12, Defendant denies the same. 
13. With regard to paragraph 13, Defendant admits that Plaintiff was employed by 
Defendant, but denies the remainder of this paragraph. 
ANSWER-2 
14. With regard to paragraph 14, Defendant admits the same. 
PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS 
15. With regard to paragraph 15, Defendant is without sufficient information to either 
admit or deny the allegations ofthis paragraph, and therefore, denies the same. 
I 6. With regard to paragraph 16, Defendant is without sufficient information to either 
admit or deny the allegations of this paragraph, and therefore, denies the same. 
CLAIMS OF RELIEF 
(DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION) 
(TITLE I OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT) 
17. With regard to paragraph 17, there are no factual allegations in this paragraph, and 
therefore, Defendant denies the same. 
18. With regard to paragraph 18, Defendant admits that Ronald Berrett was employed 
by Clark County and his employment ended on June 30, 2012, but denies the 
remainder of this paragraph. 
19. With regard to paragraph 19, Defendant denies the same. 
20. With regard to paragraph 20, Defendant denies the same. 
21. With regard to paragraph 21, Defendant denies the same. 
22. With regard to paragraph 22, Defendant denies the same. 
23. With regard to paragraph 23, Defendant admits that Lanie Berrett was employed by 
Clark County and terminated on June 30, 2012, but denies the remainder of this 
paragraph. 
24. With regard to paragraph 24, Defendant objects to this paragraph. The letter is the 
best evidence and speaks for itself. 
25. With regard to paragraph 25, Defendant denies the same. 
ANSWER-3 
26. With regard to paragraph 26, Defendant denies the same. 
27. With regard to paragraph 27, Defendant denies the same. 
28. With regard to paragraph 28, Defendant denies the same. 
29. With regard to paragraph 29, Defendant denies the same. 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(HOUSING DISCRIMINATION) 
(TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1968) 
30. With regard to paragraph 30, there are no factual allegations in this paragraph, and 
therefore, Defendant denies the same. 
31. With regard to paragraph 31, Defendant denies the same. 
32. With regard to paragraph 32, Defendant objects to this paragraph. The letter is the 
best evidence and speaks for itself. 
33. With regard to paragraph 33, Defendant denies the same. 
34. With regard to paragraph 34, Defendant denies the same. 
35. With regard to paragraph 35, Defendant denies the same. 
36. With regard to paragraph 36, Defendant denies the same. 
37. With regard to paragraph 37, Defendant denies the same. 
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(RETALIATION/WHISTLE-BLOWER) 
(IDAHO CODE§ 6-2101 et seq.) 
38. With regard to paragraph 38, there are no factual allegations in this paragraph, and 
therefore, Defendant denies the same. 
ANSWER-4 
39. With regard to paragraph 39, there are no factual allegations in this paragraph, and 
therefore, Defendant denies the same. 
40. With regard to paragraph 40, Defendant denies the same. 
41. With regard to paragraph 41, Defendant admits the same. 
42. With regard to paragraph 42, Defendant admits the same. 
43. With regard to paragraph 43, Defendant is without sufficient information to either 
admit or deny the allegations ofthis paragraph, and therefore, denies the same. 
44. With regard to paragraph 44, Defendant is without sufficient information to either 
admit or deny the allegations of this paragraph, and therefore, denies the same. 
45. With regard to paragraph 45, Defendant denies the same. 
46. With regard to paragraph 46, Defendant admits only that Mr. Berrett suggested a 
need to address a propane problem and presented a quote to the District's Board of 
Trustees, Defendant denies remainder of paragraph. 
47. With regard to paragraph 47, Defendant denies the same. 
48. With regard to paragraph 48, Defendant denies the same. 
49. With regard to paragraph 49, Defendant admits only that Mr. Berrett suggested a 
need to address a propane problem and presented a quote to the District's Board of 
Trustees, Defendant denies remainder of paragraph. 
50. With regard to paragraph 50, Defendant denies the same. 
51. With regard to paragraph 51, Defendant denies the same. 
52. With regard to paragraph 52, Defendant admits only that Plaintiffs were terminated 
from their employment with Defendant, and denies the remainder of the paragraph. 
53. With regard to paragraph 53, Defendant denies the same. 
ANSWER-5 
54. With regard to paragraph 54, Defendant denies the same. 
55. With regard to paragraph 55, Defendant denies the same. 
56. With regard to paragraph 56, Defendant denies the same. 
57. With regard to paragraph 57, Defendant denies the same. 
58. With regard to paragraph 58, Defendant denies the same. 
59. With regard to paragraph 59, Defendant denies the same. 
60. With regard to paragraph 60, Defendant denies the same. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
1. Plaintiffs' Complaint, and each and every allegation contained therein, fails to state 
a claim against Defendant upon which relief can be granted. 
2. Plaintiffs have failed to comply with requirements of the Idaho Tort Claims Act. 
3. Defendant is entitled to immunity as set forth in the Idaho Tort Claims Act. 
4. Plaintiffs are barred from maintaining this action against Defendant under the 
doctrine of absolute immunity or qualified immunity. 
5. All relevant decisions regarding or affecting Plaintiffs made by Defendant were 
based on legitimate business reasons. 
6. Plaintiffs have failed to exhaust administrative remedies with regard to some or all 
of the claims asserted for which exhaustion is required under applicable law. 
7. Plaintiffs' damages, if any, are solely attributable to the conduct of Plaintiffs and/or 
were proximately caused in whole or in part by unforeseeable, independent, intervening, 
and/or superseding events and by the unforeseeable, acts and/or omissions of persons or 
entities other than Defendant. 
ANSWER-6 
8. Plaintiffs' claims are precluded by the doctrines of Waiver, Estoppel and/or 
Laches. 
9. Plaintiffs' claims are precluded by the applicable Statutes of Limitation. 
10. Plaintiffs have failed to mitigate damages, if any. 
11. The acts or omissions of Plaintiffs and/or others constitute comparative negligence 
which, pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-801 et seq, or other applicable laws, bars or reduces 
Plaintiffs' recovery, if any, against Defendant. 
12. The actions of Defendant were at all times carried out in good faith. Defendant 
had objectively reasonable belief that all conduct was lawful at all times stated in 
Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
13. Equitable remedies are not appropriate. 
14. Defendant has not engaged in any conduct that would violate or be contrary to 
public policy. 
15. Defendant allege that some or all of the injuries claimed by Plaintiffs pre-existed 
the incident alleged in the Complaint, or were the progression thereof, and were the result 
of medical factors and conditions not proximately caused by any action of Defendant. 
16. Plaintiffs' Complaint and the averments contained therein fail sufficiently to allege 
the times and places at which certain material events described in the complaint allegedly 
occurred, and such claims therefore are barred and/or subject to dismissal pursuant to Rule 
9 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
17. Plaintiffs' damages, if any, are limited to the extent provided for by Idaho Code§§ 
6-1603, 6-1604 and 6-1606, and/or applicable Idaho law. 
18. The foregoing defenses are applicable, where appropriate, to any and all of 
ANSWER-? 
Plaintiffs' claims for relief. In asserting these defenses, Defendant does not admit the 
burden of proving the allegations or denials contained in the defenses, but, to the contrary, 
assert that by reasons of the denials and/or by reason of relevant statutory and judicial 
authority, the burden of proving the facts relevant to many of the defenses and/or the 
burden of proving the inverse to the allegations contained in many of the defenses is upon 
the Plaintiffs. Defendant does not admit, in asserting any defense, any responsibility or 
liability, but, to the contrary, specifically den any and all allegations of responsibility and 
liability in Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
19. Defendant may have additional defenses to Plaintiffs' Complaint, but cannot at this 
time, state with specificity those defenses. Accordingly, Defendant reserves the right to 
supplement this Answer and add additional defenses as discovery in the case progresses. 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
Defendant has been required to retain counsel to defend this action, and is entitled to 
recover reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in the defense of this action from Plaintiff, 
pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 6-918A, 12-117, 12-120, 12-121, Rules 54 and 58 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure and all other applicable laws allowing for the recovery of costs or 
attorney fees in this action. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays for judgment as follows: 
1. That Plaintiffs' Complaint be dismissed with prejudice, with Plaintiffs taking 
nothing thereunder; 
2. Defendant be awarded costs and attorney fees necessarily incurred in defending 
this action; 
ANSWER-8 
3. For such other relief as the Court may deem just and proper. 
Dated this 30th day of January, 2013. 
_IS/ ___________ _ 
BLAKE G. HALL 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following 
this 30th day of January, 2013, by the method indicated below: 
James S. Wessel [ ] Mailing 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES 
2635 Channing Way 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Fax 




[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] ECF 
__ IS.I ____________ _ 
BLAKE G. HALL 
V 
RLED IN CHAMBERS 
llt Idaho Fall, 
JJonnnHJ.eoun,, 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
RONALD RYAN BERRETT AND 
LANIE BERRETT, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
CLARK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT 
NO. 161, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2017-328 
JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: The Plaintiff's claims against the Defendant 
are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
t;;,,"' 
/ 
Dated this~ day of November 2017. 
JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL Page 1 of2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this J!t: day of November 2017 the JUDGMENl- OF DISMISSAL 
was entered and a true and correct copy was served upon the parties listed below by mailing, 
with the correct postage thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered to their courthouse 
boxes. 
Counsel for Plaintiffs: 
Jacob S. Wessel 
THOMSEN HOLMAN WHEILER, PLLC 
2635 Channing Way 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
Fax: 208-522-1277 
Email: wessel@thwlaw.com 
Counsel for Defendant/Respondent: 
Blake G. Hall 
HALL ANGELL & ASSOCIATES, LLP 
1075 S Utah Avenue, Ste. 150 





Clerk of the District Court 
Jefferson County, Idaho 
JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL Page 2 of 2 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
RONALD RYAN BERRETT AND 
LANIE BERRETT, husband and wife, 
Case No. CV-2017-328 
• 
: 
.,.--.•, Plaintiffs, --0 :: .·· 
V. 
CLARK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT 
NO. 161, 
Defendant. 
OPINION AND ORDER ON PARTIES~ \ -;. 
CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY ~ '; .. 
JUDGMENT "· -
This Opinion and Order is in response to the parties' cross-motions for summary 
judgment. 
I. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For purposes of summary judgment, the Court finds the following facts: 
The plaintiffs, Ronald Ryan Berrett and Lanie Berrett ("Ryan" or "Mr. Berrett", and 
"Lanie" or "Ms. Berrett", and collectively as ''the Berretts"), were both employed by the Clark 
County School District (the "School District"). Ryan was employed as the district's maintenance 
supervisor, Lanie as the lunchroom supervisor. During the relevant time period, Erin Haight-
Mortensen ("Ms. Haight-Mortensen") was chairwoman of the Clark County School Board, 
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David Kerns ("Mr. Kerns") was the district superintendent, and Gayle Woods ("Ms. Woods") 
was the district business manager. 
1. Ryan 
As the School District's maintenance supervisor, Ryan's responsibilities included the 
School District's heating and furnace systems. Including the propane tank and corresponding 
system that supplied propane gas to heat the School District's various buildings. In January 2012, 
Ms. Woods began receiving reports that the old gymnasium smelled of propane. She then 
informed Mr. Kerns, and Mr. Kerns informed Ms. Haight-Mortensen there was a leak in the 
propane system. Ms. Woods, Mr. Kerns, and Ms. Haight-Mortensen were all aware that the 
propane system leak was a building code violation. 1 
The task of finding and fixing the leak fell to Ryan. As a result, Ryan began reporting on 
the problem in his monthly letters to the Clark County School Board (''the School Board") in 
February 2012. He wrote, "We do have a propane pressure issue that has been ongoing for 
several years. I have been working with a Sermon technician and think a lot of the problems are 
at the bulk tank. I will bet [sic] the problem resolved. "2 
In March, Ryan provided another update to the School Board. In his letter, he described 
the work he had done over the past month and his diagnosis of the problem. He then concluded, 
"I am waiting for a bid from sermon [sic] to correct this problem, when I receive it I will give it 
to MR. KERNS [sic] and we will go from there. "3 There is a dispute about what happened after 
Ryan received the quote from Sermon Electric, Ryan claims that he showed it to Mr. Kerns and 
was told to "keep quiet." Mr. Kerns disputes that he never instructed Ryan to "keep quiet." 
1 Woods Aff. 3; Kerns Aff. 2; Haight-Mortensen Aff. 3. 
2 Woods Aff. Ex. A. February 2, 2012 letter. 
3 Woods Aff. Ex. A. March 12, 2012 letter. 
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Also in March, the School District received an inspection report. In the report, the School 
District was cited for multiple maintenance violations. Some of the violations cited were repeat 
offenses, for which the School District had been cited in prior inspections. As the maintenance 
supervisor, Ryan was responsible for these violations. 
During the months of February, March, and April, Ryan worked with technicians from 
both Sermon Electric and High Planes Propane and their involvement is mentioned in his 
monthly letters. Over the course of this three month period, both companies visited the school on 
numerous occasions and attempted to identify and the leak in the propane system. The School 
Board approved payment for these service calls. 4 After several months of investigation, it was 
discovered that the propane system contained micro-leaks throughout and plans were made to 
repair it after school let out for the summer. 
In May 2012 the propane leak still remained unfixed. The School Board minutes indicate 
Ryan appeared and told the School Board that ''the propane issues are still a problem."5 Later on, 
near the end of May or first of June, Ryan posted a derogatory message on Facebook. The 
message was critical of the Clark County School District and Administration and violated the 
established policies outlined in the employee manual. The message also appears to have 
contained a cryptic reference to the School District's propane leak. After it was posted, several 
members of the community saw and commented on the message. Ms. Haight-Mortensen was 
among those who saw the message. After viewing the message, Ms. Haight-Mortensen provided 
a copy of it to Mr. Kerns and requested that he speak Ryan about it. 
At Ms. Haight-Mortensen's request, Mr. Kerns approached Ryan about the Facebook 
post and asked that it be removed. When confronted, Ryan became belligerent and called Mr. 
4 Woods Aff. 3. 
5 Woods Aff. Ex. A. 
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Kerns a "fucking asshole."6 Mr. Kerns then explained why the post was inappropriate and 
requested that Ryan remove it, a second time. Ryan agreed to remove it, and did so. 
Mr. Kerns discussed then the Facebook post and his encounter with Ryan at the School 
Board's next meeting. During the meeting it was decided that Mr. Berrett was an at-will 
employee and discharge was the appropriate sanction for his conduct. A termination letter was 
then drafted and delivered to Ryan. The letter, signed by Mr. Kerns, states in relevant part: 
You have been insubordinate and verbally abusive to the District administration 
and have ridiculed personnel through social media on the internet. Your 
performance in some duties has been declining as well with building maintenance 
and keeping lights replaced and in working order. Due to your status as an "at-
will", or non-contractual employee, the District administration has decided to 
terminate your employment effective June 30th, 2012.7 
As per the terms of the letter, Ryan's employment was terminated on June 30, 2012. 
2. Lanie 
As the lunchroom supervisor, Ms. Berrett was responsible for proper management of the 
kitchen. Among other things, this required that she prepare ( and adhere to) an annual budget and 
submit state-required paperwork. However, for at least three consecutive years, Lanie exceeded 
her approved budget. Despite being admonished and informed of hardship placed on the School 
District when she exceeded her budget, she continued to exceed it. In addition to exceeding the 
budget, it was also discovered that Lanie repeatedly failed to submit several forms required by 
the State of Idaho. These were grounds for her termination, as stated in the letter. 
On June 30, 2012, Lanie's employment was terminated. Her termination letter, which 
was signed by Mr. Kerns, states, "You have consistently overspent the Food Service budget each 
year, with the amount increasing each time. You also are not performing satisfactorily in your 
supervisory duties and you have not followed the direction from your own supervisor when 
6 Kerns Aff. 7. 
7 Kerns Aff. Ex. B. 
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called upon to make sure District policies and procedures are followed."8 Lanie's employment 
was terminated per the terms of the letter. 
After they were discharged, the Berretts filed their in the Federal District Court ofldaho. 
The Federal court granted summary judgment in favor of the School District on all claims and 
the Berretts appealed to Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed the Federal District Court's ruling as to the federal law claims, but remanded the 
decision back on to the state law claims. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the 
Berretts had established a prime facie case under the Act and were entitled to a trial. Upon the 
remand, the Federal District Court declined to exercise jurisdiction and dismissed the case 
without prejudice. The Berretts then filed their state law claims in state district court. 
II. 
PLEADINGS 
The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Ryan Berrett claims that his 
employment was terminated because he reported on a leak in the Clark County School District's 
propane system. He claims that this amounted to a retaliatory discharge because he engaged in 
protected activity under the Idaho Whistleblower Act. He further claims his termination violated 
the Idaho Whistleblower Act. 
Lanie Berrett claims that she was terminated in retaliation for her husband's protected 
activity. She claims that public policy entitles her to protection under the Idaho Whistleblower 
Act, as the spouse of a whistleblower. Based on these assertions, she claims that she was 
wrongfully terminated. 
8 Kerns Aff. Ex. D. 
OPINION AND ORDER ON PARTIES' CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 5 of22 
V V 
Both of the Berretts claim the "law of the case" applies to the Ninth Circuit Court 
decision, binding this Court to act in accordance with that decision. They claim that by virtue of 
that decision, they are entitled to survive summary judgment and proceed to trial. 
In opposition to the Berretts' claims, the Defendant claims that summary judgment 
should be granted in its favor. The School District claims that the Ryan is not entitled to 
protection under the Act, his termination was not the result of any protected activity, Lanie's 
termination was unrelated to her husband's activities, and public policy does not protect Ms. 
Berrett from termination. 
III. 
APPLICABLE LAW 
1. Standard of Review - Motion for Summary Judgment 
Summary judgment is proper if, based upon ''the pleadings, depositions, and admissions 
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw."9 In evaluating a party's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, "[The Court] liberally construes all disputed facts" and draws 
"all reasonable inferences and conclusions supported by the record in favor of the party opposing 
the motion."10 Where there is no "issue of material fact, only a question of law remains."11 When 
only a question of law remains, the Court "exercises free review."12 
Additionally, the nonmoving party must provide more than a "mere scintilla of 
evidence," creating a genuine issue of material fact. 13 In other words, "[T]he nonmoving party 
9 Kiebert v. Goss, 144 Idaho 225,227, 159 P.3d 862, 864 (2007); I.R.C.P. 56(c). 
1° Kiebert, 144 Idaho at 227, 159 P.3d at 864. 
II Id. 
i2 Id 
13 Van v. Portneuf Med Ctr., 147 Idaho 552,556 212 P.3d 982,986 (2009). 
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must respond to the summary judgment motion with specific facts showing there is a genuine 
issue for trial."14 
2. Law of the Case 
The law of the case is similar to stare decisis. Like stare dee is is, it seeks to eliminate 
"relitigation of settled issues .... "15 Specifically, the Idaho Court of Appeals has stated: 
[W]here an appellate court states a principle of law in deciding a case, that rule 
becomes the law of the case and is controlling both in the lower court and on 
subsequent appeals as long as the facts are substantially the same. The decision on 
an issue of law made at one stage of a proceedin/ becomes precedent to be 
followed in successive stages of that same litigation. 1 
However, notwithstanding this precedent, established by the Idaho Court of Appeals, state 
district courts are not required to treat Federal district or circuit court decisions or interpretations 
ofldaho law as binding. 17 This applies "even on issues of federal law." 18 Certainly, they may 
treat Federal district and circuit court decisions as persuasive, but they are not required to do 
so.19 
3. The Idaho Whistleblower Act-§ 6-2101 et seq. 
The Idaho Whistleblower Act ("the Act") affords "a legal cause of action for public 
employees who experience adverse action from their employer as a result of reporting waste and 
violations of a law, rule or regulation."20 Protection under the Act is afforded to employees who 
communicate, "in good faith the existence of any waste of public funds, property or manpower, 
14 Id. 
15 Sun Valley Ranches, Inc. v. Prairie Power Co-op., Inc., 124 Idaho 125, 129, 856 P.2d 1292, 1297 (Idaho Ct. App. 
1993). 
16 Id. (quoting Frazier v. Neilsen, 118 Idaho 104, 106, 794 P.2d 1160, 1162 (Idaho Ct. App. 1990)) (internal 
citations omitted). 
11 See State v. McNeely, 162 Idaho 413,413, 398 P.3d 146, 149 {Idaho 2017) (finding error where state district court 
felt compelled to follow a directive or pronouncement of the Ninth Circuit). 
18 Id. (quoting Dan Wiebold Ford, Inc. v. Universal Computer Services, Inc., 142 Idaho 235,240, 127 P.3d 138, 143 
(2005)). 
19 McNeely, 162 Idaho at 413,398 P.3d at 149 (Idaho 2017). 
20 IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 6-2101 (1994). 
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or a violation or suspected violation of a law ... under the law of this state or the United 
States."21 However, a good faith communication must also "be made at a time and in a manner 
which gives the employer a reasonable opportunity to correct the waste or violation."22 
IV. 
ANALYSIS 
These are the issues before the Court on Summary Judgment. (1) Does the "law of the 
case" apply to the Ninth Circuit Court's decision, binding this Court and entitling the Berretts to 
a trial on their claims for relief? (2) Is Ryan Berrett entitled to protection under the Idaho 
Whistleblower Act as outlined by Idaho Code section 6-2101 et seq.? (3) Is Lanie Berrett entitled 
to protection under the Idaho Whistleblower Act, as a matter of public policy, because she is the 
spouse of an asserted whistle blower? Each of these issues will be addressed in turn. 
1. The "law of the case" doctrine does not apply and the Court may make an 
independent evaluation of the facts before it. 
The Court must first decide whether the "law of the case" applies to the Ninth Circuit 
Court's decision, binding this Court and entitling the Berretts to trial on their claims for relief. 
Based on the Court's reasoning and analysis, the "law of the case" does not apply to the Ninth 
Circuit Court's decision and the Court is not bound to follow it. 
As the Court has stated, the Berretts previously filed their claim in the Federal District 
Court for the District of Idaho. In that case, the Berretts asserted both federal and state law 
claims for relief. The School District moved for summary judgment and the Federal District 
Court granted the motion. The Berretts appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals. 
21 IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 6-2104(1) (1994) (emphasis added). 
22 IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 6-2104(1) (1994). 
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The Ninth Circuit Court affirmed the district court's rulings on the Berretts' federal law 
claims but remanded the remaining state law claims back to the Federal District Court. In doing 
so, the Ninth Circuit stated: 
Mr. Berrett established a prima facie case of retaliatory conduct by presenting 
evidence that: he engaged in protected activity by reporting "a violation or 
suspected violation of a law" . . . he suffered an "adverse action" when he was 
terminated . . . and the "close relation in time" between them, among other 
factors, suggests he may have been fired for reporting the propane issue. This is 
sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact to survive summary 
judgment. 23 
Upon remand, the Federal District Court declined to exercise jurisdiction over the case and 
dismissed it without prejudice. The Berretts then filed their claims in state district court. They 
argue the Ninth Circuit's decision is binding upon the Court and entitles them to a trial on the 
merits of their claims. In this assertion, the Berretts specifically rely on the "law of the case" 
doctrine. 
The "law of the case" doctrine is similar to stare decisis. Like stare decisis, it seeks to 
eliminate "re litigation of settled issues .... "24 On the issue, the Idaho Court of Appeals has 
stated: 
[W]here an appellate court states a principle of law in deciding a case, that rule 
becomes the law of the case and is controlling both in the lower court and on 
subsequent appeals as long as the facts are substantially the same. The decision on 
an issue of law made at one stage of a proceedin/ becomes precedent to be 
followed in successive stages of that same litigation.2 
However, notwithstanding the precedent established by the Idaho Court of Appeal, state district 
courts are not required to treat Federal district or circuit court decisions as controlling.26 This rule 
23 Wessel Aff. Ex. A, at 2. 
24 Sun Valley Ranches, Inc., 124 Idaho at 129, 856 P.2d at 1297. 
25 Id (quoting Frazier v. Neilsen, 118 Idaho 104, 106, 794 P.2d 1160, 1162 {Idaho Ct. App. 1990)(intemal citations 
omitted). 
26 McNeely, 162 Idaho at 413,398 P.3d at 149 (finding error where state district court felt compelled to follow a 
directive or pronouncement of the Ninth Circuit). 
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applies "even on issues of federal law." 27 The Court notes that the issues in this case arise under 
state, not federal, law. 
In short, the "law of the case" does not apply here. Certainly, the Court may still treat the 
Federal district and circuit court decisions as persuasive, but it is not required to do so.28 Because 
the Court is not bound by the Ninth Circuit's decision and the issues of the case arise under state 
law, it will look at the facts presently before it and make an independent evaluation and decision. 
2. Ryan Berrett is not entitled to protection under the Idaho Whistleblower Act. 
Next, the Court turns its attention to the second issue before it on summary judgment: Is 
Ryan Berrett entitled to protection under the Idaho Whistleblower Act as outlined by Idaho Code 
section 6-2101 et seq.? Based on the following analysis, the Court concludes he is not. 
The Act affords "a legal cause of action for public employees who experience adverse 
action from their employer as a result of reporting waste and violations of a law, rule or 
regulation."29 Protection under the Act is afforded to any employee that "communicates in good 
faith the existence of any waste of public funds, property or manpower, or a violation or 
suspected violation of a law ... under the law of this state or the United States. "30 Therefore, 
more narrowly stated, the issue is whether Ryan reported a violation or suspected violation of a 
law, entitling him to protection under the Act. 
Ryan claims that he reported a violation of the law because he reported on the School 
District's problem(s) with the propane system. He claims he was discharged in retaliation for 
making these reports. In response to Ryan's claims, the School District argues the discharge was 
not retaliatory and has motioned for summary judgment. In order to survive summary judgment, 
27 McNeely, 162 Idaho at 413,398 P.3d at 149 (quoting Dan Wiebold Ford, Inc. v. Universal Computer Services, 
Inc., 142 Idaho 235, 240, 127 P.3d 138, 143 (2005)). 
28 McNeely, 162 Idaho at 398 P.3d at 149 (Idaho 2017). 
29 IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 6-2101 (1994). 
30 IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 6-2104(1) (1994) (emphasis added). 
OPINION AND ORDER ON PARTIES' CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 10 of22 
V V 
the Berretts carry ''the burden of presenting evidence from which a rational inference of 
retaliatory discharge under the whistleblower act [can] be drawn. "31 In other words, they must 
present "a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge .... "32 
A prima facie case for retaliatory discharge consists of three elements. To survive 
summary judgment the Berretts must establish: (1) Ryan was an employee of the District and 
"engaged or intended to engage in protected activity;" (2) the School District ''took adverse 
action against" him; and (3) there is "a causal connection between the protected activity" and the 
adverse action taken by the District.33 These three elements will be discussed in sequence below. 
a. Ryan Berrett did not engage, or intend to engage, in protected activity. 
It is not disputed that Ryan was an employee of the School District. Therefore, in order to 
satisfy this first element, Ryan only needs to establish that he engaged in, or intended to engage 
in, a protected activity.34 Based on the Court's analysis, Ryan has not established that he engaged 
in a protected activity. 
There is very little precedent that may be used to define the scope of "protected 
activities" contemplated under Idaho law. However, one case, Black v. Idaho State Police, has 
provided some guidance in the form of examples. 35 The Black court stated: 
Examples of protected activity include (1) reporting safety violations that 
potentially violate federal regulations ... (2) documenting a waste of public funds 
and manpower ... and (3) communicating a mayor's potential conflict of interest 
with an employee health plan that could potentially waste public resources. 36 
Of the three examples listed above, the first is most relevant here. Ryan claims the safety 
violation he reported was the leak in the propane system, and that the reports he made became 




35 Black v. Idaho State Police, 155 Idaho 570,573,314 P.3d 625,628 (Idaho 2013). 
36 Id fu.3. 
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the catalyst for his discharge. However, as the following analysis illustrates, the reports Ryan 
made do not fall within the range of "protected activities" contemplated by the Act. 
Ample evidence indicates the propane odor in the old gymnasium was well known 
throughout the School District in January 2012. It was reported to Ms. Woods, the School 
District's business manager, by several staff members.37 In turn, Ms. Woods reported the issue to 
Mr. Kerns, the School District's superintendent.38 Mr. Kerns then reported the issue to the 
School Board's chairwoman, Ms. Haight-Mortensen.39 
As the School District's maintenance supervisor, responsibility fell to Ryan to identify 
the problem and fix it. After becoming aware of the problem, Mr. Berrett made his first report on 
the problem in in February, in his monthly letter to the School Board. Here, the Court again 
points out that the issue had already been reported to the School Board by Mr. Kerns and was 
well known throughout the School District and the Administration. 
In his March letter, Ryan reported on the issue again. This time he described the work he 
had done to identify the problem and fix it. He also informed the School District, "I am waiting 
for a bid from sermon [sic] to correct this problem, when I receive it I will give it to MR. 
KERNS [sic] and we will go from there.',4o Ryan claims he later received the bid from Sermon 
Electric, showed it to Mr. Kerns, and was told to "keep quiet." Mr. Kerns disputes that he ever 
told Ryan to "keep quiet." 
Although this allegation is suspicious, it is of little consequence. Even if Ryan was told to 
"keep quiet," the Court wonders: What was there to keep quiet about? The School Board was 
already aware of the propane leak. Mr. Kerns, himself, informed the School Board's 
37 Woods Aff. 3 
38 Kerns Aff. 2. 
39 Haight-Mortensen Aff. 2. 
40 Woods Aff. Ex. A. March 12, 2012 letter. 
OPINION AND ORDER ON PARTIES' CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 12 of22 
V 
chairwoman, Erin Haight-Mortensen, and Ryan began reporting the problem a month later in his 
letters to the School Board. The School Board was already aware of the problem and already 
knew it was a building code violation, months before this particular conversation between Ryan 
and Mr. Kerns occurred. 
Additionally, there is other evidence that suggests the propane leak was already known to 
the School Board, even before Ryan was allegedly told to "keep quiet" by Mr. Kerns. As early as 
February, a technician from Sermon Electric began making service calls to the school and was 
assisting Ryan in resolving the propane leak. Ryan reported this in his February letter to the 
School Board. Eventually, Ryan also enlisted the aid of High Planes Propane. It is apparent the 
School Board knew of this involvement because "it approved payment for each of the service 
calls.',41 This is important because it evidences that the School Board had separate knowledge of 
the propane problem; apart from Ryan's, Ms. Woods', or Mr. Kerns' reports of the issue. 
It is beyond believable that an employee could be charged with solving a problem ( even a 
building code or safety violation), provide regular progress reports to his employer, discuss the 
viability of proposed solutions with superiors, and then, after being fired, use those same 
activities to substantiate claim of retaliatory discharge. This is especially true when the employee 
was charged with fixing a problem already known to the employer. Certainly, the statute offers 
protection to employees who report "a violation or suspected violation of a law." And it is 
undisputed that the propane leak was a violation of law; however, there was nothing to report for 
purposes of the Act because the School District already knew about the problem and was trying 
to fix it. Therefore, Ryan has failed to establish that these discussed actions constituted protected 
activity. 
41 Woods Aff. 3. 
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The Court now looks to Ryan's other actions to determine whether any of these 
reasonably constituted protected activity. First, Ryan claims he appeared at the May 17 school 
board meeting to testify against Mr. Kerns. 42 The meeting notes shed a different light on his 
participation in that meeting; instead, these merely indicate Ryan reported ''the propane issues 
are still a problem.',43 As with his other reports, this was nothing more than a progress report on 
the problem Ryan had already been tasked with solving. 
Just as before, the Court finds it difficult to conclude this participation in the School 
Board meeting constitutes protected activity, even after drawing reasonable inferences in his 
favor. The School Board already knew of the propane leak, Mr. Kerns had personally informed 
the School Board of the issue approximately four months prior, Ryan had been providing the 
School Board with monthly reports on the issue, and the School Board had approved payments 
for service calls made by Sermon Electric and High Planes Propane long before this meeting 
occurred. Again, the Court is left to ponder, what else was there to report that might have 
constituted a protected activity? 
Finally, the Court addresses the message Ryan posted to Facebook near the end of May 
or beginning of June. The posted was message was critical of the Clark County School District 
and Administration. Although the message may have contained a cryptic reference to the 
propane problem, it more closely resembles an unfettered rant by a disgruntled employee. It 
offers nothing that resembles a good faith report of "a violation or suspected violation of a 
law .... " 44 Therefore, the Court cannot deem it protected activity. 
Because Mr. Berrett has not established that he engaged in any protected activity, 
summary judgment in favor of the School District is appropriate. Nevertheless, for the sake of 
42 Berrett Aff. 5. 
43 Woods Aff. Ex. A. 
44 IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 6-2104(1) (1994) (emphasis added). 
OPINION AND ORDER ON PARTIES' CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 14 of22 
inquiry, the Court continues its analysis of the two remaining elements: (1) adverse action 
against the employee, and (2) a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse 
action. 
b. The District took an adverse action against Ryan Berrett by terminating his 
employment. 
The second element of a retaliatory discharge claim requires the employee to establish 
the employer took an adverse action against them. Based on the following analysis, the Court 
concludes that the Clark County School District took adverse action against Ryan. The evidence 
before the Court is that Mr. Berrett's employment was terminated. This is undisputed. 
After Ryan aired his discontent via social media, Ms. Haight-Mortensen notified Mr. 
Kerns about the post and requested that he speak to Ryan about it. Mr. Kerns approached Ryan 
about the Facebook post and asked that it be removed. Ryan became belligerent and called Mr. 
Kerns a "fucking asshole.',45 Mr. Kerns then explained why the post was inappropriate and 
requested that Ryan remove it, for the second time. Ryan agreed to remove it, and did so. 
Mr. Kerns discussed then the Facebook post and his encounter with Ryan at the School 
Board's next meeting. During the meeting it was decided that Mr. Berrett was an at-will 
employee and discharge was the appropriate sanction for his conduct. A termination letter was 
then drafted and delivered to Ryan. The letter, signed by Mr. Kerns, states in relevant part: 
You have been insubordinate and verbally abusive to the District administration 
and have ridiculed personnel through social media on the internet. Your 
performance in some duties has been declining as well with building maintenance 
and keeping lights replaced and in working order. Due to your status as an "at-
will", or non-contractual employee, the District administration has decided to 
terminate your employment effective June 30th, 2012.46 
45 Kerns Aff. 7. 
46 Kerns Aff. Ex. B. 
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The School District does not dispute that this letter was delivered, nor that Ryan's employment 
was terminated. Because it is undisputed his employment terminated, Ryan has established that 
the School District took adverse action against him. However summary judgment in favor of the 
School District is still appropriate based on the Court's analysis of the other two elements. 
c. There is no causal connection between Ryan Berretts alleged, protected 
activity and the adverse action taken by the District. 
To survive summary judgment on a retaliatory discharge claim, Ryan must also establish 
a causal connection between his alleged, protected activity and the adverse action taken by the 
School District. Because Ryan failed to establish that he engaged in a protected activity, there 
can be no causal connection to the adverse action taken by the District. Nevertheless, the Court 
continues its analysis of the final element for the sake of inquiry. Relevant to this inquiry is the 
"Proximity in time between the protected activity and the adverse employment action ... .',47 
As stated, several the School District's other employees and administrators received 
reports of a propane odor in the gymnasium as early as January 2012. Over a period of several 
months, Ryan worked to resolve the issues and provided regular reports to Mr. Kerns and the 
School Board. Multiple affidavits and their corresponding exhibits support these facts. It was not 
until approximately five months later, after multiple written and verbal reports were provided 
that Ryan's employment was terminated. This is a significant amount of time, and the Court 
concludes that the adverse action taken against Ryan and the alleged protected activity are not 
causally connected. 
Instead, another cause for Ryan's discharge is more likely. As the Court discussed above, 
Ryan posted a derogatory message on Facebook in late May or early June. The posted message 
47 See Curlee, 148 Idaho at 397,224 P.3d at 464 (quoting Heng v. Rotech Med Corp., 688 N.W.2d 389,401, (N.D. 
2004)). 
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was critical of the School District and the Administration and violated the School District's 
established policies. Ryan further compounded this behavior when he was confronted by Mr. 
Kerns. When he was confronted Ryan was belligerent, calling Mr. Kerns a "fucking asshole." As 
a result of this conduct, Ryan was deemed "insubordinate and verbally abusive to the District 
administration and have ridiculed personnel through social media on the internet" and his 
employment was terminated. 48 
In addition to this belligerent conduct, the letter provided another reason for Ryan's 
discharge: he had been doing a poor job in his maintenance duties.49 The evidence before the 
Court supports this. Only a few months before his discharge, the School District's facilities were 
inspected and numerous maintenance violations were discovered. In fact, some of these 
violations had been noted in the previous two or three inspections and still remained 
unresolved. 50 
Based upon the undisputed evidence and drawing reasonable inferences in favor of the 
nonmoving party, Ryan's "termination had nothing to do with the propane issue" or any other 
protected activity. 51 Therefore, the Court concludes there is no causal connection between the 
adverse action taken by the School District (i.e. Ryan's discharge) and any activity Ryan claims. 
Because Ryan has failed to establish that he engaged in any protected activity or that the adverse 
action taken against him was related to such activity was causally related, summary judgment in 
favor of the School District is appropriate. 
3. As a matter of public policy, Lanie Berrett does not qualify for protection under the 
act as the spouse of a whistleblower. 
48 Kerns Aff. Ex. A. 
49 Kens Aff. Ex. A. 
50 Woods Aff. Ex. A. 
51 Haight-Mortensen Aff. 5. 
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As a matter of public policy, Lanie Berrett claims that she qualifies for protection under 
the Act as the spouse of a whistleblower. However, based on the Court's prior analysis, Ryan 
Berrett failed to establish that he was a whistleblower under the Act or was the subject of a 
retaliatory discharge. Because Ryan does not qualify for protected status under the Act, Lanie 
cannot claim it as his spouse either. 
However, even if Ryan had established a prima facie case retaliatory discharge, Lanie 
would still not be entitled to protection for two reasons. First, under established law, spouses of 
employees are unprotected by the Act. Second, her termination is not causally connected to any 
protected activity. 
a. Spouses of Employees are Unprotected 
Spouses of employees who engage in protected activity are not protected under the Act or 
any related Idaho law. The Idaho Whistleblower Act provides a "cause of action for public 
employees who experience adverse action from their employer as a result of reporting waste and 
violations of a law, rule or regulation."52 Lanie Berrett asserts that as a matter of public policy, 
she is entitled to protection. However, the Court cannot adopt this conclusion.\ 
The language of the Act specifically allows relief for "employees." It makes no reference 
to, or allowance, for spouses of employees. 53 The Court is unwilling to read words into the 
statute that were not included by the legislature, nor is the Court willing to extend protection that 
is not expressly provided by the Act. Therefore, the Court cannot conclude that spouses of 
employees engaging in protected activity are entitled to protection under the Act. Because Lanie 
Berrett is not entitled to protection as the spouse of an employee claiming protection under the 
Act, summary judgment in favor of the School District should be granted. 
52 IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 6-2101 (1994) (emphasis added). 
53 See IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 6-2101 (1994). 
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b. Lanie's Termination is not Causally Connected 
Even if Lanie were entitled to protection as the spouse of an employee engaging in 
protected activity, summary judgment is still appropriate because she has not established that her 
termination was causally connected to any ( even the activity asserted by her husband ). As 
discussed above, the Berretts must a establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge to 
survive summary judgment. 54 Such a claim requires three elements: (1) the employee engaged in 
a protected activity, (2) the employer took adverse action against the employee, and (3) the 
adverse action was causally connected to the protected activity. 55 
Lanie does not assert that she engaged in protected activity; rather, she relies on her 
husband's claim that he engaged in protected activity. As the Court previously concluded, Ryan 
did not engage in protected activity. Even ifhe had, the Act does not extend protection to 
spouses of employees engaging in protected activity. 
The second element requires an adverse action against the employee. If the Act made 
allowance for spouses of employees, Lanie could establish this element. Her employement was 
terminated and this is not disputed by the School District. Therefore, adverse action was taken 
against her. 
However, Lanie would not qualify for protection under the Act because her termination is 
not causally connected to any protected activity. In the termination letter, signed by David Kerns, 
and delivered to Lanie, the reasoning for her termination is stated. The letter states, "You have 
consistently overspent the Food Service budget each year, with the amount increasing each time. 
You also are not performing satisfactorily in your supervisory duties and you have not followed 
the direction from your own supervisor when called upon to make sure District policies and 
54 Curlee, 148 Idaho at 397,224 P.3d at 464. 
55 Id 
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procedures are followed. "56 This reasoning for her termination is further supported by the 
affidavits. 
The multiple affidavits submitted to the Court indicate that Ms. Berrett consistently 
overspent the food service budget. Notwithstanding, Lanie continued to exceed her budget. Then, 
after all this, it was discovered that Lanie had failed, repeatedly, to submit paperwork required by 
the State of Idaho. 
These are the offenses cited in her termination letter. They are entirely separate and apart 
from her husband's activities and the propane leak. The termination letter does not mention or 
even allude that her termination is in any way related to her husband or his actions. As a result, 
the Court cannot conclude that the termination of Lanie's employment was in retaliation for any 
protected activity and summary judgment in favor of the School District is appropriate. 
v. 
CONCLUSION 
Therefore, the Court concludes, based on its prior analysis, that it is not bound by the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision on the Berretts' claims and may conduct an independent 
evaluation of the facts before it. Additionally, having conducted an independent evaluation of the 
facts before it, the Court cannot conclude that either of the Berretts' engaged in a protected 
activity or that their terminations are causally connected to any protected activity. Because the 
Berretts have failed to establish these two elements, even drawing reasonable inferences in their 
favor, the Court cannot conclude there is a genuine issue of material fact left to be resolved at 
trial. Lastly, based Court's prior analysis, the School District's Fourteenth Defense should be 
denied. Therefore, summary judgment in favor of the School District is appropriate. 
56 Kerns Aff. Ex.D. 
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Based on the foregoing, the Court orders as follows: 
1- Plaintiffs Partial Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. 
2- Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
,,...J.:-
Dated this /5 day of November 2017. 
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FAX No. P. 001/041 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH RJDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
RONALD RYAN BERRETT AND 
LANIE BERRETT, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
CLARK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT 
N0.161, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CVft2017-0328 
MEMORDANDUM DECISION ON 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER 
This Memorandum Decision is in response to the Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider. 
I. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For purposes of this Motion to Reconsider the Court adopts the following facts, 
acknowledging there were inadvertent facts in the Court's prior opinion at summary judgment: 
Toe plaintiffs, Ronald Ryan Berrett and Lanie Berrett ("Ryan" or "Mr. Berrett", and 
"Lanie" or "Ms. Berrett", and collectively as ''the Berretts"), were both employed by the Clark 
County School District (the "District"). Ryan was employed as the District's maintenance 
supervisor and Lanie as the lunchroom supervisor. During the relevant time period, Erin Haight-
Mortensen (''Ms. Haight-Mortensen'') was chairwoman of the Clark County School Board, 
MEMORDANDUMDECISION ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER Page I of 41 
FEB/14/2018/WED 10:40 AM 
RECEIVED 02/14/2018 09:32AM 
FAX No. P. 002/041 
David Kerns ("Mt. Kerns") was the district superintendent. and Gayle Woods ("Ms. Woods") 
was the district business manager. 
1. Ryan 
As the District's maintenance supervisor, Ryan Berrett maintained and fixed the 
District's furnace system. 1 As discussed below, this also included the propane tank and 
corresponding system that supplied propane gas to the furnaces. In January 2012, Ms. Woods 
began receiving reports that the old gymnasium smelled of propane. 2 Ms, Woods informed Ryan 
of the reported odor. 3 Ms. Woods also informed Mr. Kerns, and Mr. Kerns informed Ms. Haight-
Mortensen. 4 Ms. Woods, Mr, Kerns. and Ms. Haight-Mortensen were all aware that the propane 
system leak was a building code violation.5 
Ryan began working to solve the problem and enlisted the help of Sermon Electric.6 
Ryan also began reporting on the problem in his monthly Ieners to the District's school board 
("the Board").7 In February, he wrote. "We do have a propane pressure issue that has been 
ongoing for several years. I have been working with a Sermon technician and think a lot of the 
problems are at the bulk tank. I will bet [sicJ the problem resolved."8 Although Ryan does not 
mention this letter (or any of the others he sent) in his affidavit, he has not disputed the 
authenticity of the letters provided by the District. 
1 Affidavit of Jacob S. Wessel in Response to Defendant's Morton for Summary Judgment, Ronald Ryan Berrett and 
Lanie Berrett v. Clark County School District No. 161, Jefferson County case no. CV-17-0328 (filed September 15, 
2017) (hereinafter "Wessel Affidavit), at attachment p.311. 
2 Affidavit of Gayle Woods, Ronald Ryan Berrett and Lanie Berrett v. Clark County School District No. 161, 
Jefferson County case no. CV-17-0328 (filed August 31. 2017) (hereinafter ''Woods Affidavit), at p.3 
l Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.311. 
4 Woods Affidavit, at p.3; Affidavit of David Kerns, Ronald Ryan Berrett and Lanie Berrett v. Clark Coumy School 
Distrlct No. 161, Jefferson County case no. CV-17-0328 (filed August 31, 2017) (hereinafter "Kerns Affidavit), at 
p.2. 
5 Woods Affidavit, at p.3; Kerns Affidavit, at p.2; Affidavit of Erin Haight-Mortensen, Ronald Ryan Berrett and 
Lanie Berrett v. Clark County School Disrrict No. 161, Jefferson County case no. CV-17--0328 (filed August 31, 
2017) (hereinafter "Haight-Mortensen Affidavit), at p.3. 
6 Wessel Affidavit, atattachmentp.311-12. 
1 Woods Affidavit, at Ex. A, p.27-29. 
8 Woods Affidavit, at Ex. A. p.27. 
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In March, he provided another update to the Board.9 This time he described the work he 
had done on the propane system over the past month and his diagnosis of the problem. 10 He 
concluded by writing, "I am waiting for a bid from sermon [sic] to correct this problem, when I 
receive it I will give it to MR. KERNS [sic] and we will go from there."11 Later, Ryan received 
the bid and showed it to Mr. Kerns and Ms. Haight-Mortensen. 12 There is a dispute about what 
happened after Ryan received the quote from Sermon Electric and showed it to Mr. Kerns. Ryan 
claims that Mr. Keros told him to "keep quiet:'13 Mr. Kerns disputes that he instructed Ryan to 
''keep quiet."14 
During the months of February, March, and April, Ryan worked with technicians from 
both Sermon Electric and High Planes Propane. 15 Ryan mentioned the involvement of Sermon 
Electric and High Planes Propane in his monthly letters to the school board. 16 Over the course of 
this three month period, both companies visited the school on numerous occasions and attempted 
to help Ryan isolate and repair the leak in the propane system. 17 During this time frame, the 
Board was aware of these visits and approved payment for the service calls.18 After several 
months of work, it was discovered that the propane system contained micro-leaks throughout and 
plans were made to repair it. 19 
9 Woods Affidavit, at Ex. A, p.28. 
10 Woods Affidavit, at Bx. A, p.28. 
11 Woods Affidavit, at Ex. A, p.28. 
11 Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.312-13. 
13 Wessel Affidavit. atattachmentp.313. 
14 Kerns Affidavit, at p.2. 
15 Wessel Affidavit, at attachmentp.311-13. 
16 Woods Affidavit, at Ex. A, p.27-29. 
17 Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.311-13. 
18 Woods Affidavit, at p.3. 
19 Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.312-13; Woods Affidavit, at p.4; Kerns Affidavit, at p.3-4; Haight-Mortensen 
Affidavit, at p.3-4. 
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In May 2012 the propane issue was still unresolved.20 Ryan attended the Board meeting 
to discuss the ongoing propane issue that month.21 The Board minutes indicate Ryan appeared 
and told the School Board that "the propane issues are still a problem."22 Ryan characterizes his 
participation in this meeting, by stating that he "testified against Mr. Kerns .... "23 
In June, Ryan posted a derogatory message on Facebook. 24 The following is an image of 
the message Ryan posted, as included in his affidavit:25 
After it was posted, several members of the community saw and commented on the message.26 
Ms. Haight~Mortensen was among those who it message.27 After viewing the message, Ms. 
Haight-Mortensen provided a copy of it to Mr. Kerns.28 
Mr. Kerns discussed Ryan's Pacebook post Ryan at the Board's next meeting.29 Mr. 
Kerns and Ms. Haight Mortensen were both present and involved in the meeting. 30 During the 
20 Woods Affidavit, at Ex. A, p,34. 
21 Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.314; Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.4. 
22 Woods Affidavit, at Ex. A, p.34. 
23 Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.314. 
14 Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.31S, 323-24. 
25 Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.324. 
26 Haight•Mortensen Affidavit, at p.5, Ex.A. 
27 Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.5. 
28 Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.5. 
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meeting, the District determined that because Mr. Berrett was an at-will employee, termination 
was the appropriate sanction for his conduct,31 A termination letter was then drafted and 
delivered to Ryan.32 The letter, signed by Mr. Kerns, states in relevant part: 
You have been insubordinate and verbally abusive to the District administration 
and have ridiculed personnel through social media on the internet. Your 
performance in some duties has been declining as well with building maintenance 
and keeping lights replaced and in working order, Due to your status as an "at-
will", or nonwcontractual employee, the District administration has decided to 
tetminate your employment effective June 30111, 2012.33 
Accordingly, Ryan's employment was terminated on June 30, 2012.34 Ryan disputes that the 
Board was aware of, or approved, his termination but has not provided any evidence to support 
this conclusion. 
2. Lanie 
Lanie Berrett was the District's lunchroom supervisor from spring 2009 through June 
2012.35 As the lunchroom supervisor, Ms. Berrett was responsible for proper management of the 
kitchen.36 This required that she prepare (and adhere to) an annual budget and submit state-
required paperwork. 37 The District asserts that Lanie failed to remain within her allotted budget 
for at least three consecutive years and submit the state-required paperwork.38 Furthermore, the 
District asserts that Lanie's job performance was unsatisfactory.39 
Her termination letter, which was signed by Mr, Kerns, states, "You have consistently 
overspent the Food Service budget each year, with the amount increasing each time. You also are 
29 Kerns Affidavit, at p.5; Haight~Mortensen Affidavit, at p.5~6 
30 Kerns Affidavit, at p.5; Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.5. 
31 Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.5-6. 
32 Kerns Affidavit. at p.5; Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.5-6. 
Jl Kerns Affidavit, at Ex. B. 
34 Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.315. 
35 Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.329; Woods Affidavit, at p.5; Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.6. 
36 Woods Affidavit, at p.5; Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.6; 
37 Woods Affidavit, at p.5; Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.6; 
38 Woods Affidavit, at p.5: Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.6; 
39 Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.6; 
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not performing satisfactorily in your supervisory duties and you have not followed the direction 
from your own supervisor when called upon to make sure District policies and procedures are 
followed,".w Accordingly, Lanie's employment was terminated,41 Lanie disputes the reasons for 
her termination, 42 Therefore, for purposes of suromary judgment, the Court assumes Lanie 
performed satisfactorily, did not exceed the budget, and submined the state-required paperwork. 
After they were discharged, the Berretts filed an action in the Federal District Court of 
Idaho. The Federal court granted summary judgment in favor of the District on all claims and the 
Berretts appealed to Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed the Federal District Court's ruling as to the federal law claims, but remanded the 
decision back to the Federal District Court on the state law claims. The Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals concluded that the Berretts had established a prime facie case under the Idaho 
Whistleblower Act and were entitled to a trial, Upon the remand, the Federal District Court 
declined to exercise jurisdiction and dismissed the case without prejudice. The Berretts then filed 
their claims in state district court, 
II. 
APPLICABLE LAW 
1. Standard - Motion to Reconsider 
"On a motion for reconsideration, the court must consider any new admissible evidence 
or authority bearing on the correctness of an interlocutory order." 4l However, it is not required 
that the motion "be supported by new evidence or authority." 44 "When deciding [a] motion for 
reconsideration, the district court must apply the same standard of review that the court applied 
40 Kerns Affidavit, at Ex. D. 
41 Wessel Affidavit. at attachment p.330, 
42 Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.329-30. 
43 Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266,276,281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012). 
44 Jd. 
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when deciding the original order that is being reconsidered. "45 Therefore, when deciding a 
motion to reconsider a grant of summary judgment, the Court must apply the summary judgment 
standard. 46 
2. Standard - Summary Judgment 
Summary judgment is proper if, based upon 11:he pleadings, depositions, and admissions 
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."47 In evaluating a 
party's Motion for Summary Judgment, "[The Court] liberally construes all disputed facts" and 
draws "all reasonable inferences and conclusions supported by the record in favor of the party 
opposing the motion. "48 Where there is no "issue of material fact, only a question of law 
remains."49 When only a question of law remains, the Court "exercises free review."50 
Additionally, the nonmoving party must provide more than a ''mere scintilla of 
evidence," creating a genuine issue of material fact.51 In other words, "[T]he nonmoving party 
must respond to the summary judgment motion with specific facts showing there is a genuine 
issue for trial. ,,s2 "Bare assertions that an issue of fact exists, in the face of particular facts 
alleged by the movant, are not sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact. "53 
4S Id. 
46 ld. 
47 Kiebert v. Goss, 144 Idaho 225,227, 159 P.3d 862, 864 (2007); I.R.C.P. 56(c), 
48 Kiebert, 144 Idaho at 227, 159 P.3d at 864. 
49 Id. 
so Id. 
51 Van v. Portne.uf Med, Ctr., 147 Idaho 552,556 212 P.3d 982, 986 (2009). 
si Id, 
:s3 Cates v. Albertson's Inc,, 126 Idaho 1030, 1033, 895 P.2d 1223, 1226 (1994). 
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The law of the case is similar to stare decisis. Like stare decisis, it seeks to eliminate 
''relitigation of settled issues .... "s4 Specifically, the Idaho Court of Appeals has stated: 
[W]here an appellate court states a principle of law in deciding a case, that rule 
becomes the law of the case and is controlling both in the lower court and on 
subsequent appeals as long as the facts are substantially the same. The decision on 
an issue of law made at one stage of a proceed~ becomes precedent to be 
followed in successive stages of that same litigation.s 
However, notwithstanding this precedent, established by the Idaho Court of Appeals, state 
district courts are not required to treat Federal district or circuit court decisions or interpretations 
of Idaho law as binding.56 This applies "even on issues of federal law." 57 Certainly, they may 
treat Federal district and circuit court decisions as persuasive, but they are not required to do 
so,ss 
4, Idaho Whistleblower Act M § 6-2101 et seq. 
The Idaho Whistleblower Act (''the Act'') affords ''a legal cause of action for public 
employees who experience adverse action from their employer as a result of reporting waste and 
violations of a law, rule or regulation."59 Protection under the Act is afforded to employees who 
communicate, "in good faith the existence of any waste of public funds, property or manpower, 
or a violation or suspected violation of a law ... under the law of this state or the United 
54 Sun Valley Ranches, Inc. v. Prairie Power Co-op .. Inc., 124 Idaho 125,129,856 P.2d 1292, 1297 (Idaho Ct. App. 
1993). 
55 Jd. (quoting Frazierv. Neilsen, 118 ldaho 104, 106, 794P.2d l 160, 1162 (Idaho Ct. App. 1990)) (internal 
citations omitted). 
56 See State v. McNeely, 162 Idaho 413,413.398 P.3d 146, 149 (Idaho 2017) (finding error where state district court 
felt compelled to follow a directive or pronouncement of the Ninth Circuit). 
51 Id. (quoting Dan Wiebold Ford, Inc. v. Universal Computer-Services, Inc., 142 Idaho 235,240, 127P.3d 138, 143 
~00.S)}. 
McNeety, 162 Idaho at 413,398 P.3d at 149 (Idaho 2017). 
59 Idaho Code§ 6-2101 (1994). 
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States."60 However, a good faith communication must also "be made at a time and in a manner 
which gives the employer a reasonable opportunity to cocrect the waste or violation. "61 
III. 
ANALYSIS 
These are the issues before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider. (1) Does the 
"law of the case" apply to the Ninth Circuit Court's decision, thereby binding this Court and 
entitling the Berretts' to a trial their claims? (2) Did the Court properly construe the facts in favor 
of the plaintiffs in its decision at summary judgment? (3) Did the Court properly grant summary 
judgment in favor of the Defendant, thereby dismissing Ryan Berren' s whistleblower claim? ( 4) 
Did the Court properly grant summary judgment in favor of the Defendant on Lanie's public 
policy claim? (5) Was summary judgment properly granted on Plaintiffs remaining federal law 
claims? 
1. The Law of the Case 
The law of the case does not apply and the Court may make an independent evaluation of 
the facts and evidence before it (i.e. it is not bound by the prior decision of the Ninth Circuit 
Court's decision). AB stated in the Court's earlier decision, the Berretts previously filed their 
claims in f-ederal court. The District moved for summary judgment and the Federal District Court 
granted summary judgment for the District. This decision was appealed to the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals. 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling on the Berretts' federal 
law claims but remanded the case back on the remaining state law claims. In doing so, the Ninth 
Circuit stated: 
60 Idaho Code§ 6-2104(1) (emphasis added). 
61 Id. 
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Mr. Berrett established a prim.a facie case of retaliatory conduct by presenting 
evidence that: he engaged in protected activity by reporting "a violation or 
suspected violation of a law" . . . he suffered an "adverse action" when he was 
tenninated . . . and the "close relation in time" between them, among other 
factors, suggests he may have been fired for reporting the propane issue. This is 
sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact to survive summary 
judgment. 62 
P. 010/041 
Upon remand the Federal District Court declined jurisdiction because there were no more federal 
law claims and the case was dismissed without prejudice. Subsequently, the Berretts refiled their 
claims in state district court. Toe Defendants then moved for summary judgment. At summary 
judgment the Berretts argued that the Ninth Circuit's decision on appeal constitutes the law of 
the case, entitling them to proceed to trial on the merits of their claims. 
After careful analysis, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants. 
The Berretts have filed a motion requesting the Court reconsider its prior decision. After the 
following analysis, the Court remains convinced that its prior decision, granting summary 
judgment in favor of the Defendants, was proper. 
Like stare decisis, the "law of the case" seeks to eliminate ''relitigation of settled issues .. 
. . ,.63 The Idaho Court of Appeals has stated: 
[W]here an appellate court states a principle of law in deciding a case, that rule 
becomes the law of the case and -is controlling both in the lower court and on 
subsequent appeals as long as the facts are substantially the same. The decision 
on an issue of law made at one stage of a proceeding becomes precedent to be 
followed in successive stages of that same litigation. 64 
In Swanson. v. Swanson, the Idaho Supreme Court described the law of the case as follows: 
[U)pon appeal, the Supreme Court in deciding a case presented states in its 
opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, such pronouncement 
62 Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Ronald Ryan and Lanie Berrett v. Clark Counry School District No. 161, 
Jefferson County case no. CV-17-0328 (filed May 9, 2017) (hereinafter "Complaint''), at Ex. A. 
63 Sun Valley Ranches, Inc., 124 Idaho at 129,856 P.2d at 1297. 
64 Id. (quoting Frazierv. Netlsen, ll8 Idaho 104, 106, 794 P.2d 1160, 1162 (Idaho Ct. App. 1990) (internal citations 
omitted) (emphasis added). 
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becomes the law of the case, and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent 
progress, both in the trial court and upon subsequent appeal ... . 65 
P. 011/041 
The Idaho Supreme Court has pointed out other language in Creem v. Northwestern Mut. Fire 
Ass 'n. of Seattle, Wash. which describes the law of the case doctrine this way: 
Where a judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court 11for a 
new trial," the case comes on for the same, in all respects, as if it had never been 
tried, subject to this condition, however, that it must be tried in light of and in 
consonance with the rules of law as announced by the appellate court in that 
particular case. 66 
This case is substantially different from the one filed in federal court and does not meet 
the standards relied upon by the Idaho Supreme Court in Swanson or Cteem. The original 
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial was filed in the United States District Court for the 
District of Idaho in December 2012 and assigned case number 4:12-CV-0626ftEJL. The Federal 
District Court then granted summary judgment for the Defendants on all claims. Plaintiffs 
appealed the case to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court in part 
but remanded the case back on Ryan's "whistleblower claim" and on Lanie's "public policy 
claim." Upon remand, the Federal District Court granted the Defendant's Motion for the Court to 
Decline Jurisdiction and dismissed Plaintiffs' state law claims without prejudice. 67 
Plaintiffs' then filed their claims anew, incorporating their same federal Complaint and 
Demand for Jury Trial when they filed their case in Jefferson County. This new case was filed in 
a separate jurisdiction from Plaintiffs' earlier case, and was assigned a new case number 
(Jefferson County case no. CV-2017-0328). Although Plaintiffs assert that the case filed in 
Jefferson County is the same case, it is not. As quoted above, the Idaho Supreme Court has 
65 134 ldaho 512,515, 5 P.3d 973,976 (2000) (quotingSuitts v. FtmSec. Bank of Idaho, 110 Idaho 15, 21,713 P.2d 
1374, 1380 (1985)). 
66 Creem v. Northwestern Mut. Fire Ass'n of Seattle. Wash., 58 Idaho 349, _, 74 P.2d 702, 703 (1937). 
G7 Complaint, at Ex. B. 
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previously announced that the law of the case only applies ''in that particular case. 1168 Based on 
the Court's reasoning and analysis the two cases are different and separate. Therefore, the law of 
the case does not apply. 
Despite Plaintiffs' arguments to the contrary, there are additional reasons why the 
law of the case does not apply. First, state district courts are not required to treat federal district 
. or federal circuit court decisions or interpretations of Idaho law as binding, 69 Second, the facts in 
the case before the Court are not the same as those in the federal case. 
As stated, state district courts are not required to treat federal district or federal circuit 
court decisions or interpretations of Idaho law as binding. 70 This even applies to "issues of 
federal law.;' 71 Certainly, Idaho courts may treat Federal district and circuit court decisions as 
persuasive, but they are not required to do so.72 
In its Order and Opinion on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment the Court relied on 
this holding as announced by State v. McNeely, 162 Idaho 413, 398 P.3d 146 (2017). In 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider, Plaintiffs attacked the Court's reliance on McNeely by arguing 
that the question before this Court, in this case, is entirely different from the question presented 
in McNeely (i.e. "must this Court follow decisions by the Ninth Circuit in this exact case"},73 
The fatal flaw in Plaintiffs argument is, as reasoned above, the case now pending is not the exact 
case that was before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Even if this were the exacr same case, 
the Court still believes the holding in McNeely is relevant and dispositive. 
611 Creem v. Northwestern Mut. Fire Ass'n of Seattle, Wash., 58 Idaho 349, _, 74 P.2d 702, 703 (1937). 
69 See State v. McNeely. I 62 Idaho at_, 398 P.3d at 149 (finding error where state district court felt compelled to 
follow a directive or pronouncement of the Ninth Circuit). 
70 Id. 
11 Id. (quoting Dan Wiebold Ford, Inc. v. Universal Computer Services, Inc., 142 Idaho 235. 240, 127 P.3d 138, 143 
(2005)), 
72 McNeely, 162 Idaho at_, 398 P.3d at 149 (Idaho 2017). 
7
' Motion t.o ReconSider, Ronald Ryan Be,rett and Lanie Berrett v. Clark County School District No. 161, Jefferson 
County case no. CV-17-0328 (filed November 28, 2017) (Hereinafter ''Motion"), at p.4. 
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Notwithstanding, the Court wishes to supplements it prior reasoning and analysis by 
relying on the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in English v. Taylor, 160 Idaho 737,742,378 
P.3d 1036, 1041 (2016). In English, the plaintiffs filed their complaint in the Bonneville County 
district court.74 The case was then removed to federal court based diversity of citizenship.75 
Later, the Englishes "filed a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint ... " on 
December 10, 2013, and sought to add two new defendants, Eastern Idaho Regional Medical 
Center and Dr. James Taylor.76 The Englishes did not serve copies of their motion or the second 
amended complaint on either of the new defendants at that time. 77 The motion was granted and 
the Second Amended Complaint was filed on January 16, 2014. 78 "[T]he filing of the Second 
Amended Complaint destroyed diversity and deprived the federal district court of subject matter 
jurisdiction," 79 After the Englishes filed their Second Amended Complaint in federal court, the 
parties stipulated to remand the case back to state district court. 80 
On January 24, 2014, after the case was remanded back to the state district court, the 
plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint in the Bonneville County district court, and 
served the two new defendants. 81 
On March 4, 2014, the Englishes filed an ex parte Rule 60 Motion to Clarify 
Docket entry order with the federal district court, seeking clarification that the 
order granting their motion to file the second amended complaint related back to 
the date on which the Englishes filed their motion for leave to file the Second 
Amended Complaint. The motion stated that the purpose would be to clarify "that 
the Complaint was filed on December 10, 2013, instead of some other date.''
82 
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The federal district court entered a clarifying order on the Englishes motion to amend, stating, 
uThe Court hereby clarifies that Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint was effectively filed on 
December 10, 2013 .... "83 
Subsequently, the new defendants filed motions for "summary judgment on grounds that 
the statute of limitations had expired" and the district court granted the motions, concluding "the 
Englishes did not commence the actions against Respondents until after the statute of limitations 
had expired." 84 The Englishes appealed. On appeal before the Idaho Supreme Court the 
Englishes argued that the federal district court's clarifying order (i.e. the second amended 
complaint was effectively filed December 10, 2013) was dispositive. The Idaho Supreme Court 
noted that this argument had waived on appeal but addressed the claim anyways by stating, 
''Even if the Englishes had not waived the argument, it is well established that 'the decisions of 
lower federal courts are not binding on state courts, even on issues of federal law.' Therefore, the 
federal district court's order of clarification is not binding on this Court."8s 
As stated, the Court also recognizes that the facts in the federal case and the state case are 
not substantially the same. Although Plaintiffs' filed the exact same affidavits that were filed in 
federal court, along with copies of the Defendant's affidavits from federal court, the Defendant 
has filed new affidavits. These affidavits offer facts not before the federal district court or the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Specifically, these affidavits state that the District was aware of 
the propane leak in January and recognized it was a building code violation; even though it was 
13 Id. 
84 Id. 
115 Id. (intemal citations omitted). Although it was a decision made by the federal district court and not the Ninth 
Circuit that was at issue in English, this was not the case in McNeely. At issue in McNeely was a pronouncement by 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Idaho Supreme Court concluded that decisions of the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals may be treated as persuasive but are not binding on Idaho's stat.e courts. McNeely, 162 Idaho at_, 398 
P.3d at 148-49. 
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unable to isolate the cause or source of the leak.136 Therefore, based on the prior reasoning and 
analysis, the Ninth Circuit's decision in the Berrett's former case is not binding on this court, in 
this new case. 
2. Disputed and Undisputed Facts 
Plaintiffs have asserted multiple errors in the Court's findings of fact in its Opinion and 
Order on the Parties' Cross Motion for Summacy Ju~gment. Specifically, Plaintiffs' assert the 
Court failed to recognize facts that support their position and that the Court did not liberally 
construe the facts in the light most favorable to them. Examples of the asserted errors are 
provided below: 
First, Ryan's [sic] was hired as a person on disability. When he was hired, he told 
Kerns that he could not do the physical work required, but that he would call 
professionals to do the work. He was not responsible for the propane, heating and 
furnace system. Due to the smell, he called propane companies to check the 
system. Second, all of the affidavits state that until March, [sic] 2012, no one 
could find a leak in the propane system. No one knew there was a leak in the 
propane system. They only knew of a smell. Third, at the May, [sic] 2012 meeting 
Ryan testified against Kerns along with two propane professionals, and Kerns was 
a [sic] fired as a result. Fourth, Ryan never swore at Kerns and never called him a 
"fucking asshole", [sic] but Kerns used foul language towards Ryan and Lanie on 
multiple occasions. Fifth, Kerns fired the Berretts without the school boal'<Ps 
knowledge. Only after they were fired, did the Berretts and Kerns go before the 
school board to discuss the termination. Sixth, Ryan Berrett always received 
positive performance reviews. The first time anyone complained about his 
performance was the statement in his termination letter that he was a doing a poor 
job in his maintenance duties.87 
Further, Ryan asserts that he engaged in a protected activity under the Idaho 
Whistleblower Act and the evidence shows the propane issue was not known to the District. 
Meanwhile, Lanie asserts that the Court erred because she "never exceeded her lunch room 
budget in any year" and that her employment evaluations were positive and she did not fail to 
86 Woods Affidavit, at p. 3; Kerns Affidavit, at p.2; Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.3. 
87 Motion, at p.7. 
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submit the state-required forms mentioned above. Each of these is discussed in greater detail 
below. 
a. Ryan's Job Responsibilities 
In his Motion to Reconsider Ryan asserts that he was hired as a person on disability. The 
issue of Ryan's disability was not before the Court at summary judgment. Because it was not 
before the Court at summary judgment, it is immaterial to the Court's analysis of Plaintiffs' 
Motion to Reconsider, 
In addition to claiming he was hired as a person on disability, Ryan asserts, for the first 
time in his Motion to Reconsider, he was not responsible for the propane, heating, or furnace 
systems. However, based on the following analysis, the Court cannot reasonably infer that 
Ryan's responsibilities as maintenance supervisor did not include the furnace and propane 
systems; or that he was not tasked with resolving the propane issue. 
The Court's conclusion is supported by various statements from Ryan's own affidavit. 
First, Ryan writes, "I had been doing the best I could with my disability to maintain and fix 
furnaces, water heaters, and plumbing issues by myself. "88 Whether these were part of his job 
duties upon hiring or whether he acquired these duties later by assignment or his own initiative, 
it was asserted by Plaintiffs that Ryan undertook to fix these systems. 89 
Ryan also described how he became of aware of the propane problem in his own 
affidavit, indicating that in January 2012 he began "getting calls every other day about [sic] 
strong odor of propane in the old gymnasium from [the District's] business manager (Gayle 
Woods) .... "90 He also wrote that he "Had High Planes Propane come over to check for propane 
smell [sic]," He told Dave Kerns, "[He] was going to have Sermon Service and Electric come out 
88 Wessel Affidavit., at attachment p.311. 
89 Wessel Affidavit, at attachmo.nt p.311. 
90 Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.311. 
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and [he] was going to lock the old gym up."91 Over a period of several months Ryan continued, 
with the assistance of Sermon Electric, to work on solving the problem(s) with the propane . 
system, Once Sermon Electric had prepared a price quote for the needed repairs, Ryan was the 
person who received this quote and shared it with Dave Kerns. 92 Ryan also provided regular 
reports on the work he was doing with the propane and heating systems in District meetings and 
in letters written to the school board.93 Later, Ryan also reported on the problem(s) with the 
propane system at Board meeting in May. 94 
All of these facts support the Court's conclusion because in the absence of some 
responsibility for the furnace, heating, and propane systems, it is difficult for the Court to 
understand why Ryan would have been involved in fixing the problem the way he was. There is 
no evidence before the Court th.at Ryan ever disputed or objected to his responsibility for the 
propane and heating systems prior to the objection in Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider. 
Therefore, based on the prior reasoning and analysis, the Court cannot reasonably infer that Ryan 
was not the person responsible for maintaining and fixing the furnace and propane systems. 
b. Affidavits 
Ryan has argued that the Court erred in granting summary judgment for the District 
because "[A]ll the affidavits state that until March, [sic] 2012, no one could find a leak in the 
propane system. No one knew there was a leak in the propane system. They only knew of a 
smell.'; Even drawing reasonable inferences in Ryan's favor, and assuming the actual source, 
location, or cause of the propane leak was undiscovered until March 2012, the Court disagrees 
with Ryan's assertions, 
91 Wessel Affidavit. at attachment p.31 L 
92 Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.312. 
93 Woods Affidavit, at Ex. A. 
94 Wessel Affidavit, at attachmentp.314. 
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As mentioned above, Ryan began getting regular calls about a propane odor in the old 
gymnasium as early as January 2012. The Court cannot reasonably infer that the odor of propane 
in a room or building does not indicate the existence of a leak. Furthermore, when the Plaintiffs 
filed their claims in state court, the District provided affidavits from Gayle Woods, Dave Kerns, 
and Erin Haight-Mortensen. These affidavits each contain a similar statement which indicates the 
District was "aware that the leak in the propane system was a building code violation."9:; As the 
affidavits point out, the exact cause of the odor or the leak was unknown but it is evident 
everyone involved knew it was a problem and they were actively working to solve it. Solving the 
problem was difficult because the source or cause of the propane smell, or leak, could not be 
isolated. 
Plaintiffs dispute these affidavits by arguing they contradict the affidavits filed by the 
District in the federal case. However, the Court cannot reasonably infer that the new affidavits 
contradict the earlier affidavits that were filed in federal court. The new affidavits emphasize the ' 
difficulty in isolating the problem and indicate that Gayle Woods, Dave Kerns, and Erin Haight-
Mortensen recognized the smell represented a building code violation that needed to be located 
and corrected. Information that was not provided within the affidavits filed in the federal case. 
Plaintiffs also rely upon deposition testimony in which Dave Kerns admits that he was 
unaware that the propane leak was a safety issue or that the propane tanks were not in 
compliance with building code or that he was unconcerned that the leak posed a safety threat. 
Neither of these are material. As stated in the affidavits, the District was already aware that a 
building code violation existed somewhere in the system and it was working to isolate it. 
Because the District already knew about the violation and was working to isolate it, the mere fact 
~ Woods Affidavit, at p.3; Kerns Affidavit, at p.2; Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.3. 
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that Ryan (with help from Sermon Electric) may have been the person who isolated the source of 
the problem and reported it does not qualify him for protection under the Act. 
As to the safety concerns regarding the propane leaks, which were pointed out by 
Plaintiffs in their motion to reconsider, this claim is immaterial. The Idaho Whistleblower Act 
affords protection to employees who "[communicate] in good faith the existence of any waste of 
public funds, property or manpower, or a violation or suspected violation of a law, rule or 
regulation adopted under the law of this state, a political subdivision of this state or the United 
States."96 Although the Court recognizes that a "safety" issue may be a result or concern of the 
reported ''violation of a law, rule or regulation", the statute's focus is on violations oflaw, rules, 
or regulations. Protection under the act is triggered when an employee reports a 11violation of a 
law, rule or regulation'' not a •'safety" issue.97 Therefore, it is immaterial whether Mr. Kerns 
recognized the propane problem as a safety concern for purposes of the Act. 
c. May 2012 School Board Meeting 
As the Court discussed above, Ryan was called upon to discuss the propane issue at the 
May 2012 school board meeting. Ryan asserts that "According to school board member Sherri 
Mead ... the school board terminated Kerns based upon [Ry8.l)'s] testimony,"98 Ryan points this 
out his affidavit and has provided a note written his calendar (attached to his affidavit as Exhibit 
B). However, as presented, this assertion is hearsay. It is an out-of-court statement that does not 
fall within any of the recognized exceptions pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Evidence. 
Plaintiffs argue that Ms. Mead's statement is not hearsay under Idaho Rule of Evidence 
80I(d)(2) because it is an admission of a party opponent. This is incorrect. Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 80l(d)(2) requires more than just a statement, the statement must be 
96 Idaho Code§ 6-2103(1)(a). 
97 Id, 
98 Motion, at p. IO. 
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[T]he party's own statement, in either an individual or a representative capacity, 
or (B) a statelll.ent of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its 
truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by a party to make a statement 
concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by a party's agent or servant concerning 
a matter within the scope of the agency or employment of the servant or agent, 
made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement by a co-
conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. 99 
P. 020/041 
Plaintiffs have proffered nothing that indicates Sherri Mead was speaking as the District's 
representative, that the District manifested agreeance or adopted her statement as truth; or that 
Ms. Mead was authorized to make the statement, was acting within the scope of her agency or 
employment, or was a co-conspirator. Therefore, the Court cannot conclude that Ms. Mead's 
statement regarding Dave Kern's tennination is anything but inadmissible hearsay. 
The Court has previously stated that Plaintiffs must provide more than a mere scintilla of 
evidence to make an issue of fact, on the issue of Mr. Kerns' departure or termination they have 
not done so. 100 Even if the statement proffered by Plaintiffs was not hearsay, or Plaintiffs had 
obtained an affidavit from Sherri Mead or taken her deposition these would have little bearing on 
the issues presented in this case. Ryan has never asserted that he was fired because Mr. Kerns 
was fired. In his complaint, Ryan did not assert that it was Mr. Kerns who fired him, wrongfully 
or otherwise. Plaintiffs' complaint states, in relevant part: 
On Jwie 30, 2012, [the District] terminated Plaintiffs' employment. The reason 
which [the District] gave for plaintiffs' tennination was a pretext. The true reason 
and a motivating reason for plaintiffs' tenninations was that Plaintiff Ronald 
Ryan Berrett communicated to the District, in good faith, a violation of a law, rule 
or regulation which had been adopted under the law of the state of Idaho. 
101 
Therefore, whether Sherri Mead told Ryan that Mt. Kerns was terminated based on something 
Ryan stated at the Board meeting is immaterial to the Court's analysis. 
99 Idaho Rules of Evidence 80l(d)(2). 
100 Van, 147 Idaho at 556, 212 P.3d at 986. 
101 Complaint, at Ex. C, 
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In its Opinion and Order on the Parties' Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment the Court 
found that Ryan Berrett referred to Dave Kerns as a "fucking asshole" when confronted 
regarding the Facebook post Upon reconsideration, this finding was in error; however, it is 
immaterial to the Court's analysis and does not change the outcome of the Court's decision at 
summary judgment or upon reconsideration. 
e. School Board's Knowledge of Ryan and Lanie's Termination 
Plaintiffs have asserted that Dave Kerns terminated their employment without the school 
board's knowledge. This is a conclusory assertion raised by the plaintiffs in their Motion to 
Reconsider. Beyond the conclusory statements made in their Motion to Reconsider, Plaintiffs 
have not pointed to any place in the record or their affidavits or anywhere else that supports their 
conclusions. In other words, they have not provided a scintilla of evidence that makes this a 
disputed fact. 102 
Meanwhile, the District has supplied the affidavits of Dave Kerns and Erin Haight-
Mortensen. Mr. Keros' affidavit states, in relevant part: 
Mr. Berrett's termination had nothing to do with the propane issue. The Distict 
decided to terminate Mr. Berrett following his insubordination and verbal abuse 
directed toward me. In approximately late May or early June, 2012, I was 
contacted by Erin Haight-Mortensen who had seen a derogatory Facebook post 
about me. Ms. Haight-Mortensen provided me with a copy of the Facebook post 
and I placed it in Mr. Berrett's personnel file. It is my understanding that students 
and parents saw the post and that some students had commented on the post. The 
Facebook post was inappropriate and a violation of District Policy. 
At the next meeting with the School Board, I discussed the Facebook post with 
board members and it was determined that because Mr. Berrett was an at-will 
employee that termination was appropriate. rn:; 
100 Van, 147 Idaho at S56, 212 P.3d at 986. 
103 Kerns Affidavit. at p.5. 
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With regard to Lanie's termination, Mr. Kerns wrote, Because of the repeated inability to 
efficiently run the kitchen, the District made the decision to terminate Ms. Berrett.'' 104 
P. 022/041 
Regarding the Berretts' termination, Ms. Haight-Mortensen stated, ''I was involved in the 
decision to terminate Mr. Berrett's employment and can attest that his termination had nothing to 
do with the propane issue. The District decided to terminate Mr. Berrett following Mr. Barrett's 
insubordination and verbal abuse directed towards Mr. Kerns."105 Ms. HaightwMortensen also 
wrote Lanie's employment was terminated because of her inability to manage the kitchen and 
remain within her budget.106 
Even if Mr. Kerns had terminated Lanie and Ryan without the school board's approval, 
he had the authority to do so. Ms. Haight-Mortensen indicated that, "Because Mr. Kerns was the 
interim Superintendent, he had authority to terminate Mr. Berrett. He likewise had authority to 
terminate Ms. Berrett. "107 The Court notes that being fired or terminated without the approval of 
the school board is not the basis for the Berrens' claims. Nor have Plaintiffs cited a proposition 
of law that would support such a position. 
Instead, Plaintiffs claim they were fired in retaliation for Ryan ''blowing the whistle" on 
the problems with the District's propane system, and that their terminations violated Idaho law 
and public policy. However, based on the Court's reasoning and analysis in other sections of this 
opinion. the Court cannot reasonably infer either of the Berretts qualify for protection under the 
Act. Because the Berretts do not qualify for protection under the Act, the Court cannot 
reasonably infer their terminations with, or without, the Board's approval were wrongful. Even if 
the Board1s approval was required, Ryan and Lanie have not provided any evidence to support 
104 Kerns Affidavit, at p.6. 
105 Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.5. 
106 Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.6-7. 
101 Haight-Monensen Affidavit, at p.6. 
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an inference that the Board lacked knowledge of the tern:rinations. Therefore, the Court may not 
reasonably infer that their terminations were done without the Board's knowledge. In the absence 
of disputed facts, the Court concludes that its decision at summary judgment was appropriate. 
f. Performance Reviews 
Plaintiffs assert the Court's error by arguing "Ryan always received positive performance 
reviews. The first time anyone complained about his performance was the statement in his 
termination letter that he was doing a poor job in his maintenance duties.u108 In his affidavit he 
wrote, •nespite my experience and my always stellar performance evaluations, they denied me 
requested reasonable accommodations and eventually fired me."109 These statements are 
conclusory and are insufficient to create an issue of material fact. Rather, this statement is 
commentary on the evidence but it is not evidence. The court assumes the fact that he received 
stellar performance reviews for purposes of summary judgment, notwithstanding the facts 
presented by the record. 
The Court notes the inspection reports provided by the District which mention the 
discovery of numerous maintenance violations. At summary judgment the Court recognized 
these stating, "Only a few months before [Ryan's] discharge, the School District's facilities were 
inspected and numerous maintenance violations were discovered. In fact, some of these 
violations had been noted in the previous two or three inspections and still remained 
unresolved."110 Plaintiffs did not dispute that these violations occurred at summary judgment and 
has not done so in their Motion to Reconsider. They only assert a lack of complaints regarding 
his job performance prior to his termination. 
108 Motion, at p.7. 
109 Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.315. 
110 Woods Affidavit, at Ex. A. 
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Nonetheless, the Court sets aside the maintenance violations previously relied upon and 
assumes, for purposes of summary judgment, that Ryan "always" received superb performance 
reviews. In light of this assumption, the Court's conclusion remains unchanged. As stated in the 
termination Iener provided to Ryan, his employment was terminated because he was 
"insubordinate and verbally abusive to the District administration and ... ridiculed personnel 
through social media on the internet. "
111 Ryan does not dispute that he did so and has provided a 
copy of the message he posted as an exhibit to his affidavit.112 This reasoning for his termination 
is independent of the propane issue and independent of his job perfonnance. The Court 
recognizes that even if Ryan always received stellar perfonnance reviews and had never posted 
his grievances or frustrations on social media, this would not preclude his termination because he 
was an at-will employee.113 Ryan has not disputed this. 
Idaho law is very clear regarding at-will employees: "Unless an employee is hired 
pursuant to a contract which specifies the duration of the employment or limits the reasons why 
an employee may be discharged, the employee is at-will and can be terminated for ariy reason or 
no rea.son at all."114 Absent the application of an exception to this general rule, the District did 
not need to provide a reason for Ryan's termination. As the Court found at summary judgment, 
and reiterates below, the Court cannot reasonably infer that Ryan qualified for protection under 
the Idaho Whistleblower Act. Therefore, as an at-will employee his tennination was not 
wrongful. 
111 Kerns Affidavit, 11,t Ex. A. 
112 Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.315, 323-24. 
113 Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.5-6. 
114 Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Products, 139 Idaho 172, 179, 75 P.3d 733, 740 (2003) (emphasis added), 
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Plaintiffs dispute that Lanie ever exceeded her budget; meanwhile, the District asserts 
that Lanie exceeded her budget in multiple years. Plaintiffs point to Lanie's affidavit and 
attached exhibits to support her assertion. In her affidavit Lanie wrote, "In 2009, when I took 
over as lunchroom supervisor, I stayed within budget."115 She also wrote, "[A]though we may 
have overspent the budget in a given month, I did not overspend the Food Service budget in any 
given year. "116 
Additionally, Lanie has provided to the "Child Nutrition Financial Report" as "Exhibit 
A" to her affidavit. Although the Child Nutrition Financial Report shows a balanced food 
services budget_ for the 2009 fiscal year, the data is inconclusive. First, Lanie did not become the 
Food Service Supervisor until May 2009 and it is unclear what time period this report covers, 117 
Second, she has not provided the reports for the remaining years of her tenure as Food Service 
Supervisor. Lanie was the Food Service Supervisor from May 2009 until June 2012. 118 Despite 
asserting that she never exceeded her allotted budget, she has failed to provide evidence for 
2010, 2011, and 2012.119 
In direct contradiction of the assertions in her affidavit, Lanie admitted to overspending 
her budget when Defendant's counsel asked about it during her deposition: 
Q. In the second line it says that you have consistently overspent the food service 
budget each year, with the amount increasing each time, That's a true statement? 
A. Yes, sir, it is. 
Q, You don't dispute that you overspent the food service budget each year, 
correct? 
115 Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.329. 
116 Wessel Affidt1vit, at attachment p.330. 
117 Wessel Affidavit, at Attachment p.330. 
118 Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.330. 
119 The Court also notes that the District has failed to produce reports for these years, although overage figures were 
provided in the Affidavit of Gayle Woods. 
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Plaintiffs have not attempted to reconcile the conflicting statements in Lanie's affidavit 
with her deposition testimony. Nor have they done so in their Motion to Reconsider and 
did not do so when asked by the Court at oral argument. However, this is immaterial to 
the Court's analysis. 
Even assuming Lanie never exceeded her budget, she was an atvwill employee. 121 
Plaintiffs have not disputed this fact. As the Court recognized above, 14Unless an 
employee is hired pursuant to a contract which specifies the duration of the employment 
or limits the reasons why an employee may be discharged, the employee is at-will and 
can be terminated for any reason or no reason at all."12'). Because Lanie was an at~will 
employee the District could fire Lanie for "any reason or no reason at all." Plaintiffs do 
not assert that Lanie engaged in any activity that would protect her from termination or 
limit the District's ability to terminate her employment. Instead, she asserts protection as 
a matter of public policy because of her husband's activities. However, as the Court 
found at summary judgment, and reiterates below, Ryan, did not qualify for protection 
under the Idaho Whistleblower Act. Therefore, even if the Act, or Idaho public policy, 
provided an exception for the spouse of a whistleblower, the Court cannot reasonably 
infer that Lanie's termination was wrongful because she was an at~will employee and 
because her husband did not engage in protected activity. 
P. 026/041 
120 Affidavit of Blake G. Hall, Ronald Ryan Berrett and Lanie Berrett v. Clark County School District No. 161, 
Jefferson County case no. CV-17-0328 (filed August 31, 2017) (hereinafter "Hall Affidavit''), 11.t Ex, B, p.70:13 -
f;-71:20. 
21 Kerns Affidavity, at Ex. B. 
122 Edmondson, 139 Idaho at 179, 75 P.3d at 740 (emphasis added). 
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h. Lanie's Performance Evaluations 
P. 027/041 
Like Ryan, Lanie asserts that she "always received positive performance evaluations" and 
only a few weeks before her termination ''had received a positive performance evaluation and an 
offer of a raise!'123 As discussed above, it is undisputed that Lanie was an at-will employee, 
"Unless an employee is hired pursuant to a contract which specifies the duration of the 
. employment or limits the reasons why an employee may be discharged, the employee is at~will 
and can be terminated for any reason or no reason at all."124 Therefore, the District could fire 
Lanie for ''any reason or no reason at all." Based on the Court's analysis at summary judgment 
and in other sections of this opinion, Lanie does not qualify for protection from this rule. 
Therefore, the Court cannot reasonably infer that Lanie's termination was wrongful. 
i. Required Forms 
At summary judgment the Court recognized that Lanie failed to submit several state~ 
required forms during her tenure as lunch room supervisor. The Court reasoned that this was part 
the District's reasoning for firing her. Despite asserting her always positive perfonnance 
evaluations, Lanie never directly disputes her failure to submit these forms. However, even if 
Lanie did not properly submit the forms, it is inunaterial to the Court's additional analysis. 
As stated, Lanie was an at-will employee. Under Idaho law, an at-will employee may ''be 
terminated for any reason or no reason at all" absent some exception. 125 The Court has 
previously determined that Lanie did not qualify for protected status. Therefore, as an at-will 
employee, her termination was not wrongful. 
113 Wessel Affidavit, a.t attachment p.330. 
114 Edrrumdson, 139 Idaho at 179, 75 P.3d at 740 (emphasis added). 
125 Id. (emphasis added). 
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3. The Berretts are not entitled to protection under the Idaho Whistleblower Act, or 
Idaho Public Policy, 
In light of the Court's additional reasoning and analysis regarding the disputed and 
undisputed facts in this case. the Court reevaluates the Berretts' claims for protection under the 
Idaho Whistleblower Act and Idaho public policy. After additional analysis, the Court concludes 
that its decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the District was appropriate. The Court 
will evaluate each plaintiff's claims for protection individually, beginning with Ryan's. 
a. Ryan 
Toe Act affords "a legal cause of action for public employees who experience adverse 
action from their employer as a result of reporting waste and violations of a law, rule or 
regulation."126 Protection under the Act is afforded to any employee that "communicates in good 
faith the existence of any waste of public funds, property or manpower, or a violation or 
suspected violation of a law ... under the law of this state or the United States. "127 Therefore, 
more narrowly stated, the issue is whether Ryan reported a violation or suspected violation of a 
law, entitling him to protection under the Act. 
Ryan elm.ms that he reported a violation of the law because he reported on the District's 
problem(s) with the propane system. He claims he was discharged in retaliation for making these 
reports. In response_ to Ryan's claims, the District argues the discharge was not retaliatory and 
has motioned for summary judgment. In order to survive summary judgment, _the Berretts carry 
"the burden of presenting evidence from which a rational inference of retaliatory discharge under 
1211 Idaho Code§ 6-2101. 
127 Idaho Code§ 6-2104(1). 
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the whistleblower act [can) be drawn."128 In other words, they must present "a prima facie case 
of retaliatory discharge .... "129 
A prima facie case for retaliatory discharge consists of three elements. To survive 
summary judgment the Berretts must establish: (1) Ryan was an employee of the District and 
"engaged or intended to engage in protected activity;" (2) the District "took adverse action 
against" him; and (3) there is "a causal connection between the protected activity'' and the 
adverse action taken by the District.1 lo These three elements will be discussed in sequence 
below. 
i. Ryan Berrett did not engage, or intend to engage, in protected 
activity. 
It is undisputed that Ryan was an employee of the District. Therefore, in order to satisfy 
this first element, Ryan only needs to establish that he engaged in, or intended to engage in, a 
protected activity. 1; 1 Based on the Court's analysis, it cannot reasonably infer that Ryan engaged 
in any protected activity. 
There is very little precedent that may be used to define the scope of "protected 
activities" contemplated llllder Idaho law. However, as the Act states, it applies to good faith 
communications of "the existence of any waste of public funds, property or manpower, or a 
violation or suspected violation of a law, rule or regulation adopted under the law of this state, a 
political subdivision of this state or the United States. "132 
In this case, Ryan claims that he reported a building code violation and that the_report(s) 
he made became the catalyst for his termination. As the following analysis illustrates, the alleged 




132 Idaho Code§ 6-2103(1)(a). 
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reports Ryan made do not fall within the range of "protected activities" contemplated by the Act. 
Ample evidence indicates the propane odor in the old gymnasium was well known to the District 
in January 2012. It was reported to Ms. Woods, the District's business manager by several staff 
members. 133 In tum, Ms. Woods called Ryan to inform him of the problem. 134 Ms. Woods also 
reported the issue to Mr. Kerns, the District's superintendent.135 Mr. Kerns reported the issue to 
the chairwoman of the Board, Ms. Haight-Mortensen. 136 
As the District's maintenance supervisor, responsibility fell to Ryan, or he was assigned, 
to identify the problem and fix it.137 The Court cannot reasonably infer otherwise. In February, 
after becoming aware of the problem, Mr. Berrett made his first report in his monthly letter to the 
Board. Here, the Court again points out it cannot reasonably infer the issue had not already been 
reported to the Board by Mr. Kerns and was not already well known throughout the District and 
the administration. 138 
In his March letter, Ryan reported on the issue again. This time he described the work he 
had done to identify and fix the problem. He also informed the Board, "I am waiting for a bid 
from sennon [sic] to correct this problem, when I receive it I will give it to MR. KERNS [sicJ 
and we will go from there."139 Ryan claims he later received the bid from Sermon Electric$ 
showed it to Mr. Kerns, and was told to "keep quiet." Mr. Kerns disputes that he ever told Ryan 
to "keep quiet." 
133 Woods Affidavit, at p.3 
134 Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.311. 
m Kerns Affidavit, at p.2. 
130 Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.2. 
137 In Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider, Ryan disputed his responsibility for the propane system but as the Court's 
earlier analysis shows: there is no genuine dispute of fact. It is clear that Ryan was tasked with solving the problem 
the propane system. 
138 Woods Affidavit, at p. 3; Kerns Affidavit, at p.2; Haight~Morte.nsen Affidavit, at p.3. 
139 Woods Affidavit, at Ex. A, p.28. 
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Although this allegation is suspicious, it is of little consequence. Even if Ryan was told to 
''keep quiet," the Court cannot reasonably infer there was anything to keep quiet about. The 
school board was already aware of the propane leak. Mr. Kerns had already informed the school 
board's chairwoman, Erin Haight-Mortensen, and Ryan had already begun reporting the problem 
in his letters to the Board. He had already told the Board that Sermon Electric was preparing a 
price quote for the needed repairs. 140 Based on the affidavits and other evidence supplied, the 
Court cannot reasonably infer that the propane issue was not already known to the District. Nor 
can the Court reasonably inf er that the leak was not known to be a building code violation before 
this particular conversation between Ryan and Mr. Kerns occurred. 
This is also supported by additional evidence. M. early as February; a technician from 
Sermon Electric began making service calls to the school and was assisting Ryan in resolving the 
propane leak.141 Ryan reported this in his February letter to the Board. Ryan also enlisted the aid 
of High Planes Propane. 142 It is apparent the School Board knew of this involvement because "it 
approved payment for each of the service calls."143 
It is beyond believable that an employee could be charged with solving a problem (even a 
building code or safety violation), provide regular progress reports to his employer, discuss the 
viability of proposed solutions with superiors, and then, after being fired, use those same 
activities to substantiate claim of retaliatory discharge. This is especially true when the employee 
was charged with fixing a problem already known to the employer. 
Certainly, the statute offers protection to employees who report "a violation or suspected 
violarion of a law" and it is undisputed that the propane leak was a violation of law; however, 
140 Woods Affidavit. at Ex. A, p.28 
141 Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.311-12. 
142 Wessel Affidavit. at attachment p.311. 
143 Woods Affidavit, at p.3. 
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there was nothing to report for purposes of the Act because the District already knew about the 
problem and was working to fix it. Therefore, Ryan has failed to establish that any of the actions 
described above constituted protected activity. 
The Court now looks to Ryan's other actions to determine whether any of these 
reasonably constituted pi:otected activity. First, Ryan claims he appeared at the May 17 school 
board meeting to testify against Mr. Kerns. 144 The notes from the meeting shed a different light 
on his participation. The notes indicate Ryan reported that "the propane issues are still a 
problem."14s From the District's perspective Ryan's participation appears to have been nothing 
more than another progress report on the problem he had been tasked with resolving. 
Ryan asserts that he and two others ''were called before the Board and asked one at a time 
if [they] thought that the Superintendent knew that the propane problem could possibly cause 
injury to human life." The court for Summary Judgment assumes this to be true. Regardless, this 
statement supports the conclusion the District already knew about the propane problem and 
acknowledged it, Why else would the school board have ''called" upon Ryan to discuss the issue 
at all? 
All things considered and drawing reasonable inferences in favor of the Plaintiffs (the 
nonmoving party), the Court cannot reasonably infer that Ryan's participation in the school 
board meeting was protected activity, The District already knew about of the propane leak, Mr. 
Kerns had personally informed the Board of the issue four months before. Ryan had also been 
providing the Board with monthly reports on the issue. The Board had also approved payments 
for service calls made by Sermon Electric and High Plan.es Propane. Again, the Court is left to 
ponder, what else was there to report that might have constituted a protected activity? Even if 
144 Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.314. 
145 Woods Affidavit, at Ex. A. 
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Ryan's assertions are true, even if he was called to testify about or against Mr. Kern at the school 
board meeting, what could he have said to qualify him for protection? Ryan does not claim he 
was terminated for testifying against Mr. Kerns. He claims he was fired for reporting on the 
propane issue, which was a violation of law. 146 
Lastly, the Court discusses the message Ryan posted to Facebook on or about June 18, 
2012. 147 The posted message was critical of the District and its administration. 148 Although the 
message may have contained a cryptic reference to the propane problem, it more closely 
resembles an unfettered rant by a disgruntled employee. 149 It offers nothing th.at resembles a 
good faith report of ''a violation or suspected violation of a law, , .. " 150 Therefore, the Court 
cannot reasonably infer that it constitutes protected activity. 
Because the Court cannot reasonably infer that Ryan engaged in any protected activity, 
summary judgment in favor of the District was appropriate. Nevertheless, for the sake of inquiry, 
the Court continues its analysis of the two remaining elements: ( 1) adverse action against the 
employee, and (2) a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action. 
b. The District took an advel"se action against Ryan Berrett by terminating his 
employment. 
The second element of a retaliatory discharge claim requires the employee to establish 
the employer took an adverse action against them. Based on the following analysis, the Court 
may reasonably infer the District took adverse action against Ryan. The evidence before the 
Court is that Mr. Berrett' s employment was terminated. This fact is undisputed. 
146 Complaint, Ex. C, at p.7-9. 
141 Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.323-24. 
148 Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.323-24. 
149 Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.323-24. 
150 Idaho Code§ 6~2104(1), 
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After Ryan posted the aforem~tioned rant on Facebook, Ms. Haight-Mortensen notified 
Mr. Kerns about the post and requested that he speak to Ryan about it. Mr. Kerns then discussed 
the Facebook post at the Board's next meeting. During the meeting it was decided that Mr. 
Berrett was an at-will employee and discharge was the appropriate sanction for his conduct. A 
termination letter was then drafted and delivered to Ryan. The letter, signed by Mr. Keros, states 
in relevant part: 
You have been insubordinate and verbally abusive to the District adnlinistration 
and have ridiculed personnel through social media on the internet. Your 
performance in some duties has been declining as well with building maintenance 
and keeping lights replaced and in working order. Due to your status as an "at~ 
will", or non-contractual employee, the District administration has decided to 
terminate your employment effective June 30th, 2012.151 
The District does not dispute that this letter was delivered, or that Ryan's employment was 
terminated. Because it is undisputed his employment terminated, Ryan has established that the 
District took adverse action against him. 
The Court notes that, for the first time at oral argument, on Plaintiffs' Motion to 
Reconsider, Plaintiffs asserted that the District took additional adverse action against them. 
Plaintiffs asserted that the District raised their rent and eventually evicted them from their 
District owned residence. The Court recognizes these as additional adverse actions and assumes 
them to be true, but the Court has already recognized that, for purposes of summary judgment, 
the District took adverse action against the Plaintiffs. Therefore, the prior related analysis and 
conclusion of the Court is unchanged by these new assertions and swnmary judgment in favor of 
the School District was still appropriate based on the Court's analysis of the two remaining 
elements. 
151 Kerns Affidavit, at Ex. B, 
MEMORDANDUM DECISION ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER Page 34 of 41 
FEB/14/2018/WED 10:54 AM 
RECEIVED 02/14/2018 09:32AM 
FAX No. P. 035/041 
c. There is no causal connection between Ryan Berrett's alleged, protected 
activity and the adverse action taken by the District. 
To survive summary judgment on a retaliatory discharge claim, Ryan must also establish 
a causal connection between his alleged, protected activity and the adverse action taken by the 
District. Because Ryan failed to establish that he engaged in a protected activity, there can be no 
causal connection to the adverse action taken by the District. Nevertheless, the Court continues 
its analysis of the final element for the sake of inquiry. Relevant to this inquiry is the "Proximity 
in time between the protected activity and the adverse employment action .... "152 
As stated, several of the District's other employees and adn:tinistrators received reports of 
a propane odor in the gymnasium as early as January 2012. Over a period of several months, 
Ryan worked to resolve the issues and provided regular reports to Mr. Kerns and the Board, 
Multiple affidavits and their corresponding exhibits support these facts. It was not until 
approximately four or five months later, after multiple written and verbal reports were provided, 
that Ryan's employment was terminated, This is a significant amount of time, and the Court 
cannot reasonably infer that the adverse action taken against Ryan and the alleged protected 
activity are causally connected. 
Beyond this, Ryan asserts that he attended the May 17 Board meeting and testified 
against Mr. Kerns. Then his employment was terminated roughly six weeks later. Although these 
two events occurred close in time, the temporal relation is immaterial be.cause a claim that Ryan 
was terminated for testifying against Mr. Kerns is not before the Court. Therefore, the Court 
cannot reasonably infer that there a causal connection between the adverse action taken by the 
District and the activities Ryan claims were protected. This is especially true because the District 
152 See Curlee, 148 Idaho at 397, 224P.3d at 464 (quoting Heng v. RotechMed.Corp .. 688 N.W.2d 389,401. (N.D. 
2004)). 
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was already aware of the propane issue as early as January and Ryan had been providing regular 
reports on the problem months before his termination. 
The Court notes that the Ninth Circuit Court concluded that Ryan's termination was 
sufficiently close in time to the alleged, protected activity to survive summary judgment. 
However, the facts now before the Court are different from the facts in the case heard by the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The affidavits filed in this case make it clear the District was 
aware of the building code violation caused by the propane issue as early as January 2012. As the 
Court discussed above, many IIlonths passed since Ryan began working on and reporting on the 
propane issue and his termination. Based on this analysis, the Court cannot reasonably infer that 
the two events were close in time or causally connected. Therefore, In other words, the Court 
properly granted summary judgment in favor of the District and Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider 
should be denied as to the wrongful termination claim. 
4. As a matter of public policy, Lanie Berrett does not qualify for protection under: the 
Act as the spouse of a whistleblower. 
As a matter of public policy, Lanie Berrett claims that she qualifies for protection from a 
retaliatory discharge as the spouse of a whistleblower. However, based on the Court's prior 
analysis, it cannot reasonably infer that Ryan Berrett failed to establish that he was a 
whistleblower under the Act or was the subject of a retaliatory discharge. Because Ryan does not 
qualify for protected status under the Act, Lanie cannot claim protection as his spouse. Even if 
Ryan had established a case retaliatory discharge, Lanie would still not be entitled to protection 
for two reasons. First, under established law, spouses of employees are unprotected by both the 
Act and public policy. Second, the Court cannot reasonably infer that her termination is causally 
connected to any protected activity. 
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Spouses of employees who engage in protected activity are not protected under the Act or 
any related Idaho law or policy. The Idaho Whistleblower Act provides a "cause of action for 
public employeu who experience adverse action from their employer as a result of reporting 
waste and violations of a law, rule or regulation."u3 Lanie Berrett asserts that as a matter of 
public policy,_ she is entitled to protection. However, the Court will not adopt this conclusion. 
The language of the Act specifically allows relief for "employees." It makes no reference 
to, or allowance for, spouses of employees. 154 The Court is unwilling to read words into the 
statute that were not included by the legislature. Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has not 
previously extended protection to an employee's spouse as a matter of public policy and the 
Court is unwilling to do so now. "Even if a cause of action for damages should exist as relief for 
alleged retaliatory discharge in contravention of public policy based upon conduct of the 
employee's spouse ... the dearth of evidence in this case fails ... " to support a reasonable 
inference that Lanie's spouse was entitled to protection under the act, or that her termination was 
causally connected to any of his allegedly protected activities. m 
Plaintiffs have argued that this Court should extend whistleblower protection to spouses 
of eligible employers. Plaintiffs have made valid arguments as to why this would be appropriate; 
however, in considering these arguments the Court notes that the whistleblower statute's latest 
version was enacted by the legislature in 1994, It is not a statute that is over fifty, or even one 
hundred, years old with a changing and evolving population. The court also notes the specific 
language of the statute says, "employee." 
is3 Idaho Code§ 6~2101 (emphasis added). 
154 See id. 
'" Edmondson, 139 Idaho at 179, 75 P.3d at 740 (emphasis added). 
MEMORDANDUM DECISION ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER Page 37 of 41 
FEB/14/2018/WED 10:56 AM 
RECEIVED 02/14/2018 09:32AM 
FAX No. P. 038/041 
This Court consistently applies statutes as written and it is not persuaded that this is a 
situation where an exception or an addition to the statute is appropriate as a matter of public 
policy. If the Idaho legislature desires to extend protection to spouses of employees under the 
whistleblower statute it may do so. This court is not persuaded that it should enlarge the 
protection already made available by the legislature. The Idaho legislature may do so if it 
believes such protection is appropriate. 
b, Lanie's Termination is not Causally Connected 
Even if relief were available based upon the conduct of an employee's spouse as a matter 
of public policy, summary judgment is still appropriate because Lanie has not established that 
her termination is causally connected to any protected activity (even the activity asserted by her 
husband). As discussed, the Berretts must establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge to 
survive summary judgment. 156 Such a cl~im requires three elements: (1) the employee engaged 
in a protected activity, (2) the employer took adverse action against the employee, and (3) the 
adverse action was causally connected to the protected activity. 157 
Lanie does not assert that she engaged in protected activity; rather, she relies on her 
husband's claim that he engaged in protected activity. The Court previously decided that it could 
not reasonably infer Ryan had engaged in protected activity. The Court emphasizes that even if 
he had, neither the act nor Idaho public policy extends protection to spouses of employees who 
engaged in protected activity. 
The second element requires an adverse action against the employee. If the Act made 
allowance for spouses of employees, Lanie could establish this element, Her rent was increased, 
her employment was terminated, and she was evicted from her residence. Therefore, for purposes 
156 Curlee, 148 Idaho at 397, 224 P.3d at 464. 
1s1 Id. 
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of summary judgment, the Court may reasonably infer that adverse action was taken against 
Lanie. 
However, the Court cannot reasonably infer Lanie qualifies for protection under the Act 
because her termination is causally connected to any protected activity. Lanie has not asserted 
that she engaged in any protected activity. Instead, she asserts that her termination is causally 
connected to her husband's activities. 
As stated, "Proximity in time between the protected activity and the adverse employment 
action ... " is relevant to determining whether the two are causally connected.158 As discussed 
above, months passed between Lanie's termination and Ryan's allegedly protected activity. 
During this period, Ryan was constantly updating the school board on his progress. The Board 
also called on Ryan to discuss the propane issue at the May 17 Board meeting. 159 Based on this 
and the Court's analysis in other sections of this opinion, the Court cannot reasonably infer that 
Lanie's termination was causally connected to any protected activity. As a result, the Court 
cannot reasonably infer that Lanie's termination was in retaliation for any protected activity 
(either her own or her spouses). As a result, the Court properly granted summary judgment in 
favor of the District on Plaintiffs' claim for retaliatory discharge. Plaintiffs' Motion to 
Reconsider should be denied. 
5. Remaining Claims 
As to the remaining federal law claims, listed in the complaint, which were not addressed 
by the parties in the original Summary Judgment Motion and in the Courts prior Opinion and 
Order on Parties' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court grants the Plaintiffs' Motion 
158 See id. (quoting Her,,g v. Rotech Med.Cory., 688 N.W.2d 389,401, (N.D. 2004)). 
,s9 This provides additional evidence that the District knew about and acknowledged the propane problem. 
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to Reconsider. As the Plaintiffs correctly point out, they should be allowed to address those 
issues through pleading and argument. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Court orders as follows: 
1- Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider the decision on Plaintiffs' Whistleblower/Retaliation 
Claims is DENIED. 
2- Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider the decision on Plaintiffs' Disability Discrimination 
claims is GRANTED, 
3- Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider the decision on Plaintiffs' Fair Housing Act claims is 
GRANTED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TBE 
-STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
RONALD RYAN BERRETT AND 
LANIE BERRETT. husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
CLARK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT 
NO. 161, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2017-328 
OPINION AND ORDER ON PARTIES, 
CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
This Opinion and Order is in response to the parties' cross-motions for summary 
judgment. 
I. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For purposes of summary judgment, the Court finds the following facts: 
The plaintiffs. Ronald Ryan Berrett and Lanie Berrett ( .. Ryan" or'~. Berrett'', and 
"Lanie .. or "Ms. Berrett''• -and collectively as ''the Berretts~'). were both employed by the Clark 
County School District (the "School District"). Ryan was employed as the district's maintenance 
supervisor, Lanie as the lunchroom supervisor. During the relevant time period, Erin Haight-
Mortensen ("Ms. Haight-Mortensen") was chairwoman of the Clark County School Board, 
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David Kerns (''Mr. Kerns .. ) was the district superintendent, and Gayle Woods (''Ms. Woods") 
was the district business manager. 
1. Ryan 
As the School District's-maintenance supervisor, Ryan's responsibilities included the 
School District's heating and.:fur:nace systems. Including the propane tank and corresponding 
system that supplied propane gas to heat the School District's various buildings. In January 2012, 
Ms. Woods began receiving reports that the old gymnasium smelled of propane. She then 
informed Mr. Kerns, and Mr. Kerns informed Ms. Haight-Mortensen there was a leak in the · 
propane system. Ms. Woods, Mr. Kerns, and Ms. Haight-Mortensen we.re all aware that the 
propane system leak was a building code vi-Olation. 1 
The task of :findjng and fucing the leak fell to Ryan. As a result, Ryan began reporting on 
the problem in his monthly letters to 1he Clark County School Board (''the School Board") in 
February 2012. He wrote, ~we do have a propane pressure issue that has been ongoing for 
several years. I have been working with a Sermon technician and think a lot of the problems are 
at the bulk tank. I will bet [sic] the problem resolved."2 
In March. Ryan provided-another update t.o the -School Board. In his letter, he described 
the work he had done over the past month and his diagnosis of the problem. He then concluded, 
"I am waiting for a bid from sermon [sic] to couect this problem, when I receive it I will give it 
to MR. KERNS [sic] and we will go from there. "3 There is a dispute about what happened after 
Ryan received the quote from Seanon Electric. Ryan clauns that he showed it to Mr. Kerns and 
was told to c'keep quiet" Mr. Kerns disputes that he never instructed Ryan to "'keep quiet" 
1 Woods Aff. 3; Kerns Aff. 2; Haight~Mortensen Aff. 3. 
2 Woods Aif. Ex. A. February 2, 2012 letter. 
3 Woods Aff. Ex. A. Mm-ch 12, 2012 letter. 
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Also in March, the School District received an inspection report. In the report. the School 
District was-eited for multiple maintenance violations. Some of the violations cited were repeat 
offenses. for which the School District hBd been cited in prior inspections. As the maintenance 
supe:rvisor, Ryan was responsible for these violations. 
During the months of February, March, and April, Ryan worked with technicians from 
both Sermon Electric and High Planes :Propane and their involvement is mentioned in his 
monthly letters. Over the course of this three month period, both companies visited the school on 
numerous occasions and attempted to identify and the leak in the propane system. The School 
Board approved payment for these service call-s. 4 After several months of in.vestigation, it was 
discovered that the propane system contained micro-leaks throughout and plans were made to 
repair it after school let out for the smnmer. 
In May 2012 the propane leak still remained unfixed. The School Board minutes indicate / ,_;J-i <.rr··t 
Ryan appeared and told the School Board that "the propane issues are still a problem.. »5 La:ter on, 
near the end of May or first of June, Ryan posted.a derogatory message on Faceboo.k. The 
tnessage was critical of the Clark County School Di.strict and Administration and violated the 
established policies outlined in the employee manual. The message also appears to have 
contained a cryptic reference to the School District's propane leak. After it was posted, several 
members of the community saw and co:tnm.ented on the message. Ms. Haight-Mortensen was 
among those who saw the message. After viewing the message, Ms. Haight-Mortensen provided 
a copy ofit to Mr. Kems and requested that he speak Ryan about it. 
At Ms. Haight-Mortensen's request. Mr. Kerns approached Ryan about the Facebook 
, __ .,. I d O '/){ 
post and asked-that it be removed. 'When confrente~ Ryan became belligerent and called :Mr. ~ 
4 Woods A.ff: 3. 
5 Woods AfE Ex. A. 
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Kerns a ''fu.clcing asshole. »6 Mr. Kerns then explained why the post was inappropriate and 
requested that Ryan remove it, a second time. Ryan agreed to remove it. -and did so. 
Mr. Kerns discussed-th.en the Facebook post and his encounter with Ryan at the School 
Board"s next meeting. During the rneeting it was decided that Mr. Berrett was-an at-will 
employee and discharge was the appropriate-sanction for his conduct. A termination letter was 
then drafted and delivered to Ryan. 1b.e letter, signed by Mr. Kerns, states in relevant part: 
You have been insubordinate and verbally abusive to the District administration 
and have ridiculed personnel thmn2h sor.fal media on the intemet. Your 
pezfonnance in some duties has been declining as well with building mmn.tenance 
and koeping lights replaced and in working order. Due to your status as an "at-
will". or non-contractual employee) the District administration has decided to 
t.en:oinate your employment effective June 30th, 2012.7 
As per the terms of the letter, Ryants employment was terminated on June 30, 2012. 
2. Lanie 
As the hmchroom supervisor, Ms. Berrett was responsible for proper management of the 
kitchen. Among other things, this required that she prepare ( and adhere to) an annual budget and 
submit state-required paperwork. However, for at least three consecutive years, Lanie exceeded 
her approved budget. Despite beiug admonished and informed of hardship placed on the School 
District when she exceeded her budget, she continued to exceed it. In addition to exoeeding the 
'i ~✓·-'\. budget, it was also discovered. that Lanie repeatedly failed to submit several fonns required by ; \J-1 6 
the State of!daho. These were grounds for her termination, as stated in the letter. 
On June 30, 2012, Lanie1s employment was terminated. Her temrirurtion letter. 'Which 
was signed by Mr. Kerns. states, ''You have consistently overspent the Food Service budget each 
year, with the amount mcreasing each time. You also are not performing satisfactorily in your 
supervisory duties and you have not followed the direction from your own supervisor when 
6 I<ems Aff. 7. 
7 Kerns A.ff. Ex. B. 
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called upon to make sure District policies and procedures are followed_J,s Lanie's employment 
was terminated per the terms of the letter. 
After they were discharged. the Berretts filed their in the Federal District Court ofldaho. 
The Federal court granted summary judgment in favor of 1he School District on all claims and 
the Ben-ens-appealed to Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed. the Federal District Court's-ruling as to the federal law claims, but remanded the 
decision back on to the state law claims. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the 
Betretts had established a prime facie case lln.der the Act and were entitled. to a trial. Upon the 
remand, the Federal District Court declined to exercise jurisdiction and dismissed the case 
with.out prejudice. The Berretts then filed their state law clanns in state district court. 
II. 
PLEADINGS 
The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Ryan Bettett claims that bis 
employment was terminated because he reported on a leak in the Clarlc County School District's 
propane system. He claims that this amounted to a retaliatory discharge because he engaged in 
protected activity under the Idaho Whlstleblower Act. He further claims his termination violated 
the Idaho Whistleblower Act 
Lanie Berrett claims that she was terminated in retaliation for her husband's protected 
activity. She claims that public policy entitles her to protection llll.der the Idaho Whistleblower 
Act, as the spouse of a wbistleblower. Based on these assertiOllS, she claims that she was 
wrongfully terminated. 
8 Kerns Af£ Ex. D. 
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Both of the Berretts -claim the "law of the case" applies to the Ninth Circuit Court 
decisio~ binding this Court to act in accordance with that decision. They claim that by virtue of 
that decision, they are entitled to survive. summary judgment and proceed to trial. 
In opposition to the Berretts' claims, the Defendant claims that SUin.DlarJ judgment 
should be granted in its favor-. The School Distrlct claims that the Ryan is not entitled to 
protection under the Act, his termination was not the result of any protected activity, Lanie's 
termination was um-elated to her husband's activities, and public policy does not protect Ms. 
Berrett from tennination. 
w. 
APPUCABLE LAW 
1. Standard of Review -Motion fo:r Summary Judgment 
Summary judgment is proper if. based upon "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions 
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that th.ere is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that 1h.e moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw."9 In evaluating a party's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, "[The Court] liberally construes all disputed facts" and draws 
"all reasonable inferences and conclusions supported by the record in favor of the party opposing 
the moti.oJL"10 Where there is no '•issue of material fact. only a question oflaw :remains."11 When 
only a question oflaw remains, the Court "exercises free review_,J12 
Additionally. the nonmoving party must provide more than a •~ere scintilla of 
evidence." creating a genuine issue of .material fact. 13 In other words, "{T]he nonmoving party 
'Ktebenv. Goss, 144 Idaho 225. 227, 159 P.3d 862, 864 (2007); l.R..C.P. 56(c). 
10 Kieben. 144 Idaho at 227, 159 P.3d at 864. 
11 Id 
ll Id 
IS Van v. Portne,efMed. err., 147 Idaho 552,556 212 P.3d 982, 986 (2009). 
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must respond to the summary judgment motion with specific facts showing there is a genuine 
issue for trial."14 
2. Law of the Case 
Tue law of the case is similar to stare decisiS. Like stare decisis, it seeks to eliminate 
"relitigation of settled issues .... ''15 Specifically, the Idaho Court ofAppeals has stated: 
[W]here an appellate court states a principle of law in deciding a case. that rule 
becomes the law of the case and is controlling both in the lower court and on 
subsequent appeals as long as the facts are substantially the same. The decision on 
tm issue of law made at one stage of a proce~ becomes precedent to be 
followed. in successive stages of that same litigation.1 
However3 notwithstanding this precedent, established by the Idaho Court of Appeals. state 
district courts are not required to treat Federal district or circuit court decisions or inteipretaiions 
of Idaho Jaw as bind.ing.17 This applies "even on issues of federal law." 18 Certainly> they may 
treat Federal district and circuit court decisions as persuasive, but they ate not required to do 
s0.19 
3. The Idaho Whisdeblower Act - § 6.:2101 et seq. 
The Idaho Whistleblower Act ("the Act'') affords "a legal cause of action for public 
employees who experience adverse action from their employer as a result of reporting waste and 
violations of a law, rule o:,; :regulati.on."20 Protection under the Act is afforded to employees who 
communicate. "in good faith the existence of any waste of public funds, property or manpower, 
1• Id. 
15 SW1 Valley Ranches, Inc. \I. Pral'rte.Power Co-op., Inc., 124Idaho 125,129, 856P.2d 1292, 1297 (Idaho Ct App. 
19.93). 
16 Id. (quoting Frazier'V. Neilsen, 118 Idaho 104, 106, 794P.2d 1160, 1162 (Idaho Ct. App. 1990)) (internal 
citations omitted). 
17 See State v. McNeely, 162 Idaho 413,413,398 P.3d 146, 149 (Id8ho 2017) (findmg error where state district court 
felt compelled t.o follow a directive or pronouncement of the N:intb. Circuit). 
u Id. (quoting Dan W'rebold Ford, Inc. -v. Universal Computer Services, Inc., 142 Idaho 235,240, 127 P.3d 138, 143 
(2005)). 
19 McN,uily, 162 Idaho at 413,398 P.3d at 149 (Idaho2017). 
20 IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 6-2101 (1994). 
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or a violation or suspected violation of a law .. ." under the law of t:bis state ot the United 
States. ,.ii However, a good faith communication must also "be made at a time and in a :r:mmner 
which gives the employer a reasonable opportunity to correct the waste or violation.',22 
IV. 
ANALYSIS 
These are the issues before the Court on Summa.ry Judgment. (1) Does the "law of the 
case" apply to the Nmth Circuit Court's decision. binding this Court and entitling the Berretts 10. 
a trial on their claims for relief? (2) Is Ryan Berrett entitled to protection under the Idaho 
Wbistleblower Act as outlined by Idaho Code section 6-2101 et seq.? (3) Is Lanie Benett entitled 
to protection under the Idaho Whistleblower Act, as a matter of publ~c policy, because she is 1he 
spouse of an asserted whistleblowcr? Each of these :issues will be addressed in tom. 
1. The "law of the case'' doctrine does not apply and the Court may .niake an 
independent evaluation of the facts before it 
The Court must first decide whether the '"law of the case" applies to the Ninth Circuit 
Court's decision. binding this Court and entitling the Berretts to trial on their claims- for relief. 
Based on the Court's reasoning and analysis, the "law of the case" does not apply to the Ninth 
Circuit Court's decision and the Court is not bound to follow it. 
As the Comt has stated, the Berretts previously filed their claim in the Federal District 
Court for the District ofidaho. In that case, the Berretts asserted both federal and state law 
claims for relie£ The School District moved for summary judgment and the Federal District 
Court granted '!he motion. Toe Berretts appeal-ed. the decision to the Nmth Circuit Court of 
Appeals. 
21 InAHO CODE ANN. § 6-2104(1) (1994) ( emphasis added). 
22 IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 6-2104(1) (1994). 
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The Ninth Circuit Comt affinned the district court's rulings on the Berretts' federal law 
claims but remanded the remaining state law claims back to the Federal District Court. In doing 
so, the Ninth Circuit stated: 
Mr. Berrett established a prima facie case of retalia:tory conduct by presenting 
evidence that: he engaged in protected activity by reporting "a violation or 
suspected violation of a law" .... he suffered an "adverse action" "When he was 
terminated . . . and the ••close relation in time" between th.em, among other 
factors, suggests he may have been fired for reporting the propane issue. Tiris is 
sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact to survive summary 
judgment. 23 
Upon remaud, the Federal District Court declined to exercise jurisdiction over the case and 
dismissed it without prejudice. The Benetts then filed their claims in state district court. They 
argue the Ninth Circuit's decision is binding upon the Court !:lild entitles them to a trial on the 
merits of their claims. In this assertion,. the Berretts specifically rely on 1he "law of the case" 
doctrine. 
The "law of the case" doctrine is similar to stare decisis. Like stare decisis, it seeks to 
eliminate "relitigation of settled issues .... "24 On the issue, the Idaho Court of Appeals has 
stated: 
[W]here an appellate court st.ates a principle of law in deciding a case, that rule 
becomes the law of the case and is controlling both in the lower court and on 
subsequent appeals as long as the facts are substantially the Sal.ne. The decision on 
an issue of law made at one stage of a. procee<llff becomes precedent to be 
followed in successive stages of that same litigation. 
However, notwithstanding the precedent established by the Idaho Court of Appeal, state district 
courts are not required to treat Federal district or circuit comt decisioll.S as wntrolling. i 6 This r'Ule 
zi Wessel Af£: E:ic. A, at 2. 
24 Sun Valley Ranehes, Inc., 124 Idabo at 129, 856 P .2d at 1297. 
25 Id. (quoting Frazjer v. Neil.rem, 118 ldaho 104, 106, 794 P.2d 1160, 1162 (Idaho Ct. App. 1990) (intemal citations 
omitted). 
26 McNeely, 162 Idaho at 413,398 P.3d at 149 (finding error where state district court felt compelled to follow a 
directive or pronouncement of the Ninth Circllit). 
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applies "even on issues of foderal law." 27 The Court notes that the issues in this case arise under 
state, not federal, law. 
In short. the "law of the case" does not apply here. Certainly, the Comt may still treat the 
Federal district and circuit court decisions as persuasive. but it is not required to do so.:28 Because 
the Court is not bound by the Nmth Circuit"s decision and the issues of the case arise under state 
law. it will look at the facts presently before it and make an independent evaluation and decision. 
2. Ryan. Berrett.is not entitled to protection onder the Idaho Whistleblower Act. 
Next, the Court turns its attention. to the second issue before it on summary judgment: Is 
Ryan Berrett entitled to protection under the Idaho Whistleblower Act as outlined by Idaho Code 
section 6-2101 et seq.? Based on the following analysis. the Court concludes he is not. 
The Act affords "a legal cause of action for public employees who experience adverse 
action from their employer as a result of reporting waste and violations of a law. rule or 
regulation. ,.29 Protection under the Act is afforded to any employee that "communicates in good 
faith the existence of any waste of public funds, property or manpower, or a violation or 
suspected violation of a law ... under the law of this state or the United States. ,,3o Therefore, 
more narrowly sta:ted., the issue is whether Ryatt reported a violation or suspected violation of a 
law. entitling him to protection under the Act. 
Ryan claims that he reported a violation of the law because he reported on the School 
District's problem.(s) with the propane system. He claims he was discharged in retaliation for 
making these reports. In response to Ryan's claims, the School District argues the discharge was 
not retaliatory and has motioned for summary judgment. In order to survive sn:mroary judgment, 
1:1 McNeely, 162 Idaho at413,398 P.3dat 149 (quoting Dan Wiebold Ford, Inc.. v. Universal CompuierSen>ices, 
Inc., 142 Idaho 235, 240, 127 P 3d 138, 143 (2005)). 
28 McNeely, 162 ldaho at 398 P .3d at 149 (Idaho 2017). 
29 lDAHO CODBANN. § 6-2101 (1994). 
36 IDAHO CODE.ANN.§ 6--2104(1) (1994) (emphasis added). 
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the Berretts carry "the burden of presenting evidence from which a rational inference of 
retaliatory clischarge..underthe whistleblower act [can] be drawn."3J In other words. they must 
present "a prirna facie case of retaliatory discharge .... "32 
A prima facie case for retaliatory discharge consists of three elements. To survive 
summary judgment the Berretts must establish: (I) Ryan was an employee of the District and 
"engaged.or intended to engage in protected activity;" (2) the School District ''took adverse 
action against" him; and (3) there is "a causal connection between the protected activity" and the 
adverse action taken by the District. 33 These three elements will be discussed in sequence below. 
a. :Ryan :Uen-ett did not engage, or intend to engage, in protected activity. 
It is not disputed that Ryan was an etnployee of the School District Therefore, in order to 
satisfy this first element, llyan only needs to establish that he engaged in. or intended to engage 
in, a protected activity.34 Based on the Court's analysis. Ryan has not established that he engage.d 
in a protected activity. 
There is very little precedent that may be used to define the scope of "protected 
activities .. contemplated under Idaho law. Howev~ one case, Black v. Idaho State Police, has 
provided some guidance in the fotm of examples. 35 The Black court stated: 
Examples of protected activity include (I) reporting safety violations that 
potentially violate federal regulations ... (2) documenting a waste of public :funds 
and manpower ... and (3) communicating a mayor's pot.ential conflict of interest 
with an employee health plan that could potentially waste public resources.36 
Of the three examples listed abo'\Te, the first is most :relevant here. Ryan claims the safety 
violation he reported was the leak in the propane system, and that the reports he made became 




35 Black v. Idaho Stare Police, 155 ldaho 570, 573, 314 P 3d 625, 628 (Idaho 2013). 
36 Id :fu.3. 
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the catalyS1 for his discharge. How-ever, as the following analysis illustrates, tlie reports Ryan 
made do not fall withln the range of '"'protected activities» contemplated by the Act. 
Ample evidence indicates the propane odor in the old gynmasium was well known 
-tbroqghout 1he School District in Ja:rmary 2012. It was reported-to Ms. Woods, the School 
District's business manager, by several sta:ff members.37 In turn, Ms. Woods reported the issue to 
Mr. Kerns, the School Disttict' s superinte.odent. 38 Mr. Kerns then reported the issu.e to the 
School Board's chairwoman, Ms. Haight-Mortensen. 39 
As the School District's maintenance supervisor, responsibility fell to Ryan to identify 
the problem and fix it. After becoming aware of the problem, Mr. Berrett made his :first report on 
the problem. in in February, in his monthly letter to the School Board. Here, the Court again 
points out that the issue had .already been reported to the School Board by Mr. Kerns and was 
well known throughout the School District and the Admmistrati.on. 
In bis March letter. Ryan reported on the issue again.. This time he descn1>ed the work be 
had done to identify the problem and fix it He also informed. the School Distric\ .. I am waiting 
for a bid from sermon [sic] to correct this problem, when I receive it I will give it to .MR. 
KERNS [sic] and we will go :from there. "40 Ryan claims he later received the bid from Serm.on 
Electric, showed it to Mr. Kerns~ and was told to "keep quiet." Mr. Kerns disputes that he ever 
told Ryan to ".keep quiet." 
Although this allegation is suspicious. it is of little consequence. Even if Ryan was told to 
•'k,o~ qui.et,., the Court wonders: What was the.re to keep quiet about? The School Board was 
already aware of the propane leak. Mr. Kerns, himself, informed the School Board, s 
37 Woods A:ff. 3 
31 Kerns Aff. 2. 
39 Haight-Mortensen Aff. 2. 
40 Woods A.ff. Ex. A. March 12, 2012 letter. 
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chairwoman, Erin Haight-Mortensen. and Ryan began reporting the problem a mon1h later in his 
letters to the School Board. The School Board was already aware of the problem and already 
knew itwas a building code violation, mon-ths before this particular conversation between Ryan 
and Mr. Kerns occurred. 
Additionally. there is other evidence that suggests the propane leak was already known to 
the School Board, even before Ryan was allegedly told to "keep quiet" by Mr. Kerns. As early as 
February. a teclnrician from Serro.on Electric began making service calls to the school and was 
assisting Ryan in resolving the propane leak. Ryan reported this in his Fe~ letter to the 
School Board. Eventually, Ryan also enlisted the aid of High Planes Propane. It is apparent the 
School Board knew of this involvement because "it approved payment for each of the service 
calls.',41 This is important because it evidences tha:t the School Board had separate knowledge of 
the propane problem; apart from Ryan's, Ms. Woods'. or Mr. K.ems' reports of the issue. 
It is beyond believable that an employee could be charged with solving a problem ( even a 
building code or safety violation), provide regular progress reports to his employer, discuss the 
viability of proposed solutions with superiors. and th~ after being fired, use 'those same 
activities to substantiate claun of retaliatoiy discharge. This is especially true when the employee 
was charged with fixing a problem already known to the employer. Certamly, the stalllte offers 
protection to employees who report "a violation or suspected violation of a law." And it is 
undisputed that the propane leak was a violation of law; however, there was nothing to report for 
purposes of the Act because the School District already knew abeut the problem and was trying 
to :fix it. Therefore, Ryan has failed to establish that these discussed actions constituted protected 
activity. 
41 Woods Aff. 3. 
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The Court now looks to Ryan's other actions to determine whether any of these 
reasonably constituted protected activity~ F~ Ryan claims he appeared-at the May 17 school 
board meeting to testify against Mr. Kerns. 42 The meeting notes shed a different light on his 
participation in that meeting; instead, these merely indicate Ryan reported "the propane issues 
are still a problem.""3 As with his other reports. this was nothing more than a progress report on 
the problem Ryan had already been tas1ced with solving. 
Just as before. the Court finds it difficult to conclude this partitipation in the School 
Board meeting constitutes protected activity, even after drawing reasonable inferences in bis 
favor. The School Board already knew of the propane leak, Mr. Kems bad personally infonned 
the School Board of the issue approximately four months prior, Ryan had been providing the 
School Board with monthly reports on the issue, and the School Board had approved payments 
for service calls made by Sermon Electric and High Planes Propane lOI1g before this meeting 
occurred. Again, the Court is left to ponder, what else was there to report that might have 
constituted a protected activity? 
Finally, the Court addresses the message Ryan posted to Facebook near the end of May 
or beginning of June. The posted was message was critical of the Clark County School District 
and Administration. Although. the message may have contained a cryptic reference to the 
propane pro bl~ it more closely resembles an unfettered rant by a disgruntled employee. It 
offers nothing that resembles a good faith report of "a violation or suspected violation of a 
law .... " 44 Therefore, the Court cannot deem it protected activity. 
Because Mr. Berrett has not established that he engaged in any protected activity, 
summary judgment in favor of the School District is appropriate. Nevertheless, for the sake of 
Q Berrett Aff. 5, 
43 Woods Aff. Ex. A. 
-44 lDAllO CODE ANN. § 6-2104(1) (1994) ( emphasis added). 
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inquiry, the Court continues its analysis of the two remaining elements: (1) adverse action. 
against the employee. and (2) a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse 
action. 
b. The District took an adverse action against Ryan Berrett by terminating his 
employment. 
The second element oi a retaliatory discharge clw.m. reqwres the employee to establish 
the employer took an adverse action against them. Based on the following analysis. the Court 
concludes that the Cl.ark County School District took adverse action against Ryan. The evidence 
before the Court is that Mr. Be~tt• s employment was renninatetl. This is undisputed.. 
After Ryan aired his discontent via social media, Ms. Haight-Mortensen notified Mr. 
Kerns about the post and requested that he speak to Ryan about it Mr. Kerns approached Ryan 
about the Facebook post and asked th.at it be removed. Ryan became belligerent and called Mr. 
Kerns a ":fucking asshole/.4:S Mr. K.ems then explained why the past was inappropriate and 
requested that Ryan remove it, for the second time. Ryan agreed to remove it, and did so. 
Mr. Kerns discussed th.en the Facebook post and his encounter with Ryan at the School 
Board's next meeting. Dw.ing the meeting it was decided that Mr. Benett was an at-will 
employee and discharge was the appropriate sanction for his conduct. A termination letter was 
then drafted and delivered to Ryan.. The letter, signed by Mr. Kerns, states in relevant part: 
You have been insubordinate and verbally abusive to the District administration 
and have ridiculed personnel through social media on the mtemet. Your 
performance in some duties has been declming as well witb. building maintenance 
and keeping lights replaced and in working order. Due to your status as an "at-
will", or non-contractual employee, the District administration has decided to 
terminate your employment effective June 30th, 2012.46 
4$ K.ru:ns Aff. 7. 
46 Kerns Aff. Ex.. B. 
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The School District does not dispute that this letter was delivered. nor that Ryan's emplo)llllent 
was ten:ninated.Because itis undisputedhis employmentter.mina:ted. Ryan has established that 
the School District took adverse action against him. However S'llinlnm:"y judgment in favor of the 
School District .is still appropriate based on the Court's analysis ofth.e other two elements. 
c. There is no cam-al com1ection betwee. Ryan Berretts alleged. protected. 
activity ana the advene action taken by the District. 
To survive summ.ary judgment on a retaliatory discharge claim, Ryan must also establish 
a causal connection between his alleged, protected activity and the adverse action taken by the 
School District. Because Ryan failed to establish 1hat he engaged in a protected activity, there 
can be no causal connection to the adverse action taken by the District. Nevertheless, the Court 
continues its analysis of the final element for the sake of inquity, Relevant to this inquiry is the 
''Proximity in time between the protected activity and the adverse employment action_ .. _,'47 
As stated, several the School District's other employees and administrators received 
reports of a propane odor in the gymnasium as early as January 2012. Over a period of several 
months, Ryao. worked to resolve the issues and provided regular reports to Mt. Kerns and the 
School Board. Multiple affidavits and their corresponding exhibits suppott these facts. It was not 
until approximately five months later. after multiple written and verbal reports were provided 
that Ryan's employment was terminated. This is a significant amount of time, and the Court 
concl'Odes that the adverse action taken agamst Ryan and the alleged protected activity are not 
causally connected. 
In.stead, another cause for Ryan's discharge is more likely. As the Court discussed above. 
Ryan posted a derogatory message on Facebook in late May or early June. The posted message 
47 See Curlee, 148 ldaho at 397, 224P3d at464 (quotingHengv. RotechMed.Corp., 688 N.W.2d389, 401, (N.D. 2004)). 
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was critical of the School District and the Administration and violated the School District~s 
established policies. Ryan further compounded. this behavior when he was confronted by Mr. 
Kerns. When he was confronted Ryan was belligeren~ ca::lling Mr. Kerns a ''fucking asshole." As 
a result of this conduct, Ryan was deemed "insubordinate and verbally abusive to the District 
administration and have ridiculed. personnel through. social media on the :internet', and his 
employment was tenninated. 48 
In addition to this belligerent conduct, the letter provided another reason for Ryan's 
discharge: he had been doing a poor job in his maintenance duties.49 The evidence before the 
Court supports this. Only a few months before his discharge, the School District's facilities were 
inspected and numerous maintenance violations were discovered. In fact. some of these 
violations had been noted in the previous two or three inspections and still remained 
unresolved. 50 
Based upon the undisputed. evidence and drawing reasonable inferences in favor of the 
nonmoving party. Ryan•s "ter.n:rination had nothing to do with the propane issue" or any other 
protected activity. si Therefore, the Court concludes there is no causal comiection between the 
adverse action taken by th.e School District (i.e. Ryan's discharge) and any activity Ryan claims. 
Because Ryan has failed to establish that he engaged in any protected activity or that the adverse 
action taken against him was related to such activity was causally related, summary judgment in 
favor of the School District is appropriate. 
3. As a lna.tter of public policy, Lanie Berrett does not qualify for protection under the 
act as the sponse of a whistleblowet. 
4& Keras Aff: Ex. A.. 
4ll Kens Aff. Ex. A.. 
so Woods Aft Ex. A. 
.si Haight-Mortens&o Aff. 5. 
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As a matter of public policy, Lanie Berrett claims that she qualifies for protection under 
the Act as the spouse of a whistleblower. However. based on the Court's prior analysis, Ryan 
Berrett failed to establish that he was a whistleblower under the Act or was the subject of a 
retaliat.ory discharge. Because Ryan does not qualify for protected status under the Act, Lanie 
cannot claim it as his spouse either. 
However, even if Ryan had established a prim.a facie case retaliatory discharge, Lanie 
would still not be entitled to protection for two reasons. First. under established law, spouses of 
employees are unprotected by the Act. Second. her tennination is not causally connected to any 
protected activity. 
a. Sponses of Employees are Unprotected 
Spouses of employees who engage in protected activity are not protected under 1he Act or 
any related Idaho law. The Idaho Whistleblower Act provides a "cause of action for public 
employees who experience adverse action from their employer as a result of reporting waste and 
violations of a law, rule or regulati.on."52 Lanie Berrett asserts that as a m.a.tter of public policy. 
she is entitled to protection. However, the Court cannot adopt this conclusion.\ 
The .language of the Act specifically allows relief for "employees." It makes no reference 
to, or allowance, for spouses of employees. 53 The Comt is unwilling to read words into the 
statute that were not included by the legislatme, nor is the Court willing to extend protection that 
is not expressly provided by the Act Therefore, the Court C8D110t conclude that spouses of 
employees engaging in protected activity are entitled to protection under the Aci Because Lanie 
Berrett is not entitled to protection as the spouse of an employee claiming protection under the 
Act, summary judgment in favor of the School District should be granted. 
52 lDAJIOCOOE.ANN. § 6-2101 (1994) (8lllphasis added). 
13 See IDAHO CODB.ANN, § 6-2101 (1994). 
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b. Lanie>s Tenrdnation is not Causally Connected 
Even if Lanie were entitled to protection as the spouse of an employee engaging in 
protected activity, summary judgment is still appropriate because she-has not established th.at her 
termination was causally coDnected to any ( even the activity asserted by her husband ). As 
discussed above, the Berretts must a establish a prim.a facie case of retaliatory discharge to 
survive summary judgment. 54 Such a claim requires three elements: (I) the employee .engaged in 
a protected activity, (2) the employer took adverse action against the employee, and (3) the 
adverse action was causally co.nnected to the protected acti'Vity.55 
Lanie does not assert that she engaged in protected activity; rather, she relies on her 
husband's claim that he engaged in protected activity. As the Court previously concluded, Ryan 
did not engage in protected activity. Even if he had, the Act does not extend protection to 
spouses of employees engaging in protected activity. 
The second element requires an adverse action against the employee. If the Act made 
allowance for spouses· of employees, Lanie could establish this element. Her employenient was 
terminated and this is not disputed by the School District Therefore, adverse action was taken 
against her. 
However, Lanie would not qualify for protection under the Act because her temuna!ion. is 
not causally connected to any protected activity. In the te::ouioation letter. signed by David Kerns, 
and delivered. to Lanie, the reasoning for her termination is stated. The letter .states, "You have 
consistently overspent the Food Service budget each year. with the amount increasing each time. 
You also are not performing satisfactorily in your supervisory duties and you have not followed 
the direction from your own supervisor when called upon to make sure District policies and 
54 Curlee, 14& Idaho at 397,224 P.3dat 464. 
ss Id. 
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procedures are followed. ,.56 This reasoning for her termination is further supported. by the 
affidavits. 
P. 020/024 
The multiple affidavits submitted to the Court indicate that Ms. Berrett consistently 
overspent the food service budget. Notwithstanding, Lanie continued to exceed her budget. Th.en. 
after all this> it was discovered that Lanie bad failed. repeatedly, to submit paperwork required by 
the State ofldaho. 
These are the offenses cited in her termination letter. They are entirely separate and apart 
from her husband's activities and the propane leak. The termination letter does not mention or 
even. allude that her termination is in any way related to her husband or his actions. As a result, 
the Court cannot conclude that the termination of Lanie' .s employment was in retaliation for any 
protected activity and sun:unaxy judgment in favor of the School District is appropriate. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
Therefore. the Court concludes. based on its prior analysis, that it is not botmd by the 
Nfoth. Circuit Court of Appeals decision on the Berretts' claims and may conduct an independent 
evaluation of the facts before it. Additionally. having conducted an independent evaluation of the 
facts befoxe it, the Court cannot conclude that either of the Be:ttetts' engaged in a protected 
activity or that their terminations are causally connected to any protected activity. Because the 
Berretts have failed to establish tliese two elements, even drawing reasonable inferences in their 
favor, the Court camiot conclude th.ere is a genuine issue of material fa.ct left to be resolved at 
trial Lastly, based Court's prior analysis, the School District's Fourteenth Defense should be 
denied. Therefore, summary judgment in favor of the School District is appropriate. 
56 Kems Aff. Ex.D. 
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Based on the foregoing, the Comt orders as follows: 
1-- . Plaintiff's Partial Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. 
2- Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
,,,.J,,e..... 
Dated this /5 dayofNovember 2017. 
District Judge 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
RONALD RY AN BERRETT AND 
LANIE BERRETI, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
CLAR~ COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT 
N0.161, 
Defendant 
Case No. CV-2017-0328 
MEMORDANDUM DECISION ON 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER 
This Memorandum Decision is in response to the Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider. 
I. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For purposes of this Motion to Reconsider the Court adopts the following facts, 
acknowledging there were inadvertent facts in the Court's prior opinion at summary judgment: 
The plaintiffs, Ronald Ryan Berrett and Lanie Berrett ("Ryan" or "Mr. Berrett", and 
"Lanie" or "Ms. Berrett", and collectively as "the Berretts"), were both employed by the Clark 
County School District (the "District"). Ryan was employed as the District's maintenance 
supervisor and Lanie as the lunchroom supervisor. During the relevant time period, Erin Haight-
Mortensen ("Ms. Haight-Mortensen") was chairwoman of the Clark County School Board, 
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David Kerns ("Mr. Kerns") was the district superintendent, and Gayle Woods ("Ms. Woods") 
was the district business manager. 
1. Ryan 
As the District's maintenance supervisor, Ryan Berrett maintained and fixed the 
District's furnace system. 1 As discussed below, this also included the propane tank and 
corresponding system that supplied propane gas to the furnaces. In January 2012, Ms. Woods 
began receiving reports that the old gymnasium smelled of propane. 2 Ms. Woods informed Ryan 
of the reported odor.3 Ms. Woods also informed Mr. Kerns, and Mr. Kerns informed Ms. Haight-
Mortensen.4 Ms. Woods, Mr. Kerns, and Ms. Haight-Mortensen were all aware that the propane 
system leak was a building code violation. 5 
Ryan began working to solve the problem and enlisted the help of Sermon Electric. 6 
Ryan also began reporting on the problem in his monthly letters to the District's school board 
("the Board").7 In February, he wrote, 'We do have a propane pressure issue that has been 
ongoing for several years. I have been working with a Sermon technician and think a lot of the 
problems are at the bulk tank. I will bet [sic] the problem resolved."8 Although Ryan does not 
mention this letter ( or any of the others he sent) in his affidavit, he has not disputed the 
authenticity of the letters provided by the District. 
1 Affidavit of Jacob S. Wessel in Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Ronald Ryan Berrett and 
La.nie Berrett v. Clark County School District No. 161, Jefferson County case no. CV-17-0328 (filed September 15, 
2017) (hereinafter "Wessel Affidavit}, at attachment p.311. 
2 Affidavit of Gayle Woods, Ronald RY.(lll-Berrett and Lanie Berrett v. Clarie County School District No. 161, 
Jefferson County case no. CV-17-0328 (filed August 31, 2017) (hereinafter "Woods Affidavit), at p.3 3 Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.311. 
4 Woods Affidavit, at p.3; Affidavit of David Kerns, Ronald Ryan Berrett and Lanie Berrett v. Clarie County School 
District No. 161, Jefferson County case no. CV-17-0328 (filed August 31, 2017) (hereinafter "Kerns Affidavit), at p-2. 
Woods Affidavit, at p.3; Kerns Affidavit, at p.2; Affidavit of ;Erin Haight-Mortensen, Ronald Ryan Berrett and 
La.nie Berrett v. Clarie County School District No. 161, Jefferson County case no. CV-17-0328 (filed August 31, 
2017) (hereinafter "Haight-Mortensen Affidavit), at p.3. 
6 Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.311-12. 
7 Woods Affidavit, at Ex. A, p.27-29. 
8 Woods Affidavit, at Ex. A, p.27. 
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In March, he provided another update to the Board.9 This time he described the work he 
had done on the propane system over the past month and his diagnosis of the problem. 10 He 
concluded by writing, "I am waiting for a bid from sermon [sic] to correct this problem, when I 
receive it I will give it to MR. KERNS [sic] and we will go from there." 11 Later, Ryan received 
the bid and showed it to Mr. Kerns and Ms. Haight-Mortensen.12 There is a dispute about what 
happened after Ryan received the quote from Sermon Electric and showed it to Mr. Kerns. Ryan 
claims that Mr. Kerns told him to "keep quiet."13 Mr. Kerns disputes that he instructed Ryan to 
"keep quiet." 14 
During the months of February, March, and April, Ryan worked with technicians from 
both Sermon Electric and High Planes Propane. 15 Ryan mentioned the involvement of Sermon 
Electric and High Planes Propane in his monthly letters to the school board. 16 Over the course of 
this three month period, both companies visited the school on numerous occasions and attempted 
to help Ryan isolate and repair the leak in the propane system. 17 During this time frame, the 
Board was aware of these visits and approved payment for the service calls. 18 After several 
months of work, it was discovered that the propane system contained micro-leaks throughout and 
plans were made to repair it 19 
9 Woods Affidavit, at Ex. A, p.28. 
10 Woods Affidavit, at Ex. A, p.28. 
11 Woods Affidavit, at Ex. A, p.28. 
12 Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.3 I 2-13. 
13 Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.313. 
14 Kerns Affidavit, at p.2. 
15 Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.31 I-13. 
16 Woods Affidavit, at Ex. A, p.27-29. 
17 Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.311-13. 
18 Woods Affidavit, at p.3. 
19 Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.312-13; Woods Affidavit, at p.4; Kerns Affidavit, at p.3-4; Haight-Mortensen 
Affidavit, at p.3-4. 
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In May 2012 the propane issue was still unresolved.20 Ryan attended the Board meeting 
to discuss the ongoing propane issue that month.21 The Board minutes indicate Ryan appeared 
and told the School Board that "the propane issues are still a problem."22 Ryan characterizes his 
participation in this meeting, by stating that he ''testified against Mr. Kerns ... :•23 
In June, Ryan posted a derogatory message on Facebook.24 The following is an image of 
the message Ryan posted, as included in his affidavit:25 
lh.,,m St:rretl 
··,-· · foroartc.c:.oimtyschool dl$1d!1 for2 
• u,I,,,-' baVe ran tl:lll malntenence tiepartment Ke Iune 15.JustClll'l()US .... , i ttiough I hM asltfor it ~rvyear and was tDld by DM ms 
y~ars -bl' myself, withoutallY help e\11!11 ife and I have always trled ID dD the best we could to . 
that ,omeone would be bbed for sure. MyWJ the stho01 dlstrlc moneys, l haw al!;o gone ? yrs 
contribtrte: as much free time as pO§l"bla to help sava c...1,.,ft~I 50 now I think a stale audlt ""' I feel th'ls ls vefY IJl1Pl'O......,. ... .... ..... .... se...i..n an acillill budget on pa.,- . d ,_ _..,.;.., .-.. offidals l have spoten to 
.,,~·"'""'' '""
06 
• to the GASIL M a .... =-~..,.., " 
needs to be .s1r0ngly considered a~ ...... -thwt the business manager nas always been a part 
I p1e· ba11e talk to have....,.. ••.... .. · the 
agree, Also severa peo • It Is 40 + thousand dollar a year Job, ITfOl1! then 
time position In the pest and IIOW I guess 1 ,_. a--r. I am very disabled and I haw . ndmiootnutlfflonsupervtsoTma.., m ,- . . l 
malntencencuupeMSOU _ feel I sho Id ~have to take a 300.00 dollardeqeiu,e n 
done thiS Job bV myself for 80D.OO 8 fl',0~ :sc-hool ai:ut 30.000.dl>brs in flXltlg things bye myself, 1 
pay, When 1 lalDw bow llltldt I ha'/e SBVe our Administration did not want to ;iddress an Issue ttat 
strongly. feel thlsJs outofretallatkin becaUSe • then me and mywlfe have hadnothlrg but 
could hlllle endan~red the ll\lel1 of dtlldTen, ~ e,ery A~~a.wlfe ,_ been accused of fraudulerit 
. ~-~~~~~ ·- ~ grief from certln peop~ . .. ... , dearedlhe tsstiR l,asnevergotten even-an apolagy, l 
atx:USa!iOns andevtn1houl!hsh~was,ol3llv _._, __ ,_-4 thlnklnB wnatshouldl dohumm Ull 
.... ft .,.._,._huallbeen .......... m"'"""" this is Wl'On& lfyou agree hit"""'., ,IQ 
After it was posted, several members of the community saw and commented on the message. 26 
Ms. Haight-Mortensen was among those who it message. 27 After viewing the message, Ms. 
Haight-Mortensen provided a copy of it to Mr. Kems.28 
Mr. Kerns discussed Ryan's Facebook post Ryan at the Board's next meeting.29 Mr. 
Kerns and Ms. Haight Mortensen were both present and involved in the meeting. 30 During the 
20 Woods Affidavit, at Ex. A, p.34. 
21 Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.314; Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.4. 
22 Woods Affidavit, at Ex. A, p.34. 
23 Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.314. 
24 Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.315, 323-24. 
25 Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.324. 
26 Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.5, Ex.A. 
27 Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.5. 
28 Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.5. 
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meeting, the District determined that because Mr. Berrett was an at-will employee, termination 
was the appropriate sanction for his conduct.31 A termination letter was then drafted and 
delivered to Ryan.32 The letter, signed by Mr. Kerns, states in relevant part: 
You have been insubordinate and verbally abusive to the District administration 
and have ridiculed personnel tbmugh social media on the internet. Your 
performance in some duties has been declining as well with building maintenance 
and keeping lights replaced and in working order. Due to your status as an "at-
will", or non-contractual employee, the District administration has decided to 
terminate your employment effective June 30th, 2012.33 
Accordingly, Ryan's employment was terminated on June 30, 2012.34 Ryan disputes that the 
Board was aware of, or approved, his termination but has not provided any evidence to support 
this conclusion. 
2. Lanie 
Lanie Berrett was the District's lunchroom supervisor from spring 2009 through June 
2012. 35 As the lunchroom supervisor, Ms. Berrett was responsible for proper management of the 
kitchen.36 This required that she prepare (and adhere to) an annual budget and submit state-
required paperwork.37 The District asserts that Lanie failed to remain within her allotted budget 
for at least three consecutive years and submit the state-required paperwork. 38 Furthermore, the 
District asserts that Lanie's job performance was unsatisfactory.39 
Her termination letter, which was signed by Mr. Kerns, states, "You have consistently 
overspent the Food Service budget each year, with the amount increasing each time. You also are 
29 Kerns Affidavit, at p.5; Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p5-6 
3° Kerns Affidavit, at p.5; Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.5. 
31 Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.5-6. 
32 Kerns Affidavit, at p.5; Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.5-6. 
33 Kerns Affidavit, at Ex. B. 
34 Wessel Affidavit, at attachmentp.315. 
35 Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.329; Woods Affidavit, at p.5; Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.6. 36 Woods Affidavit, at p.5; Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.6; 
37 Woods Affidavit, at p.5; Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.6; 
38 Woods Affidavit, at p.5; Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.6; 
39 Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.6; 
MEMORDANDUM DECISION ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER Pages of 41 
not performing satisfactorily in your supervisory duties and you have not followed the direction 
from your own supervisor when called upon to make sure District policies and procedures are 
followed."40 Accordingly, Lanie's employment was terrninated.41 Lanie disputes the reasons for 
her termination. 42 Therefore, for pmposes of summary judgment, the Court assumes Lanie 
performed satisfactorily, did not exceed the budget, and submitted the state-required paperwork. 
After they were discharged, the Berretts filed an action in the Federal District Court of 
Idaho. The Federal court granted summary judgment in favor of the District on all claims and the 
Berretts appealed to Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed the Federal District Court's ruling as to the federal law claims, but remanded the 
decision back to the Federal District Court on the-state law claims. The Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals concluded that the Berretts had established a prime facie case under the Idaho 
Whlstleblower Act and were entitled to a trial. Upon the remand, the Federal District Court 
declined to exercise jurisdiction and dismissed the case without prejudice. The Berretts then filed 
their claims in state district court. 
II. 
APPLICABLE LAW 
1. Standard - Motion to Reconsider 
"On a motion for reconsideration, the court must consider any new admissible evidence 
or authority bearing-on the correctness of an interlocutory order." 43 However, it is not required 
that the motion "be supported by new evidence or authority." 44 "When deciding [al motion for 
reconsideration, the district court must apply the same standard of review that the court applied 
4° Kerns Affidavit, at Ex. D. 
41 Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.330. 
42 Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.329-30. 
43 Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266,276, 281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012). 
44 Id. 
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when deciding the original order that is being reconsidered. "45 Therefore, when deciding a 
motion to reconsider a grant of summary judgment. the Court must apply the summary judgment 
standard.46 
2. Standard - Summary Judgment 
Summary judgment is proper if, based upon "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions 
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuihe issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is ·entitled to judgment as a matter of law."47 In evaluating a 
party's Motion for Summary Judgment, "[The Court] liberally construes all disputed facts" and 
draws "all reasonable inferences and conclusions supported by the record in favor of the party 
opposing the motion."48 Where there is no "issue of material fact, only a question of law 
remains."49 When only a question of law remains, the Court "exercises free review."50 
Additionally, the nonmovin.g party must provide more than a "mere scintilla of 
evidence," creating a genuine issue of material fact. 51 In other words, "[T]he nonmoving party 
must respond to the summary judgment motion with specific facts showing there is a genuine 
issue for trial."52 "Bare assertions that an issue of fact exists, in the face of particular facts 
alleged by the movant, are not sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact."53 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
41 Kiebert v. Goss, 144 Idaho 225, 227, 159 P.3d 862,864 (2007); I.RC.P. 56(c), 
48 Kiebert, 144 Idaho at 227, 159 P.3d at 864. 
49 Id. 
so Id. 
51 Van v. Portneuf Med. Ctr., 147 Idaho 552,556 212 P.3d 982, 986 (2009). 
s2 ld. 
53 Cates v. Albertson's Inc., 126 ldaho 1030, 1033, 895 P.2d 1223, 1226 (1994). 
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3. Law of the Case 
The law of the case is.similar to stare decisis. Like stare decisis, it seeks to eliminate 
"relitigation of settled issues .... "54 Specifically, the Idaho Court of Appeals has stated: 
[W]here an appellate court states a principle of law in deciding a case, that rule 
becomes the law of the case and is controlling both in the lower court and on 
subsequent appeals as long as the facts are substantially the same. The decision on 
an issue of law made at one stage of a proceedinf becomes precedent to be 
followed in successive stages of that same litigation.5 
However, notwithstanding this precedent, established by the Idaho Court of Appeals, state 
district courts are not required to treat Federal district or circuit court decisions or interpretations 
of Idaho law as binding.56 This applies "even on issues of federal law." 57 Certainly, they may 
treat Federal district and circuit court decisions as persuasive, but they are not required to do 
so.ss 
4. Idaho Whistleblower Act ~ § 6-2101 et seq. 
The Idaho Whistleblower Act ("the Act") affords "a legal cause of action for public 
employees who experience adverse action from their employer as a result of reporting waste and 
violations of a law, rule or regulation."59 Protection under the Act is afforded to employees who 
communicate, "in good faith the existence of any waste of public funds, property or manpower, 
or a violation or suspected violation of a law ... under the law of this state or the United 
54 Sun Valley Ranches, Inc. v. Prairie Power Co-op., Inc., 124 Idaho 125, 129, 856 P.2d 1292, 1297 (Idaho Ct. App. 
1993). 
55 Id. (quoting Frazier v. Neilsen, 118 Idaho 104, 106, 794 P.2d ll60, 1162 (Idaho Ct App. 1990))(internal 
citations omitted). 
56 See State v. McNeely, 162 Idaho 413,413,398 P.3d 146, 149 (Idaho 2017) (finding error where state district court 
felt compelled to follow a directive or pronouncement of the Ninth Circuit). 
51 Id. (quoting Dan Wiebold Ford, Inc. v. Universal Computer Services, Inc., 142 Idaho 235,240, 127 P.3d 138, 143 
(2005)). 
58 McNeely, 162 Idaho at 413, 398 P.3d at 149 (Idaho 2017). 
59 Idaho Code§ 6-2101 (1994). 
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States.',6° However, a good faith communication must also "be made at a time and in a manner 
which gives the employer a reasonable opportunity to correct the waste or violation."61 
m. 
ANALYSIS 
These are the issues before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider. (1) Does the 
"law of the case" apply to the Ninth Circuit Court's decision, thereby binding this Court and 
entitling the Berretts' to a trial their claims? (2) Did the Court properly construe the facts in favor 
of the plaintiffs in its decision at summary judgment? (3) Did the Court properly grant summary 
judgment in favor of the Defendant, thereby dismissing Ryan Berrett' s whistleblower claim? ( 4) 
Did the Court properly grant summary judgment in favor of the Defendant on Lanie's public 
policy claim? (5) Was summary judgment properly granted on Plaintiffs remaining federal law 
claims? 
1. The Law of the Case 
The law of the case does not apply and the Court may make an independent evaluation of 
the facts and evidence before it (i.e. it is not bound by the prior decision of the Ninth Circuit 
Court's decision). As stated in the Court's earlier decision, the Berretts previously filed their 
claims in federal court. The District moved for summary judgment and the Federal District Court 
granted summary judgment for the District. This decision was appealed to the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals. 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling on the Berretts' federal 
law claims but remanded the case back on the remaining state law claims. In doing so, the Ninth 
Circuit stated: 
60 Idaho Code§ 6-2104(1) (emphasis added). 
61 /d. 
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Mr. Berrett established a prima facie case of retaliatory conduct by presenting 
evidence that: he engaged in protected activity by reporting "a violation .or 
suspected violation of a law" ... he suffered an "adverse action" when he- was 
tem1inated . . . and the "close relation in time" between them, among other 
factors, suggests he may have been fired for reporting the propane issue. This is 
sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact to survive summary 
judgment. 62 
Upon remand the Federa1 District Court declined jurisdiction because there were no more federal 
law claims and the case was dismissed without_prejudice. Subsequently, the Berretts refiled their 
claims in state district court The Defendants then moved for summary judgment. At summary 
judgment the Berretts argued that the Ninth Circuit's decision on appeal constitutes the law of 
the case, entitling them to proceed to trial on the merits of their claims. 
After careful analysis, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants. 
The Berretts have filed a motion requesting the Court reconsider its prior decision. After the 
following analysis, the Court remains convinced that its prior decision, granting summary 
judgment in favor of the Defendants, was proper. 
Like stare decisis, the "law of the case" seeks to eliminate "relitigation of settled issues .. 
. • "
63 The Idaho Court of Appeals has stated: 
[W]here an appellate court states a principle of law in deciding a case, that rule 
becomes the law of the case and is controlling both in the lower court and on 
subsequent appeals as long as the facts are substantially the same. The decision 
on an issue of law made at one stage of a proceeding becomes precedent to be 
followed in successive stages of that same Htigation.64 
In Swanson v. Swanson, the Idaho Supreme Court described the law of the case as follows: 
[U]pon appeal, the Supreme Court in deciding a case presented states in its 
opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, such pronouncement 
62 Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Ronal.d Ryan and Lanie Berrett v. Clark County School District No. 161, 
Jefferson County case no. CV-17-0328 (filed May 9, 2017) (hereinafter"Complaint"), at Ex. A. 
63 Sun Valley Ranches, Inc., 124 Idaho at 129, 856 P.2d at 1297. 
64 Id. (quoting Frazier v. Neilsen, 118 Idaho I 04, 106, 794 P.2d 1160, 1162 (Idaho Ct App. 1990) (internal citations 
omitted) (emphasis added). 
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becomes the law of the case, and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent 
progress, both in the trial court and upon subsequent appeal .... 65 
The Idaho Supreme Court has pointed out other language in Creem v. Northwestern Mut. Fire 
Ass 'n. of Seattle, Wash. which describes the law of the case doctrine this way: 
Where a judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court -''for a 
new trial," the case comes on for the same, in all respects, as if it had never been 
tried, subject to this condition, however, that it must be tried in light of and in 
consonance with the rules of law as announced by the appellate court in that 
particular case. 66 
This case is substantially different from the one filed in federal court and does not meet 
the standards relied upon by the Idaho Supreme Court in Swanson or Creem. The original 
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial was filed in the United States District Court for the 
District of Idaho in December 2012 and assigned case number 4: 12-CV-0626-EJL. The Federal 
District Court then granted summary judgment for the Defendants on all claims. Plaintiffs 
appealed the case to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court in part 
but remanded the case back on Ryan's "whistleblower claim" and on Lanie's "public policy 
claim." Upon remand, the Federal District Court granted the Defendant's Motion for the Court to 
Decline Jurisdiction and dismissed Plaintiffs' state law claims without prejudice. 67 
Plaintiffs' then filed their claims anew, incorporating their same federal Complaint and 
Demand for Jury Trial when they filed their case in Jefferson County. This new case was filed in 
a separate jurisdiction from Plaintiffs' earlier case, and was assigned a new case number 
(Jefferson County case no. CV-2017-0328). Although Plaintiffs assert that the case filed in 
Jefferson County is the same case, it is not As quoted above, the Idaho Supreme Court has 
65 134ldaho 512, 515,5 P.3d 973,976 (2000) (quotingSuitts v. First Sec. Bankofldalw, llOidaho 15, 21,713 P.2d 
1374, 1380 (1985)). 
66 Creem v. Northwestern Mut. Fire Ass'n of Seattle, Wash .. 58 Idaho 349, _, 74 P.2d 702, 703 (1937). 
61 Complaint, at Ex. B. 
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previously announced that the law of the case only applies "in that particular case."68 Based on 
the Court's reasoning and analysis the two cases are different and separate. Therefore, the law of 
the case does not apply. 
Despite Plaintiffs' arguments to the contrary, there are additional reasons why the 
law of the case does not apply. First, state district courts are not required to treat federal dis-trict 
or federal circuit court decisions or interpretations of Idaho law as binding. 
69 Second, the facts in 
the case before the Court are not the same as those in the federal case. 
As stated, state district courts are not required to treat federal district or federal circuit 
court decisions or interpretations of Idaho law as binding. 70 This even applies to "issues of 
. federal law." 71 Certainly, Idaho courts may treat Federal district and circuit court decisions as 
persuasive, but they are not required to do so.72 
In its Order and Opinion on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment the Court relied on 
this holding as announced by State v. McNeely, 162 Idaho 413,398 P.3d 146 (2017). In 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider, Plaintiffs attacked the Court's reliance on McNeely by arguing 
that the question before this Court, in this case, is entirely different from the question presented 
in McNeely (i.e. "must this Court follow decisions by the Ninth Circuit in this exact case").
73 
The fatal flaw in Plaintiffs argument is, as reasoned above, the case now pending is not the exact 
case that was before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Even if this were the exact same case, 
the Court still believes the holding in McNeely is relevant and disposifive. 
68 Creem v. Northwestern Mut. Fire Ass'n of Seattle, Wash., 58 Idaho 349, _, 74 P.2d 702, 703 (1937). 
69 See State v. McNeely, 162 Idaho at_, 398 P.3d at 149 (finding error where state district court felt compelled to 
follow a directive or pronouncement of the Ninth Circuit). 
70 Id. 
71 Id. (quoting Dan Wiebold Ford, Inc. v. Universal Computer Services, Inc., 142 Idaho 235,240, 127 P.3d 138, 143 
{2005)). 
72 McNeely, 162 Idaho at_, 398 P.3d at 149 (Idaho 2017). 
73 Motion to Reconsider, Ronald Ryan Berrett and Lanie Berrett v. Clark Cowity School District No. 161, Jefferson 
County case no. CV-17-0328 (filed November 28, 2017) (Hereinafter "Motion"), at p.4. 
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Notwithstanding, the Court wishes to supplements it prior reasoning and- analysis by 
relying on the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in English v. Taylor, 160 Idaho 737, 742, 378 
P.3d 1036, 1041 (2016). fu English, the plaintiffs filed their complaint in the Bonneville County 
district court.74 The case was then removed to federal court based diversity of citizenship.
75 
Later, the Englishes "filed a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint ... " on 
December 10, 2013, and sought to add two new defendants, Eastern Idaho Regional Medical 
Center and Dr. James Taylor.76
 The Englishes did not serve copies of their motion or the second 
amended complaint on either of the new defendants at that time. 
77 The motion was granted and 
the Second Amended Complaint was filed on January 16, 2014. 
78 "[T]he filing of the Second 
Amended Complaint destroyed diversity and deprived the federal district court of subject matter 
jurisdiction." 79 After the Englishes filed their Second Amended Complaint in federal court, the 
parties stipulated to remand the case back to state district court. 
80 
On January 24, 2014, after the case was remanded back to the state district court, the 
plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint in the Bonneville County district court, and 
served the two new defendants.81 
On March 4, 2014, the Englishes filed an ex parte Rule 60 Motion to Clarify 
Docket entry order with the federal district court, seeking clarification that the 
order granting their motion to file the second amended complaint related back to 
the date on which the Englishes filed their motion for leave to file the Second 
Amended Complaint. The motion stated that the purpose would be to clarify "that 
the Complaint was filed on December 10, 2013, instead of some other date.'.s
2 
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The federal district court entered a clarifying order on the Englishes motion to amend, stating, 
"The Court hereby clarifies that Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint was effectively filed on 
December 10, 2013 .... "83 
Subsequently, the new defendants filed motions for "summary judgment on grounds that 
the statute of limitations had expired" and the district court granted the motions, concluding "the 
Englishes did not commence the actions against Respondents until after the statute of limitations 
had expired." 
84 The Englishes appealed. On appeal before the Idaho Supreme Court the 
Englishes argued that the federal district court's clarifying order (i.e. the second amended 
complaint was effectively filed December 10, 2013) was dispositive. The Idaho Supreme Court 
noted that this argument had waived on appeal but addressed the claim anyways by stating, 
"Even if the Englishes had not waived the argument, it is well established that 'the decisions of 
lower federal courts are not binding on state courts, even on issues of federal law.' Therefore, the 
federal district court's order of clarification is not binding on this Court."
85 
As stated, the Court also recognizes that the facts in the federal case and the state case are 
not substantially the same. Although Plaintiffs' filed the exact same affidavits that were filed in 
federal court, along with copies of the Defendant's affidavits from federal court, the Defendant 
has filed new affidavits. These affidavits offer facts not before the federal district court or the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Specifically, these affidavits state that the District was aware of 
the propane leak in January and recognized it was a building code violation; even though it was 
in Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. (internal citations omitted). Although it was a decision made by the federal district court and not the Ninth 
Circuit that was at issue in English, this was not the case in McNeely. At issue in McNeely was a pronouncement by 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Idaho Supreme Court concluded that decisions of the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals may be treated as persuasive but are not binding on Idaho's state courts. McNeely, 162 Idaho at_, 398 
P .3d at 148-49. 
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unable to isolate the cause or source of the leak. 
86 Therefore, based on the prior reasoning and 
analysis, the Ninth Circuit's decision in the Berrett's former case is not binding on this court, in 
this new case. 
2. Disputed and Undisputed Facts 
Plaintiffs have asserted multiple errors in the Court's findings of fact in its Opinion and 
Order on the Parties' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment Specifically, Plaintiffs' assert the 
Court failed to recognize facts that support their position and that the Court did not liberally 
construe the facts in the light most favorable to them. Examples of the asserted errors are 
provided below: 
First, Ryan's [sic] was hired as a person on disability. When he was hired, he told 
Kerns that he could not do the physical work required, but that he would call 
professionals to do the work. He was not responsible for the propane, heating and 
furn.ace system. Due to the smell, he called propane companies to check the 
system. Second, all of the affidavits state that until March, [sic] 2012, no one 
could find a leak in the propane system. No one knew there was a leak in the 
propane system. They only knew of a smell. Third, at the May, [sic] 2012 meeting 
Ryan testified against Kerns along with two propane professionals, and Kerns was 
a [sic] fired as a result. Fourth, Ryan never swore at Kerns and never called him a 
''fucking asshole", [sic] but Kerns used foul language towards Ryan and Lanie on 
multiple occasions. Fifth, Kerns fired the Berretts without the school board's 
knowledge. Only after they were fired, did the Berretts and Kerns go before the 
school board to discuss the termination. Sixth, Ryan Berrett always received 
positive performance reviews. The first time anyone complained about his 
performance was the statement in his termination letter that he was a doing a poor 
job in his maintenance duties.
87 
Further, Ryan asserts that he engaged in a protected activity under the Idaho 
Whistleblower Act and the.evidence shows the propane issue was not known to-the District 
Meanwhile, Lanie asserts that the Court erred because she "never exceeded her lunch room 
budget in any year" and that her employment evaluations were positive and she did not fail to 
86 Woods Affidavit, at p. 3; Kerns Affidavit, at p.2; Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.3. 
81 Motion, at p.7. 
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submit the state-required forms mentioned above. Each of these is discussed in greater detail 
below. 
a. Ryan's Job Responsibilities 
In his Motion to Reconsider Ryan asserts that he was hired as a person on disability. The 
issue of Ryan's disability was not~before the Court at summary judgment. Because it was not 
before the Court at summary judgment, it is immaterial to the Court's analysis of Plaintiffs' 
Motion to Reconsider. 
In addition to claiming he was hired as a person on disability, Ryan asserts, for the first 
time in his Motion to Reconsider, he was not responsible for the propane, heating, or furnace 
systems. However, based on the following analysis, the Court cannot reasonably infer that 
Ryan's responsibilities as maintenance supervisor did not include the furnace and propane 
systems; or that he was not tasked with resolving the propane issue. 
The Court's conclusion is supported by various statements from Ryan's own affidavit. 
First, Ryan writes, "I had been doing the best I could with my disability to maintain and fix 
furnaces, water heaters, and plumbing issues by myself."
88 Whether these were part of his job 
duties upon hiring or whether he acquired these duties later by assignment or his own initiative, 
it was asserted by Plaintiffs that Ryan undertook to fix these systems.
89 
Ryan also described how he became of aware of the propane problem in his own 
affidavit, indicating that in January 2012 he began "getting calls every other day about [sic] 
strong odor of propane in the old gymnasium from [the District's} business manager (Gayle 
Woods) .... "90 He also wrote that he "Had High Planes Propane come over to check for propane 
smell [sic]." He told Dave Kerns, "[He] was going to have Sermon Service and Electric come out 
88 Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.31 I. 
89 Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p .311. 
90 Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.311. 
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and [he] was going to lock the old gym up."
91 Over a period of several months Ryan continued, 
with the assistance of Sermon Electric, to work on solving the problem(s) with the propane . 
system. Once Sermon Electric had prepared a price quote for the needed repairs, Ryan was the 
person who received this quote and shared it with Dave Kerns. 
92 Ryan also provided regular 
reports on the work he was doing with the propane and heating systems in District meetings and 
in letters written to the school board.
93 Later, Ryan also reported on the problem(s) with the 
propane system at Board meeting in May.
94 
All of these facts support the Court's conclusion because in the absence of some 
responsibility for the furnace, heating, and propane systems, it is difficult for the Court to 
understand why Ryan would have been involved in fixing the problem the way he was. There is 
no evidence before the Court that Ryan ever disputed or objected to his responsibility for the 
propane and heating systems prior to the objection in Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider. 
Therefore, based on the prior reasoning and analysis, the Court cannot reasonably infer that Ryan 
was not the person responsible for maintaining and fixing the furnace and propane systems. 
b. Affidavits 
Ryan has argued that the Court erred in granting summary judgment for the District 
because "[A)ll the affidavits state that until March, [sic] 2012, no one could find a leak in the 
propane system. No one knew there was a leak in the propane system. They only knew of a 
smell." Even drawing reasonable inferences in Ryan's favor, and assuming the actual source, 
location, or cause of the propane leak was undiscovered until March 2012, the Court disagrees 
with Ryan's assertions. 
91 Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.311. 
92 Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.312. 
93 Woods Affidavit, at Ex. A. 
94 Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.314. 
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As mentioned above, Ryan began getting regular calls about a propane odor in the old 
gymnasium as early as January 2012. The Court cannot reasonably infer that the odor of propane 
in a room or building does not indicate the existence of a leak. Furthermore, when the Plaintiffs 
filed their claims in state court, the District provided affidavits from Gayle Woods, Dave Kerns, 
and Erin Haight-Mortensen. These affidavits each contain a similar statement which indicates the 
District was "aware that the leak in the propane system was a building code violation."
95 As the 
affidavits point out, the exact cause of the odor or the leak was unknown but it is evident 
everyone involved knew it was a problem and they were actively working to solve it Solving the 
problem was difficult because the source or cause of the propane smell, or leak, could not be 
isolated. 
Plaintiffs dispute these affidavits by arguing they contradict the affidavits filed by the 
District in the federal case. However, the Court cannot reasonably infer that the new affidavits 
contradict the earlier affidavits that were filed in federal court. Toe new affidavits emphasize the 
difficulty in isolating the problem and indicate that Gayle Woods, Dave Kerns, and Erin Haight-
Mortensen recognized the smell represented a building code violation that needed to be located 
and corrected. Information that was not provided within the affidavits filed in the federal case. 
Plaintiffs also rely upon deposition testimony in which Dave Kerns admits that he was 
unaware that the propane leak was a safety issue or that the propane tanks were not in 
compliance with building code or that he was unconcerned that the leak posed a safety threat 
Neither of these are material. As stated in the affidavits, the District was already aware that a 
building code violation existed somewhere in the system and it was working to _isolate it. 
Because the District already knew about the violation and was working to isolate it, the mere fact 
95 Woods Affidavit, at p.3; Keros Affidavit, at p.2; Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.3. 
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that Ryan (with help from Sermon Electric) may have been the person who isolated the source of 
the problem-and reported it does not qualify him for protection under the Act. 
As_-to the safety concerns regarding the propane leaks, which were pointed out by 
Plaintiffs in their motion to reconsider, this daim is immaterial. The Idaho Whistleblower Act 
affords protection to employees who "[communicate] in good faith the existence of any waste of 
public funds, property or manpower, or a violation or suspected violation of a law, rule or 
regulation adopted under the law of this state, a political subdivision of this state or the United 
States."96 Although the Court recognizes that a "safety" issue may be a result or concern of the 
reported ''violation of a law, rule or regulation", the statute's focus is on violations of law, rules, 
or regulations. Protection under the act is triggered when an employee reports a "violation of a 
law, rule or regulation" not a "safety" issue.
97 Therefore, it is immaterial whether Mr. Kerns 
recognized the propane problem as a safety concern for purposes of the Act. 
c. May 2012 School Board Meeting 
As- the Court discussed above,_Ryan was called upon to discuss the propane issue at the 
May 2012 school board meeting. Ryan asserts that "According to school board member Sherri 
Mead ... the school board terminated Kerns based upon [Ryan's] testimony."
98 Ryan points this 
out his affidavit and has provided a note written his calendar (attached to his affidavit as Exhibit 
B). However, as presented, this assertion is hearsay. It is an out-of-court statement that does not 
fall within any of the recognized exceptions pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Evidence. 
Plaintiffs argue that Ms. Mead's statement is not hearsay under Idaho Rule of Evidence 
80I(d)(2) because it is an admission of a party opponent. This is incorrect. Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 801(d)(2) requires more than just a statement, the statement must be 
96 Idaho Code§ 6-2103(1)(a). 
<n Id. 
98 Motion, at p.10. 
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[TJhe party's own statement, in either an individual or a representative capacity, 
or (B) a statement of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its 
truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by a party to make a statement 
concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by a party's agent or servant concerning 
a matter within the -scope of the agency or employment of the servant or agent, 
made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement by a co-
conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy:9
9 
Plaintiffs have proffered nothing-that indicates Sherri Mead was speaking as the District's 
representative, that the District manifested agreeance or adopted her statement as truth; or that 
Ms. Mead was authorized to make the statement, was acting within the scope of her agency or 
employment, or was a co-conspirator. Therefore, the Court cannot conclude that Ms. Mead's 
statement regarding Dave Kern's termination is anything but inadmissible hearsay. 
The Court has previously stated that Plaintiffs must provide more than a mere scintilla of 
evidence to make an issue of fact, on the issue of Mr. Kerns' departure or termination they have 
not done so.100 Even if the statement proffered by Plaintiffs was not hearsay, or Plaintiffs had 
obtained an affidavit from Sherri Mead or taken her deposition these would have little bearing on 
the issues presented in this case. Ryan has never asserted that he was fired because Mr. Kerns 
was fired. In his complaint, Ryan did not assert that it was Mr. Kerns who fired him, wrongfully 
or otherwise. Plaintiffs' complaint states, in relevant part: 
On June 30, 2012, [the District] terminated Plaintiffs' employment. The reason 
which [the District] gave for plaintiffs' termination was a pretext The true reason 
and a motivating reason for plaintiffs' terminations was that Plaintiff Ronald 
Ryan Berrett communicated to the District, in good faith, a violation of a law, rule 
or regulation which had been adopted under the law of the state of Idaho.
101 
Therefore, whether Sherri Mead told Ryan that Mr. Kerns was terminated based on something 
Ryan stated at the Board meeting is immaterial to the Court's analysis. 
99 Idaho Rules of Evidence 80l(d)(2). 
100 Van, L47 Idaho at 556,212 P.3d at 986. 
101 Complaint, at Ex. ·C. 
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d. Foul Language 
In its Opinion and Order on the Parties' Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment the Court 
. found that Ryan Berrett referred to Dave Kerns as a "fucking asshole" when confronted 
regarding the Facebook post Upon reconsideration, this finding was in error~ however, it is 
immaterial to the Court's analysis ·and does not change the outcome of the Court's decision at 
summary judgment or upon reconsideration. 
e. School Board's Knowledge of Ryan and Lanie's Termination 
Plaintiffs have asserted that Dave Kerns terminated their employment without the school 
board's knowledge. This is a conclusory assertion raised by the plaintiffs in their Motion to 
Reconsider. Beyond the conclusory statements made in their Motion to Reconsider, Plaintiffs 
have not pointed to any place in the record or their affidavits or anywhere else that supports their 
conclusions. In other words, they have not provided a scintilla of evidence that makes this a 
disputed fact. 102 
Meanwhile, the District has supplied the affidavits of Dave Kerns and Erin Haight-
Mortensen. Mr. Kerns' affidavit states, in relevant part: 
Mr. Berrett's termination had nothing to do with the propane issue. The Distict 
decided to terminate Mr. Berrett following his insubordination and verbal abuse 
directed toward me. In approximately late May or early June, 2012, I was 
contacted by Erin Haight-Mortensen who had seen a derogatory Facebook post 
about me. Ms. Haight-Mortensen provided me with a copy of the Facebook post 
and I placed it in Mr. Berrett's personnel file. It is my understanding that.students 
and parents saw the post and that some students had commented on the post The 
Facebook post was inappropriate and a violation of District Policy. 
At the next meeting with the School Board, I discussed the Facebook post with 
board members and it was determined that because Mr. Berrett was an at-will 
employee that termination was appropriate. 
103 
102 Van, 147 Idaho at 556, 212 P.3d at 986. 
JOJ Kerns Affidavit, at p.5. 
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With regard to Lanie's termination, Mr. Kerns wrote, Because of the repeated inability to 
efficiently run the kitchen, the District made the decision to terminate Ms. Berrett." 
104 
Regarding the Berretts' termination, Ms. Haight-Mortensen stated, "I was involved in the 
decision to terminate Mr. Berrett's employment and can attest that his termination had nothing to 
do with the propane issue. The District decided to terminate Mr. Berrett following Mr. Barrett's 
insubordination and verbal abuse directed towards Mr. Kems."
105 Ms. Haight-Mortensen also 
wrote Lanie's employment was terminated because of her inability to manage the kitchen and 
remain within her budget.
106 
Even if Mr. Kerns had terminated Lanie and Ryan without the school board's approval, 
he had the authority to do so. Ms. Haight-Mortensen indicated that, "Because Mr. Kerns was the 
interim Superintendent, he had authority to terminate Mr. Berrett. He likewise had authority to 
terminate Ms. Berrett."
107 The Court notes that bemg fired or terminated without the approval of 
the school board is not the basis for the Berretts' claims. Nor have Plaintiffs cited a proposition 
of law that would support such a position. 
Instead, Plaintiffs claim they were fired in retaliation for Ryan "blowing the whistle" on 
the problems with the District's propane system, and that their terminations violated Idaho law 
and public policy. However, based on the Court's reasoning and analysis in other sections of this 
opinion, the Court cannot reasonably infer either of the Berretts qualify for protection under the 
Act. Because the Berretts do not qualify for protection under the Act, the Court cannot 
reasonably infer their terminations with, or without, the Board's approval were wrongful. Even if 
the Board's approval was required, Ryan and Lanie have not provided any evidence to support 
104 Kerns Affidavit, at p.6. 
,os Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.S. 
106 Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.6-7. 
107 Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.6. 
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an inference that the Board lacked- knowledge of the terminations. Therefore, the Court may not 
reasonably infer that their terminations were done without the Board's knowledge. In the absence 
of disputed facts, the Court concludes that its decision at summary judgment was appropriate. 
f. Performance Reviews 
Plaintiffs assert the Court's error by arguing "Ryan always received positive performance 
reviews. The first time anyone complained about his performance was the statement in his 
termination letter that he was doing a poor job in his maintenance duties."!08 In his affidavit he 
wrote, "Despite my experience and my always stellar performance evaluations. they denied me 
requested reasonable accommodations and eventually fired me."
109 These statements are 
conclusory and are insufficient to create an issue of material fact. Rather, this statement is 
commentary on the evidence but it is not evidence. The court assumes the fact that he received 
stellar performance reviews for purposes of summary judgment, notwithstanding the facts 
presented by the record. 
The Court notes the inspection reports provided by the District which mention the 
discovery of numerous maintenance violations. At summary judgment the Court recognized 
these stating, "Only a few months before [Ryan's] discharge, the School District's facilities-were 
inspected and numerous maintenance violations were discovered. In fact, some of these 
violations had been noted in the previous two or three inspections and still remained 
unresolved."110 Plaintiffs did not dispute that these violations occurred at summary judgment and 
has not done so in t.lieir Motion to Reconsider. They only assert a lack of complaints regarding 
his job performance prior to his termination. 
108 Motion, at p.7. 
109 Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.315. 
110 Woods Affidavit, at Ex. A. 
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Nonetheless., the Court sets aside the maintenance violations previously relied upon and 
assumes, for purposes of summary judgment, that Ryan "always" received superb performance 
reviews. In light of this assumption, the Court's conclusion remains unchanged. As stated in the 
termination letter provided to Ryan, his employment was terminated because he was 
"insubordinate and verbally abusive to the District administration and ... ridiculed personnel 
through social media on the internet."
111 Ryan does not dispute that he did so and has provided a 
copy of the message he posted as an exhibit to his affidavit. 
112 This reasoning for his termination 
is independent of the propane issue and independent of :ll.is job performance. The Court 
recognizes that even if Ryan always received stellar performance reviews and had never posted 
his grievances or frustrations on social media, this would not preclude his termination because he 
was an at-will employee. 1
13 Ryan has not disputed this. 
Idaho law is very clear regarding at-will employees: ''Unless an employee is hired 
pursuant to a contract which specifies the duration of the employment or limits the reasons why 
an employee may be discharged, the employee is at-will and can be terminated for any reason or 
no reason at all."114 Absent the application of an exception to this general rule, the District did 
not need to provide a reason for Ryan's termination. As-the Court found at summary judgment, 
and reiterates below, the Court cannot reasonably infer that Ryan qualified for protection under 
the Idaho Whistleblower Act. Therefore, as an at-will employee his termination was not 
wrongful. 
Ill Kerns Affidavit, at Ex. A. 
112 Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.315, 323-24. 
113 Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at pS6. 
!!
4 Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Products, 139 Idaho 172, 179, 75 P.3d 733, 740 (2003} (emphasis added). 
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g. Lanie's Lunchroom Budget 
Plaintiffs dispute that Lanie ever exceeded her budget; meanwhile, the District asserts 
that Lanie exceeded her budget in multiple years. Plaintiffs point to Lanie's affidavit and 
attached exhibits to support her assertion. In her affidavit Lanie wrote, "In 2009, when I took 
over as lunchroom supervisor, I stayed within budget."
115 She also wrote, "[A]though we may 
have overspent the budget in a given month, I did- not overspend the Food Service budget in any 
given year."116 
Additionally, Lanie has provided to the "Child Nutrition Financial Report" as ''Exhibit 
A" to her affidavit. Although the Child Nutrition Financial Report shows a ~alanced food 
services budget for the 2009 fiscal year, the data is inconclusive. First, Lanie did not become the 
Food Service Supervisor until May 2009 and it is unclear what time period this report covers.
117 
Second, she has not provided the reports for the remaining years of her tenure as Food Service 
Supervisor. Lanie was the Food Service Supervisor from May 2009 until June 2012.
118 Despite 
asserting that she never exceeded her allotted budget, she has failed to provide evidence for 
2010, 2011, and 2012.11
9 
In direct contradiction of the assertions in her affidavit, Lanie admitted to overspending 
her budget when Defendant's counsel asked about it during her deposition: 
Q. In the second line it says that you have consistently overspent the food service 
budget each year, with the amount increasing each time. That's a true statement? 
A.. Yes, sir, it is. 
Q. You don't dispute that you overspent the food service budget each year, 
correct? 
115 Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.329. 
116 Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.330. 
117 Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.330. 
118 Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.330. 
119 Toe Court also notes that the District has failed to produce reports for these years, although overage figures were
 
provided in the Affidavit of Gayle Woods. 
MEMORDANDUM DECISION ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER Page 25 of 41 
V V 
A. No, I don't. 120 
Plaintiffs have not attempted to reconcile the conflicting statements in Lanie's affidavit 
with her deposition testimony. Nor have they done so in their Motion to Reconsider and 
did not do so when asked by the Court at oral argument. However, this is immaterial to 
the Court's analysis. 
Even assuming Lanie never exceeded her budget, she was an at-will employee.
121 
Plaintiffs have not disputed this fact. As the Court recognized above, "Unless an 
employee is hired pursuant to a contract which specifies the duration of the employment 
or limits the reasons why an employee may be discharged, the employee is at-will and 
can be terminated for any reason or no reason at all."
122 Because Lanie was an at-will 
employee the District could fire Lanie for "any reason or no reason at all." Plaintiffs do 
not assert that Lanie engaged in any activity that would protect her from termination or 
limit the District's ability to terminate her employment. Instead, she asserts protection as 
a matter of public policy because of her husband's activities. However, as the Court 
found at summary judgment, and reiterates below, Ryan, did not qualify for protection 
under the Idaho Whistleblower Act. Therefore, even if the Act, or ldalw public policy, 
provided an exception for the spouse of a whistleblower, the Court cannot reasonably 
infer that Lanie's termination was wrongful because she was an at-will employee and 
because her husband did not engage in protected activity. 
i1.0 Affidavit of Blake G. Hall, Ronald Ryan Berrett and Lani.e Berrett v. Clark County School District No. 161, 
Jefferson County case no. CV-17-0328 (filed August 31, 2017) (hereinafter "Hall Affidavit"), at Ex. B, p. 70: 13 -
P:-71:20. 
21 Kerns Affidavity, at Ex. B. 
122 Edmondson, 139 Idaho at 179, 75 P.3d at 740 (emphasis added). 
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V 
h. Lanie's Performance Eva1uations 
Like Ryan, Lanie asserts that she "always received positive performance evaluations" and 
only a few weeks before her termination ''had received a positive performance evaluation and an 
offer of a raise."12
3 As discussed above, it is undisputed that Lanie was an at-will employee. 
''Unless an employee is hired pursuant to a contract which specifies the duration of the 
employment or limits the reasons why an employee may be discharged, the employee is at-will 
and can be terminated for any reason or no reason at all."
124 Therefore, the District could fire 
Lanie for "any reason or no reason at all." Based on the Court's analysis at summary judgment 
and in other sections of this opinion, Lanie does not qualify for protection from this rule. 
Therefore, the Court cannot reasonably infer that Lanie's termination was wrongful. 
i. Required Forms 
At summary judgment the Court recognized that Lanie failed to submit several state-
required forms during her tenure as lunch room supervisor. The Court reasoned that this was part 
the District's reasoning for firing her. Despite asserting her always positive performance 
evaluations, Lanie never directly disputes her failure to submit these forms. However, even if 
Lanie did not properly submit the forms, it is innnaterial to the Court's additional analysis. 
As stated, Lanie was an at-will employee. Under Idaho law, an at-will employee may •<lJe 
terminated for any reason or no reason at all" absent some exception.
125 The Court has 
previously determined that Lanie did not qualify for protected status. Therefore, as an at-will 
employee, henermination was not wrongful. 
123 Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.330. 
124 Edmondson, 139 Idaho at 179, 75 P.3d at 740 (emphasis added). 
125 Id. (emphasis added). 
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3. The Berretts are not entitled to protection under the Idaho Whistleblower Act, or 
Idaho Public Policy. 
In light of the Court's additional reasoning and analysis regarding the disputed and 
undisputed facts in th.is case, the Court reeval~ates the Berretts' claims for protection under the 
Idaho Whistleblower Act and Idaho public policy. After additional analysis, the Court concludes 
that its decision to grant summary judgment in favor-of the District was appropriate. The Court 
will evaluate each plaintiff's claims for protection individually, beginning with Ryan's. 
a. Ryan 
The Act affords "a legal cause of action for public employees who experience adverse 
action from their employer as a result of reporting waste and violations of a law, rule or 
regulation."126 Protection under the Act is afforded to any employee that "communicates in good 
faith the existence of any waste of public funds, property or manpower, or a violation or 
suspected violation of a law ... under the law of this state or the United States."
127 Therefore, 
more narrowly stated, the issue is whether Ryan reported a violation or suspected violation of a 
law, entitling him to protection under the Act 
Ryan claims that he reported a violation of the law because he reported on the District's 
problem(s) with the propane system. He claims he was discharged in retaliation for making these 
reports. In response to Ryan's claims, the District argues the discharge was not retaliatory and 
has motioned for summary judgment In order to survive summary judgment, the Berretts carry 
"the burden of presenting evidence from which a rational inference of retaliatory discharge under 
126 Idaho Code§ 6-2101. 
127 Idaho Code§ 6-2104(1). 
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the whistleblower act [can] be drawn.''
128 In other words, they must present "a prima facie case 
-ofretaliatory discharge ... .''
129 
A prirna facie case for retaliatory discharge consists of three elements. To survive 
summary judgment the Berretts must establish: (1) Ryan was an employee of the District and 
"engaged or intended to engage in protected activity;" (2) the District "took adverse action: 
against" him; and (3) there is "a causal connection between the protected -activity" and the 
adverse action taken by the District. 
130 These three elements will be discussed in sequence 
below. 
i. Ryan Berrett did not engage, or intend to engage, in protected 
activity. 
It is undisputed that Ryan was an employee of the District. Therefore, in order to satisfy 
this first element, Ryan only needs to establish that he engaged in, or intended to engage in, a 
protected activity.131 Based on the Court's analysis, it cannot reasonably infer that Ryan engaged 
in any protected activity. 
There is very little precedent that may be used to define the scope of "protected 
activities" contemplated under Idaho law. However, as the Act states, it applies to good faith 
communications of "the existence of any waste of public funds, property or manpower, or a 
violation or suspected violation of a law, rule or regulation adopted under the law of this state, a 
political subdivision of thi.s state or the United States."
132 
In this case, Ryan claims that he reported a building code violation and that the report(s) . 
he made became the catalyst for his termination. As the following analysis illustrates, the alleged 




132 Idaho Code§ 6-2103(l)(a). 
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reports Ryan made do not fall within the range of "protected activities" contemplated by the Act. 
Ample evidence indicates the propane odor in the old gymnasium was well known to the District 
in January 2012. It was reported to Ms. Woods, the District's business manager by several staff 
members.133 In tum, Ms. Woods called Ryan to inform him of the problem.
134 Ms. Woods also 
reported the isst1e to Mr. Kerns, the District's superintendent. 
135 Mr. Kerns reported the issue to 
the chairwoman of the Board, Ms. Haight-Mortensen.
136 
As the District's maintenance supervisor, responsibility fell to Ryan, or he was assigned, 
to identify the problem and fix it. 137 The Court cannot reasonably infer otherwise. fu February, 
after becoming aware of the problem, Mr. Berrett made his first report in his monthly letter to the 
Board. Here, the Court again points out it cannot reasonably infer the issue had not already been 
reported to the Board by Mr. Kerns and was not already well known throughout the District and 
the administration. 138 
fu his March letter, Ryan reported on the issue again. This time he described the work he 
had done to identify and fix the problem. He also informed the Board, "I am waiting for a bid 
from sermon [sic] to correct this problem, when I receive it I will give it to MR. KERNS [sic] 
and we will go from there.''139 Ryan claims he later received the bid from Sermon Electric, 
showed it to Mr. Kerns, and was told to "keep quiet" Mr. Kerns disputes that he ever told Ryan 
to "keep quiet." 
133 Woods Affidavit, at p.3 
134 Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.311. 
135 Kerns Affidavit, at p.2. 
136 Haight-Mortensen Affidavit. at p.2. 
137 In Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider, Ryan disputed his responsibility for the propane system but as the Court's 
earlier analysis shows: there is no genuine dispute of fact. It is clear that Ryan was tasked with solving the problem 
the propane system. 
138 Woods Affidavit, at p. 3; Kerns Affidavit, at p.2; Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.3. 
139 Woods Affidavit, at Ex. A, p.28. 
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Although this allegation is suspicious, it is of little -consequence. Even if Ryan was told to 
"keep quiet," the Court cannot reasonably infer there was anything to keep quiet about. The 
school board was already aware of the propane leak. Mr. Kerns had already informed the school 
board's chairwoman, Erin Haight-Mortensen, and Ryan had already begun reporting the problem 
in his letters to tbe Board. He hacf already told the Board that Sermon Electric was preparing a 
price quote for the needed repairs. 140 Based on the affidavits and other evidence supplied, the 
Court cannot reasonably infer that the propane issue was not already known to the District. Nor 
can the Court reasonably infer that the leak was not known to be a building code violation before 
this particular conversation between Ryan and Mr. Kerns occurred. 
This is also supported by additional evidence. As early as February, a technician from 
Sermon Electric began making service calls to the school and was assisting Ryan in resolving the 
propane leak. 141 Ryan reported this in his February letter to the Board. Ryan also enlisted the aid 
of High Planes Propane. 142 It is apparent the School Board knew of this involvement because "it 
approved payment for each of the service calls. "
143 
It is beyond believable that an employee could be charged with solving a problem (even a 
building code or safety violation), provide regular progress reports to his employer, discuss the 
viability of proposed solutions with superiors, and then, after being fired, use those same 
activities to substantiate claim of retaliatory discharge. This is especially true when the employee 
was charged with fixing a problem already known to the employer. 
Certainly, the statute offers protectfon to employees who report "a violation or suspected 
violation of a law" and it is undisputed that the propane leak was a violation of law; however, 
IM> Woods Affidavit, at Ex. A, p.28 
141 Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.311-12. 
142 Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.311. 
143 Woods Affidavit, at p.3. 
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there was nothing to report for purposes of the Act because the District already knew about the 
problem and was working to fix it. Therefore, Ryan has failed to establish that any of the actions 
described above constituted protected activity. 
The Court now looks to Ryan's other actions to determine whether any of these 
reasonably constituted protected activity. First, Ryan claims he appeared at the May 17 school 
board meeting to testify against Mr. Kerns.
144 The notes from the meeting shed a different light 
on his participation. The notes indicate Ryan reported that "the propane issues are still a 
problem."145 From the District's perspective Ryan's participation appears to have been nothing 
more than another progress report on the problem he had been tasked with resolving. 
Ryan asserts that he and two others "were called before the Board and asked one at a time 
if [they] thought that the Superintendent knew that the propane problem could possibly cause 
injury to human life." The court for Summary Judgment assumes this to be true. Regardless, this 
statement supports the conclusion the District already knew about the propane problem and 
acknowledged it Why else would the school board have "called" upon Ryan to discuss the issue 
at all? 
All things considered and drawing reasonable inferences in favor of the Plaintiffs (the 
nonmoving party), the Court cannot reasonably infer that Ryan's participation in the school 
board meeting was protected activity. The District already knew about of the propane leak, Mr. 
Kerns had personally informed the Board of the issue four months before. Ryan had also been 
providing the Board with monthly reports on the is.sue. The Board had also approved payments 
for service calls made by Sermon Electric and High Planes Propane. Again, the Court is left to 
ponder, what else was there to report that might have constituted a protected activity? Even if 
144 Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.314. 
145 Woods Affidavit, at Ex. A. 
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Ryan'·s assertions are true, even if he was called to testify about or against Mr. Kem at the school 
board meeting, what could he have said to qualify him for-protection?· Ryan does not claim he 
was terminated for testifying against Mr. Kerns. He claims he was fired for reporting on the 
propane issue, which was a violation of law. 1
46 
Lastly, the Court discusses the message Ryan posted t-0 Facebook on or about June 18, 
2012. 147 The posted message was critical of the District and its administration. 
148 Although the 
message may have contained a cryptic reference to the propane problem, it more closely 
resembles ~ unfettered rant by a disgruntled employee.
149 It offers nothing that resembles a 
good faith report of "a violation or suspected violation of a law ... :• 
150 Therefore, the Court 
cannot reasonably infer that it constitutes protected activity. 
Because the Court cannot reasonably infer that Ryan engaged in any protected activity, 
summary judgment in favor of the District was appropriate. Nevertheless, for the sake of inquiry, 
the Court continues its analysis of the two remaining elements: (1) adverse action against the 
employee, and (2) a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action. 
b. The District took an adverse- action against Ryan Berrett by terminating his 
employment. 
The second element of a retaliatory discharge claim requires the employee to establish 
the employer took an adverse action against them. Based on the following analysis, the Court 
may reasonably infer the District took adverse action against Ryan. The evidence before the 
Court is that Mr. Berrett's employment was terminated. This fact is,undisputed. 
146 Complaint, Ex. C, at p.7-9. 
147 Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.323-24. 
148 Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.323-24. 
149 Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.323-24. 
ISO Idaho Code§ 6-2104(1). 
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After Ryan posted the aforementioned rant on Facebook, Ms. Haight-Mortensen notified 
Mr. Kerns about the post and requested that he speak to Ryan about it Mr. Kerns then discussed 
tlie Facebook post at the Board's next meeting. During the meeting it was decided that Mr. 
Berrett was an at-will employee and discharge was the appropriate sanction for his conduct. A 
termination letter was then drafted and delivered to-Ryan. The letter, signed by Mr. Kerns, states 
in relevant part: 
You have been insubordinate and verbally abusive to the District administration 
and have ridiculed personnel through social media on the internet. Your 
performance in some duties has been declining as well with building maintenance 
and keeping lights replaced and in working order. Due to your status as an "at-
will", or non-contractual employee, the District administration has decided to 
terminate your employment effective June 30th, 2012.1
51 
The District does not dispute that this letter was delivered, or that Ryan's employment was 
terminated. Because it is undisputed his employment terminated, Ryan has established that the 
District took adverse action against him. 
The Court notes that, for the first time at oral argument, on Plaintiffs' Motion to 
Reconsider, Plaintiffs asserted that the District took additional adverse action against them. 
Plaintiffs asserted that the District raised their rent and eventually evicted them from their 
District owned residence. The Court recognizes these as additional adverse actions and assumes 
them to be true, but the Court has already recognized that, for purposes of summary judgment, 
the District took adverse action against the Plaintiffs. Therefore, the prior related analysis and 
conclusion of the Court is unchanged by these new assertions and summary judgment in favor of 
the School District was still appropriate based on the Court's analysis of the two remaining 
elements. 
151 Kerns Affidavit, at Ex. B. 
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c. There is no causal connection between Ryan Berrett's alleged, protected 
activity and the adverse action taken by the District 
To survive summary judgment on a retaliatory discharge claim, Ryan must also establish 
a causal connection between his alleged, protected activity and the adverse action taken by the 
District. Because Ryan failed to establish that he engaged in a protected activity, there can be no 
causal connection to the adverse action taken by the District. Nevertheless, the Court continues 
its analysis of the final element for the sake of inquiry. Relevant to this inquiry is the "Proximity 
in time between the protected activity and the adverse employment action .... "
152 
As stated, several of the District's other employees and administrators received reports of 
a propane odor in the gymnasium as early as January 2012. Over a period of several months, 
Ryan worked to resolve the issues and provided regular reports to Mr. Kerns and the Board. 
Multiple affidavits and their corresponding exhibits support these facts. It was not until 
approximately four or five months later, after multiple written and verbal reports were provided, 
that Ryan's employment was terminated. This is a significant amount of time, and the Court 
cannot reasonably infer that the adverse action taken against Ryan and the alleged protected 
activity are causally connected. 
Beyond this, Ryan asserts that he attended the May 17 Board meeting and testified 
against Mr. Kerns. Then his employment was terminated roughly six weeks later. Although these 
two events occurred close in time, the temporal relation is immaterial because a claim that Ryan 
w.as terminated for testifying_against Mr. Kerns is not before the Court. Therefore, the Court 
cannot reasonably infer that there a causal connection between the adverse action taken by the 
District and the activities Ryan claims were protected. This is especially true because the District 
152 See Curlee, 148 Idaho at 397,224 P.3d at464 (quoting Heng v. RotechMed.Corp., 688 N.W.2d 389,401, (N.D. 
2004)). 
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was already aware of the propane issue as early as January and Ryan had been providing regular 
reports on the problem months before his termination. 
The Court notes that the Ninth Circuit Court concluded that Ryan's termination was 
sufficiently close in time to the alleged, protected activity to survive summary judgment 
However, the facts now before the Court are different from the facts in the case heard by the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The affidavits filed in this case make it clear the District was 
aware of the building code violation caused by the propane issue as early as January 2012. As the 
Court discussed above, many months passed since Ryan began working on and reporting on the 
propane issue and his termination. Based on this analysis, the Court cannot reasonably infer that 
the two events were close in time or causally connected. Therefore, In other words, the Comt 
properly granted summary judgment in favor of the District and Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider 
should be denied as to the wrongful termination claim. 
4. As a matter of public policy, Lanie Berrett does not qualify for protection under the 
Act as the spouse of a whistleblower. 
As a matter of public policy, Lanie Berrett claims that she qualifies for protection from a 
retaliatory discharge as the spouse of a whistleblower. However, based on the Court's prior 
analysis, it cannot reasonably infer that Ryan Berrett failed to establish that he was a 
whistleblower under the Act or was the subject of a retaliatory discharge. Because Ryan does not 
qualify for protected status under the Act, Lanie cannot claim protection as his spouse. Even if 
Ryan had established a case retaliatory discharge, Lanie would still not be entitled to protection 
for two reasons. First, under established law, spouses of employees are unprotected by both the 
Act and public policy. Second, the Court cannot reasonably infer that her termination is causally 
connected to any protected activity. 
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a. Spouses of Employees are Unprotected 
Spouses of employees who engage in protected activity are not protected under the Act or 
any related Idaho law or policy. The Idaho Whistleblower Act provides a "cause of action for 
public employees who experience adverse action from their employer as a result of reporting 
waste and violations of a law, rule or regulation." 153 Lanie Berrett asserts that as a matter of 
public policy, she is entitled to protection. However, the Court will not adopt this conclusion. 
The language of the Act specifically allows relief for "employees." It makes n0 reference 
to, or allowance for, spouses of employees.154 The Court is unwilling to read words into the 
statute that were not included by the legislature. Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has not 
previously extended protection to an employee's spouse as a matter of public policy and the 
Court is unwilling to do so now. ''Even if a cause of action for damages should exist as relief for 
alleged retaliatory discharge in contravention of public policy based upon conduct of the 
employee's spouse ... the dearth of evidence in this case fails ... " to support a reasonable 
inference that Lanie's spouse was entitled to protection under the act, or that her termination was 
causally connected to any of his allegedly protected activities.155 
Plaintiffs have argued that this Court should extend whistleblower protection to spouses 
of eligible employers. Plaintiffs have made valid arguments as to why this would be appropriate; 
however, in considering these arguments the Court notes that the whistleblower statute's latest 
version was enacted by the legislature in 1994. It is not a statute that is over fifty, or even one 
hundred, years old with a chariging and evolving population. The court also notes the specific 
language of the statute says, "employee." 
153 Idaho Code§ 6-2101 (emphasis added). 
154 See id. 
155 Edmondson, l 39 Idaho at 179, 75 P.3d at 740 (emphasis added). 
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This Court consistently applies statutes as written and it is not persuaded that this is a 
situation where an exception or an addition to the statute is appropriate as a matter of public 
policy. If the Idaho legislature desires to extend protection to spouses of employees under the 
whistleblower statute it may do so. This court is not persuaded that it should enlarge the 
protection already made available by the legislature. The Idaho legislature may do so if it 
believes such protection is appropriate. 
b. Lanie's Termination is not Causally Connected 
Even if relief were available based upon the conduct of an employee's spouse as a matter 
of public policy, summary judgment is still appropriate because Lanie has not established that 
her termination is causally connected to any protected activity (even the activity asserted by her 
husband). As discussed, the Berretts must establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge to 
survive summary judgment. 156 Such a claim requires three elements: (1) the employee engaged 
in a protected activity, (2) the employer took adverse action against the employee, and (3) the 
adverse action was causally connected to the protected activity. 157 
Lanie does not assert that she engaged in protected activity; rather, she relies on her 
husband's claim that he engaged in protected activity. The Court previously decided that it could 
not reasonably infer Ryan had engaged in protected activity. The Court emphasizes that even if 
he had, neither the act nor Idaho public policy extends protection to spouses of employees who 
engaged in protected activity. 
The second element requires an adverse action against the employee. If the Act made 
allowance for spouses of employees, Lanie could establish this element. Her rent was increased, 
her employment was terminated, and she was evicted from her residence. Therefore, for purposes 
156 Curlee, 148 Idaho at 397, 224 P.3d at 464. 
1s1 Id. 
MEMORDANDUM DECISION ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER Page 38 of 41 
V 
of summary judgment, the Court may reasonably infer that adverse action was taken against 
Lanie. 
However, the Court cannot reasonably infer Lanie qualifies for protection under the Act 
because her termination is causally connected to .any protected activity. Lanie has not asserted 
that she engaged in any protected activity. Instead, she asserts that her termination is causally 
connected to her husband's activities. 
As stated, ''Proximity in time between the protected activity and the adverse employment 
action ... '' is relevant to determining whether the two are causally connected.158 As discussed 
above, months passed between Lanie's termination and Ryan's allegedly protected activity. 
During this period, Ryan was constantly updating the school board on his progress. The Board 
also called on Ryan to discuss the propane issue at the May 17 Board meeting.159 Based on this 
and the Court's analysis in other sections of this opinion, the Court cannot reasonably infer that 
Lanie's termination was causally connected to any protected activity. As a result, the Court 
cannot reasonably infer that Lanie's termination was in retaliation for any protected activity 
(either her own or her spouses). As a result, the Court properly granted summary judgment in 
favor of the District on Plaintiffs' claim for retaliatory discharge. Plaintiffs' Motion to 
Reconsider should be denied. 
5. Remaining Claims 
As to the remaining federal law claims, listed in the complaint, which were not addressed 
by the parties in the original Summary Judgment Motion and in the Courts prior Opinion and 
Order on Parties' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court grants the Plaintiffs' Motion 
158 See id. (quoting Heng v. Rotech Med.Corp., 688 N.W.2d 389,401, (N.D. 2004)). 
159 This provides additional evidence that the District knew about and acknowledged the propane problem. 
MEMORDANDUM DECISION ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER Page 39 of 41 
V 
to Reconsider. As the Plaintiffs correctly point out, they should be allowed to address those 
issues through pleading and argument 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Court orders as follows: 
1- Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider the decision on Plaintiffs' Whistleblower/Retaliation 
Claims is DENIED. 
2- Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider the decision on Plaintiffs' Disability Discrimination 
claims is GRANTED. 
3- Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider the decision on Plaintiffs' Fair Housing Act claims is 
GRANTED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this ~ruary 2018. 
~ 
District Judge 
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No Known Address
[  ] By E-mail    [  ] By mail    
[  ] By fax (number)    
[  ] By overnight delivery / FedEx    
[  ] By personal delivery
Clark County School District No 161
No Known Address
[  ] By E-mail    [  ] By mail    
[  ] By fax (number)    
[  ] By overnight delivery / FedEx    
[  ] By personal delivery
Blake G Hall
1075 S Utah Avenue Ste 150
Idaho Falls ID  83402
[  ] By E-mail    [  ] By mail    
[  ] By fax (number)    
[  ] By overnight delivery / FedEx    
[  ] By personal delivery
Jacob Scott Wessel
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls ID  83404
[  ] By E-mail    [  ] By mail    
[  ] By fax (number)    
[  ] By overnight delivery / FedEx    
[  ] By personal delivery
Dated: 11/02/2018
Colleen Poole
Clerk of the Court
By: Denise Criddle
Deputy Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON
Case No. CV-2017-328Ronald Ryan Berrett, Lanie Berrett 
 vs.
 Clark County School District No. 161 Clerk’s Certificate of Service
I, Denise Criddle, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, of the State 
of Idaho, in and for the County of Jefferson, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing 
Record in the above entitled cause was electronically compiled at my direction, and is a true, full 
and correct Record of the pleadings and documents as requested by the parties. 
  
I further certify that I have caused to be served the Clerk's Record and  Reporter's Transcript (if 
requested), along with copies of  all Exhibits offered or admitted;  No Exhibits submitted; 
 Pre-sentence Investigation, or  Other Confidential Documents; or  Confidential Exhibits 
(if applicable) to each of the Attorneys of Record or Parties in this case as follows:
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Jacob Scott Wessel wessel@thwlaw.com [X] By E-mail
Blake G. Hall bgh@hasattorneys.com [X] By E-mail
Ronald Ryan Berrett
No Known Address
[  ] By E-mail    [  ] By mail    
[  ] By fax (number)    
[  ] By overnight delivery / FedEx   
[  ] By personal delivery
Lanie Berrett
No Known Address
[  ] By E-mail    [  ] By mail    
[  ] By fax (number)    
[  ] By overnight delivery / FedEx   
[  ] By personal delivery
Clark County School District No 161
No Known Address
[  ] By E-mail    [  ] By mail    
[  ] By fax (number)    
[  ] By overnight delivery / FedEx   
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Blake G Hall
1075 S Utah Avenue Ste 150
Idaho Falls ID  83402
[  ] By E-mail    [  ] By mail    
[  ] By fax (number)    
[  ] By overnight delivery / FedEx   
[  ] By personal delivery
Jacob Scott Wessel
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls ID  83404
[  ] By E-mail    [  ] By mail    
[  ] By fax (number)    
[  ] By overnight delivery / FedEx   
[  ] By personal delivery
Dated: ______________ Colleen Poole
Clerk of the Court
By: Denise Criddle
Deputy Clerk
